NOVICIO V. PEOPLE (CRIMINAL)

The settled rule is that the determination of whether or not the accused acted in SELF-DEFENSE, complete or incomplete, is a factual issue. And equally entrenched is the legal aphorism that factual findings of the trial court and its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its conclusions anchored on its findings are acccorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the CA. The exception is when it is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case.

We have reviewed the records of the RTC and the CA and we find no justification to deviate form the trial court's findings and its conclusion. we find that the petitioner has not adequately discharged his burden of proving the elements of self-defense.

It is petitioner's postulation that the lone gunshot wound of Mario does not establish intent to kill. However, the number of wounds inflicted is not the sole consideration in proving intent to kill. In Adame v. CA, a single gunshot wound was inflicted on the victim but this Court convicted the accused therein of frustrated homicide. Just like in Adame, it is worth stressing that petitioner used a gun in this case, and, if not for Mario's act of shoving the table at him, petitioner could have fired a second shot. Furthermore, the nature and location of the would should also be considered. The doctor's positive testimony was that the wound sustained by Mario could cause death if left untreated. In fact, the first hospital to which Mario was brought could not fully cater to the medical treatment required, and Mario had to be transferred to the Center. This Court has repeatedly held that if the victim's wound would normally cause death, then the last act necessary to produce homicide would have been performed and death would have resulted were it not for the timely medical attention given to the victim.

MAGALANG V. CA (LABOR)

Established is the rule that when a decision becomes final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court will have the power to review the said judgment. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation and will set to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality. We have further stresses in prior cases that just as the losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision.

LUCES V. DAMOLE (ADMINISTRATIVE, CRIMINAL)

Also known as swindling, ESTAFA is committed by any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned in the RPC. Specifically, the elements of estafa through misappropriation or conversion are (1) that the money, goods, or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under ant other obligation involving the duty to deliver or return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

As to the PO cards covered by Trust Receipt No. 4103, the prosecution sufficiently established that they were used by petitioner herself and her relatives as evidenced by the copies of the PO cards they actually used bearing their names. Although there was no prohibition for petitioner to use or for her relatives to purchase the PO cards, they should have paid the corresponding price, and petitioner should have remitted the proceeds to the private complainant. There being no adequate explanation why she personally used and allowed her relatives to use the cards, there is ample circumstantial evidence for estafa. Using the PO cards as owner is conversion.

The essence of estafa under Article 315 par. 1(b) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the prejudice of the owner. The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without a right.

LU V. LU (REMEDIAL)

Under the Rules of Court, the proper mode to challenge such an order, which undoubtedly is interlocutory, is through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. This procedural defect, therefore, bars the Court from ruling on the propriety of such admission. We cannot take cognizance of proceedings before the RTC unless they are brought before us through the proper mode of review. To be sure, the Urgent Motion cannot be a substitute for the remedy of a special civil action for certiorari. Consequently, the amended complaint admittedly by the RTC stands.

With the issue of admission of the amended complaint resolved, the question of whether or not the original complaint should have been dismissed was mooted. Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that an amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. In this case, the orignal complaint was deemed withdrawn from the records upon the admission of the amended complaint.

It is settled that courts do not entertain a moot question. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value. This Court, therefore, abstains from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for.

To reiterate, the trial court's decision on the merits rendered the issue on the propriety of the injunction moot and academic, notwithstanding the fact that said decision has been appealed to the CA. Courts are called upon to resolve actual cases and controversies, not to render advisory opinions.

It is true that we have held in a number of cases that the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving the case. Courts will still decide cases otherwise, moot and academic if: first, there is grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

However, not one of the enumerated exceptions obtains in the instant case. Thus, a denial of the instant petition is warranted.

The Court had, in the past, laid down the test in determining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation by ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, the money claim being only incidental to or merely a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

In the current controversy, the main purpose of the complaint filed before the RTC was the annulment of the issuance of the LLDC shares of stocks because they had been allegedly issued for less than their par value. Thus, David sought the dissolution of the corporation and the appointment of receivers/management committee. To be sure, the annulment of the shares, the dissolution of the corporation and the appointment of receivers/management committee are actions which do not consist in the recovery of a sum of money. If in the end, a sum of money or real property would be recovered, it would simply be the consequence of such principal action. Therefore, the case before the RTC was incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since David paid the docket fees for an action the subject of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, as computed by the clerk of Court, the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Even assuming that the subject in the instant case is capable of pecuniary estimation, still the case should not be dismissed because the insufficiency of the fees actually paid was belatedly raised; David relied on the assessment made by the Clerk of Court; and if there is a deficiency, it may instead be considered a lien on the judgment that may hereafter be rendered.

While it is true that this Court had previously dismissed complaints for non-payment of docket fees, as in the early case of Manchester, these cases uniformly involved bad faith on the part of the plaintiff, such that the correct amount of damages claimed was not specifically stated. The Court, in such cases, concluded that there was bad faith on the part of the complainant and a clear intent to avoid payment of the required docket fee, thus, the dismissal of the case was warranted.

It may be recalled that despite the payment of insufficient fees, this Court refrained from dismissing the complaint/petition in IBC-13 v. Alonzo-Legasto, Yambao v. CA, and Ayala Land v. Carpo. In those cases, the inadequate payment was caused by the erroneous assessment made by the Clerk of Court. In IBC-13, we declared that the payment of the docket fees, as assessed, negates any imputation of bad faith to the respondent or any intent of the latter to defraud the government. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the respondent, and there was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply. In Yambao, this Court concluded that petitioners cannot be faulted for their failure to pay the required docket fees, for, given the prevailing circumstances, such failure was clearly not a dilatory tactic or intended to circumvent the Rules of Court. In Ayala Land, the Court held that despite the jurisdictional nature of the rule on payment of docket fees, the appellate court still had the discretion to relax the rule in meritorious cases.

In the instant case, David paid the docket fees as assessed by the Clerk of Court. Even if the amount was insufficient, fraud and bad faith cannot be attributed to David to warrant the dismissal of his complaint. Consistent with the principle of liberality in the interpretation of the Rules, in the interest of substantial justice, this Court had repeatedly refrained from dismissing the case on the ground alone. Instead, it considered the deficiency in the payment of the docket fees as a lien on the judgment which must be remitted to the Clerk of Court of the court a quo upon the execution of the judgment.

It has been consistently held that there is no power, the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case than the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action of the defendant and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it.

LANDBANK V. SPOUSES ORILLA (REMEDIAL)

EXECUTION OF A JUDGMENT PENDING APPEAL is governed by Section 2(a) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in the special order after due hearing. As provided above, execution of the judgment or final order pending appeal is discretionary. As an exception to the rule that only a final judgment may be executed, it must be strictly construed. Thus, execution pending appeal should not be granted routinely but only in extraordinary circumstances.

The Rules of Court does not enumerate the circumstances which would justify the execution of the judgment or decision pending appeal. However, we have held that "good reasons" consist of compelling or superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages suffered should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment or final order. The existence of good reasons is what confers discretionary power on a court to issue a writ of execution pending appeal. These reasons must be stated in the order granting the same. Unless they are divulged, it would be difficult to determine whether judicial discretion has been properly exercised.

In this case, do good reasons exist to justify the grant by the SAC of the motion for execution pending appeal? The answer is a resounding YES.

The expropriation of private property under RA 6657 is a revolutionary kind of expropriation being a means to obtain social justice by distributing land to the farmers, envisioning freedom from the bondage to the land they actually till. As an exercise of police power, it puts the landowner, not the government, in a situation where the odds are practically against him. He cannot resist it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the property taken by the government. As expected, the landowner will exercise this right to the hilt, subject to the limitation that he can only be entitled to "just compensation." Clearly therefore, by rejecting and disputing the valuation of the DAR, the landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just compensation.

The SAC found that the valuation made by the petitioner, and affirmed by DAR, was unjustly way below the fair valuation of the landholding at the time of its taking by the DAR. The SAC, mindful also of the advanced age of the respondents at the time of the presentation of evidence for the determination of just compensation, deemed it proper to grant their motion for execution pending appeal with the objective of ensuring "prompt payment" of just compensation.

Contrary to the view of the petitioner, "prompt payment" of just compensation is not satisfied by the mere deposit with any accessible bank of the provisional compensation determined by it or by the DAR, and its subsequent release to the landowner after compliance with the legal requirements.

The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also payment within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.

LAM V. METROBANK (CIVIL)

It is settled that the issuance of a WRIT OF POSSESSION to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial act. After the consolidation of title in the buyer's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, entitlement to the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a ministerial function. It is undisputed that herein petitioners failed to redeem the property within the redemption period and thereafter, ownership was consolidated in favor of herein respondent and a new certificate of title was issued in its name. Thus, it was a purely ministerial duty for the trial court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the herein respondent upon the latter's filing of a petition.

As to the nature of a petition for a writ of possession, it is well to state that the proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is EX PARTE and summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard.

By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding authorized under Act No 3135 as amended.

It is not strictly a judicial process as contemplated in Article 433 of the Civil Code. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit in court, by which one party "sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong."

The law does not require that a petition for a writ of possession may be granted only after documentary and testimonial evidence shall have been offered to and admitted by the court. As long as a verified petition states the facts sufficient to entitle the petitioner to the relief requested, the court shall issue the writ prayed for. The petitioner need not offer any documentary or testimonial evidence for the court to grant the petition.

The fact the the Spouses Law were allowed to actively participate in the proceedings for the said case, by filing an Answer and going through pre-trial and mediation, was a glaring procedural anomaly that the court a quo had inexcusably abetted. We cannot allow the erring court a quo to use that same aberration as an excuse for a continuing defiance of the law and jurisprudence that defines a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession as a non-litigious ex parte proceeding that does not require the participation of the mortgagor.

IN RE PENAFLOR (ADMINISTRATIVE)

CLERKS OF COURT are important functionaries of the judiciary. Their administrative functions are vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice. their office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes, and concerns. They perform a very delicate function as custodian of the court's funds, revenues, records, property, and premises. They are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction, or impairment of such funds and property. They are specifically imbued with the mandate to safeguard the integrity of the court as well as the efficiency of its proceedings, to preserve respect for and loyalty to it, to maintain the authenticity or correctness of court records, and to uphold the confidence of the public in the administration of justice. thus, they are required to be persons of competence, honesty, and probity.

GOMA V. PAMPLONA (LABOR)

Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

ARTICLE 280. REGULAR AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT - The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be REGULAR where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagements of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be CASUAL if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, any employee who has rendered at least 1 year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.

Simply stated, REGULAR EMPLOYEES are classified into: regular employees by nature of work; and regular employees by years of service.

Respondent is engaged in the management of the Pamplona Plantation as well as in the operation of tourist resorts, hotels, inns, etc. Petitioner, on the other hand, was engaged to perform carpentry work. His services were needed for a period of 2 years until such time that the respondent decided not to give him work assignment anymore. Owing to his length of service, petitioner because a regular employee, by operation of law.

Respondent argues that even assuming that petitioner can be considered an employee, he cannot be classified as a regular employee, but merely as a project employee whose services were hired only with respect to a specific job and only while that specific job existed.

A PROJECT EMPLOYEE is assigned to carry out a special project or undertaking the duration and scope of which are specified at the time the employee is engaged in the project. A project is a job or undertaking which is distinct, separate, and identifiable from the usual or regular undertakings of the company. A project employee is assigned to a project which begins and ends at determined or determinable times.

The principal test used to determine whether employees are project employees as distinguished from regular employees, is whether or not the employees were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration or scope of which was specified at the time the employees were engaged for the project. In this case, apart from respondent's base allegation that petitioner was a project employee, it had not shown that petitioner was informed that he would be assigned to a specific project or undertaking. Neither was it established that he was informed of the duration and scope of such project or undertaking at the time of his engagement.

More important of all, based on the records, respondent did not report the termination of petitioner's supposed project employment to the DOLE. Department Order No. 19 requires employers to submit a report of any employee's termination tot eh nearest public employment office everytime the employment is terminated due to a completion of a project. Respondent's failure to file termination reports, particularly on the cessation of petitioner's employment, was an indication that the petitioner was not a project, but a regular employee.

As to the question of whether petitioner was illegally dismissed, we answer in the affirmative.

Well established is the rule that regular employees enjoy SECURITY OF TENURE and they can only be dismissed for just cause and with due process, i.e., after notice and hearing. In cases involving an employee's dismissal, the burden is on the employer to prove that the dismissal was legal. This burden was not amply discharged by the respondent in this case.

Obviously, petitioner's dismissal was not based on any of the just or authorized causes enumerated under the Labor Code. After working for the respondent for a period of 2 years, petitioner was shocked to find out that he was not given any work assignment anymore. Hence, the requirement of substantive due process was not complied with.

Apart from the requirement that the dismissal of an employee be based on any of the just or authorized causes, the procedure laid down in the Implementing Rules must be followed. Failure to observe the rules is a violation of the employee's right to procedural due process.

In view of the non-observance of both substantive and procedural due process, in accordance with the guidelines outlined by this Court in Agabon v. NLRC, we declare that petitioner's dismissal form the employment is illegal.

Having shown that petitioner is a regular employee and that his dismissal was illegal, we now discuss the propriety of the monetary claims of the petitioner. An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable; and (2) backwages.

In the instant case, we are prepared to concede the impossibility of the reinstatement of petitioner considering that his position or any equivalent position may no longer be available in view of the length of time that this case has been pending. Moreover, the protracted litigation may have seriously abraded the relationship of the parties so as to render reinstatement impractical. Accordingly, petitioner may be awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

FIGUEROA V. PEOPLE (CIVIL)

The Court, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should however be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. ESTOPPEL BY LACHES, to bar a litigant from asserting the court's absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.

Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not duffer any harm.

Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of estoppel by laches unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforces, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes. In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their Cavalry once more after more or less 15 years. The same, however, does not obtain in this instant case.

We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely - only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great case and the equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction is null an void for want of jurisdiction.

FERRER V. OMBUDSMAN (ADMINISTRATIVE)

FIRST. Under Rule II, Section 2 of Admin Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), the investigating officer, upon evaluation of the complaint, shall recommend whether it may be:

1. dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
2. referred to respondent for comment;
3. endorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;
4. forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;
5. referred for administrative adjudication; or
6. subjected to a preliminary investigation.

Therefore, the prerogative as to whether or not a complaint may be given due course belongs exclusively to the Office of the Ombudsman, through its assigned investigation officer, who in this case was GIO Gruta. Concurring with the recommendation of Gio Ginez-Jabalde to dismiss the complaint, similarly approved by then Ombudsman Desierto, does not necessarily indicate that Gio Gruta did not exercise her independent judgment in this case in concluding that the complaint lodged by petitioner lacks merit. To conduct a preliminary investigation when deemed unnecessary as the same issues being raised had already been resolved would be superfluous.

As regards petitioner's allegation of denial of his right to due process, it should be remembered that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given an opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

SECOND. Petitioner posits that the Office of the Ombudsman erred in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to investigate charges of violation of RA 5487 (Private Security Agency Law) for purposes of determining the probable criminal liability of respondents who were officials of NFA. This is erroneous.

The jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute criminal cases pertains to violations of RA 3019, RA 1379, RA 6713, Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 of the Revised Penal Code, and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to office.

On the other hand, in RA 5487, it is the Philippine National Police that exercises general supervision over the operation of all private detective and watchman security guard agencies. It has the exclusive authority to regulate and to issue the required licenses to operate security and protective agencies. In this case, in the absence of a declaration form the PNP that a violation of the said law was committed by Metroguard and DASIA, the act of the NFA officials in awarding the security service contracts to the said agencies after a showing that their bids were the most advantageous to the government is presumed to be valid.

Verily, the Court has almost always adopted and quite aptly, a POLICY OF NON-INTERFERENCE in the exercise of the Ombudsman's constitutionally mandated powers. The Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a complaint outright without going through a preliminary investigation. To insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as RA 6770, saw it fit to endow that office with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers, virtually free from legislative, executive, or judicial intervention. If the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his judgment call.

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION is an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism, No such circumstance obtains in this case.

FERMIN AND TUGAS V. PEOPLE (CRIMINAL)

A LIBEL is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.

To say that the article, in its entirety, is not libelous disturbs one's sensibilities; it would certainly prick one's conscience. There is evident imputation of the crime of malversation, or vices or defects for being fugitives from the law. and of being a wastrel. The attribution was made publicly, considering that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation. The victims were identified and identifiable. More importantly, the article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainants.

Petitioner claims that there was no malice on her part because allegedly, the article was merely a fair and honest comment on the fact that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez was issued a warrant of arrest for her conviction for estafa before Judge Palattao's court.

It can be gleaned form her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make defamatory imputations against complainants. Thus, petitioner cannot, by simply making a general denial, convince us that there was no malice on her part. Verily, not only was there malice in law, the article being malicious in itself, but there was also malice in fact, as there was motive to talk ill against complainants during the electoral campaign.

Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of public interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious, or unrelated to a public officer's performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. While complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers such as petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives.

In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the conviction of petitioner for libel should be upheld.

With respect to the penalty to be imposed for this conviction, we note that the Court issued on 25 January 2008, Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 entitled Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases. The circular expresses a preference for the imposition of a FINE rather than imprisonment, given the circumstances attendant in the cases cited therein in which only a fine was imposed by the Court on those convicted of libel. It also states that, if the penalty imposed is merely a fine but the convict is unable to pay the same, the RPC provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should apply.

However, the Circular likewise allows the court, in the exercise of sound discretion, the option to impose imprisonment as penalty, whenever the imposition of a fine alone would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice.

ESTINOZO V. CA (REMEDIAL)

Immediately apparent is that the petition is the wrong remedy to question the appellate court's issuances. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the CA may file a verified petition for review on certiorari. Considering that, in this case, appeal by certiorari was available to petitioner, she effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a special civil action for certiorari, a limited form of review and a remedy of last resort, which lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The nature of the questions of law intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence. It may well be that those questions of law will treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or final order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The remedy is appeal, not certiorari as a special civil action.

Even granting arguendo that the instant certiorari petition is an appropriate remedy, still this Court cannot grant the writ prayed for because we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA in the challenged issuances. The rule as it stands now without exception, is that the 15-day reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, except in cases before this Court, as one of the last resort, which may, in its sound discretion grant the extension requested.

It is well to point out that with petitioner's erroneous filing of a motion for extension of time and with her non-filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review from the CA's decision, the challenged decision has already attained finality and may no longer be reviewed by this Court. The instant Rule 65 petition cannot even substitute for the lost appeal - certiorari is not a procedural device to deprive the winning party of the fruits of the judgment in his or her favor. When e decision becomes final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court will have the power to review the said judgment. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation and this will set to naught the main role of the courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.

We reiterate what we state din Amatorio v. People, that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure.

As a final note, we remind party-litigants and their lawyers to refrain from filing frivolous petitions for certiorari. The 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of Section 8 of Rule 65, as amended by AM No. 07-7-12-SC, now provide that:

x x x

However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under Rules 139 and 139-B of the Rules of Court.

The Court may impose motu proprio based on RES IPSA LOQUITOR, other disciplinary sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.

EAGLE V. REPUBLIC (REMEDIAL)

The body of the pleading or complaint determines the nature of an action, not its title or heading. This is because the complaint must contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action and specify the relief sought. Although denominated as an Action for Annulment of Judgment and Cancellation of Decree and Titles, the complaint is not an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, but a case for cancellation of void titles.

ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT is a remedy against a final and executory judgment. Therefore, a necessary allegation in the complaint would be that there was in fact a judgment that has been issued by the trial court, which judgment has become final. Here, the Complaint does not contain any averment to such effect. On the contrary, the Complaint consistently mentions that the Medina Decision, upon which OCT No. 129 was issued, is a fake document. From the allegations in the Complaint, it is evident that the action is mainly for the declaration of nullity of the certificated of title issued as a result of the fake court decision. This is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence, the RTC properly assumed jurisdiction.

The principle of INDEFEASIBILITY OF A TORRENS TITLE does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title. The Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. as such, a title issued based on void documents may be annulled. Moreover, elementary is the rule that prescription does not run against the State and its subdivisions.

Case law has it that he who alleges that he is a purchaser in good faith and for value of registered land bears the onus of proving such statement. This burden is not discharged by involving the ordinary presumption of good faith. Petitioner failed to discharge this burden.

Indeed, the general rule is that a purchaser may rely on what appears on the face of a certificate of title. He may be considered a purchaser in good faith even if he simply examines the latest certificate of title. An exception to this rule is when there exist important facts that would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man to go beyond the present title and to investigate those that preceded it. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor as appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated as innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith, hence, does not merit the protection of the law.

Moreover, petitioner is a corporation engaged in the real estate business. A corporation engaged in the buying and selling of real estate is expected to exercise a higher standard of case and diligence in ascertaining the status and condition of the property subject of its business transaction. Similar to investment and financing corporations, it cannot simply rely on an examination of a Torrens certificate to determine what the subject property, looks like as its condition is not apparent in the document.

DIZON V. CTA (TAX, REMEDIAL)

FIRST ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA and the CA gravely erred in allowing the admission of the pieces of evidence which were not formally offered by the BIR.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Under Section 8, RA 1125, the CTa is categorically described as a court of record. As cases filed before it are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases. Indubitably, no evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on documentary evidence require that these documents be formally offered before the CTA.

While the CTA is not governed strictly by technical rules of evidence, as rules of procedure are not ends in themselves ans are primarily intended as tools in the administration of justice, the presentation of the BIR's evidence is not a mere procedural technicality which may be disregarded considering that it is the only means by which the STA may ascertain and verify the truth of BIR"s claims against the Estate. BUR's failure to formally offer these pieces of evidence, despite CTA's directives, is fatal to its cause. such failure is aggravated by the fact that not even a single reason was advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal omission. This we take against BIR.

SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the CTA in the latter's determination of the deficiency estate tax imposed against the Estate.

Verily, this involves the construction of Section 79 of the NIRC, which provides for the allowable deductions from the gross estate of the decedent. The specific question is whether the actual claims of the creditors may be fully allowed as deductions from the gross estate of the decedent despite the fact that the said claims were reduced or condoned through compromise agreements entered into by the Estate with its creditors.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE as allowable deductions from the gross estate are basically a reproduction of the deductions allowed under the NIRC, and which was the first codification of Philippine tax laws, which in turn, were based on the federal tax laws of the US. Thus, pursuant to established rules of statutory construction, the decisions of US courts construing the federal tax code are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of our own tax laws.

We express our agreement with the DATE-OF-DEATH VALUATION RULE, made pursuant to the ruling of the US SC in Ithaca Trust co. v. US.

First, there is no law, nor do we discern any legislative intent in our tax laws, which disregards the date-of-death valuation principle and particularly provides that post-death developments must be considered in determining the net value of the estate. It bears emphasis that tax burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statute expressly and clearly imports, tax statutes being construed strictly against the government. Any doubt on whether a person, article, or activity is taxable is generally resolved against taxation.

Second, such construction finds relevance and consistency in our rules on Special Proceedings wherein the term "claims" required to be presented against a decendent's estate is generally construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime, or liability contracted by the deceased before his death.

Therefore, the claims existing at the time of death are significant to, and should be made the basis of, the determination of allowable deductions.

DEL PILAR ACADEMY V. DEL PILAR ACADEMY UNION (LABOR)

Issue: Whether or not the Union is entitled to collect agency fees from non-union members, and if so whether an individual written authorization is necessary for a valid check off.

The collection of AGENCY FEES in an amount equivalent to union dues and fees, from employees who are not union members, is recognized by Article 248(e) of the Labor Code. When so stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement or authorized in writing by the employees concerned, the Labor code and its Implementing Rules recognize it to be the duty of the employer to deduct the sum equivalent to the amount of union dues, as agency fees, from the employee's wages for direct remittance to the union. The system is referred to as CHECK OFF. No requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is necessary if the non-union employees accept the benefits resulting from the CBA.

Del Pilar admitted failure to deduct the agency fees from the salaries of non-union employees, but justifies the non-deduction by the absence of individual written authorization. It posits that Article 248(e) is inapplicable considering that its employees derived no benefits from the CBA. The annual salary of its employee is a benefit mandated by law, and not derived from the CBA - this argument cannot be sustained.

Contrary to what Del Pilar wants to portray, the grant of annual salary increase is not the only provision in the CBA that benefited the non-union employees. The union negotiated teaching hour limitations, additional compensation for overload units, payment of longevity pay, etc. These provisions in the CBA surely benefited the non-union employees, justifying the collection of and the union's entitlement to agency fees.

Accordingly, no requirement of written authorization for the non-union employees is needed to effect a valid check off. Article 248(e) makes it explicit that Article 241(o), requiring written authorization is inapplicable to non-union employees, especially in this case where the non-union employees receive several benefits under the CBA.

CRISOLOGO V. TRABAJO (JUDICIAL ETHICS)

It is settled that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.

However, the judge's inexcusable failure to observe the basic laws and rules will render them administratively liable. When the law is so simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith cosntitutes gross ignorance of the law. In any case, to constitute GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, it is not enough that the subject decision, order, or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law anf jurisprudence but most importantly, such decision, roder, or act must be attended by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations, are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.

The allowance of disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. There is no doubt that she acted in good faith and denied the motion for intervention because it would only cause delay, to the prejudice of the original parties, the civil case which had already been pending for almost a decade. Under the rules on intervention, these are valid considerations in allowing or disallowing. There is no showing that respondent judge was motivated by any ill-will in denying the conplainant's motion for intervention; hence, she could not be sanctioned.

Complainant erroneously thought that when respondent failed to act on his notice of appeal, le lost his right to appeal the court's order denying his motion for intervention and that his only remedy was to file a peition for certiorari with the CA which he in fact, did. He failed to consider that a party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him, upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time and upon payment of the docket fees. The notice of appeal does not require the approval of the court. The function of the notice of appeal is merely to notify the trial court that the appellant was availing of the right to appeal and not to seek the court's permission that he be allowed to pose an appeal.

CONGREGATION OF THE RELIGIOUS V. OROLA (CIVIL)

As uniformly found by the lower courts, we likewise find that there was a perfected contract of sale between the parties. A CONTRACT OF SALE carries the correlative duty of the seller to deliver the property and the obligation of the buyer to pay the agreed price. As there was already a binding contract of sale between the parties, RVM had the corresponding obligation to pay the remaining balance of the purchase price upon the issuance of the title in the name of respondents. The supposed 2-year period within which to pay the balance did not affect the nature of the agreement as a perfected contract of sale.

The absence of fraud and bad faith by RVM notwithstanding, it is liable to respondents for interest. RVM breached the contract of sale by refusing to pay the balance of the purchase price despite the transfer to respondents' names of the title to the property. The 2-year period RVM relies on had long passed and expired, yet, it still failed to pay. It did not even attempt to pay respondents the balance of the purchase price after the case was filed, to amicably end this litigation.

Lastly, to obviate confusion, the clear language of Article 1191 mandates that damages shall be awarded in either case of fulfillment or rescission of the obligation. In this regard, Article 2210 of the Civil Code is explicit that "interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract." The ineluctable conclusion is that the CA correctly imposed interest on the remaining balance of the purchase price to cover the damages caused the respondents by RVM's breach.

CHUA GAW V. CHUA (REMEDIAL)

If there was an error committed by the RTC in ascribing to the petitioner the respondent's testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel, it constitutes a harmless error which would not, in any way, change the result of the case.

In civil cases, that burden devolves upon the plaintiff who must establish her case by preponderance of evidence. The rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's evidence. Thus, it barely matters who with a piece of evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to consider the entirety of the evidence presented by both parties. Preponderance of evidence is then determined by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, culled from the evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.

A party who calls his adversary as a witness, therefore, is not bound by the latter's testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on. A rule that provides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him. This, the petitioner failed to do.

All parties to the case, therefore, are considered bound by the favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence. In arriving at a decision, the entirety of the evidence presented will be considered, regardless of the party who offered them in evidence. In this light, the more vital consideration is not whether a piece of evidence was properly attributed to one party, but whether it was accorded the apposite probative weight by the court. The testimony of an adverse witness is evidence in the case and should be given its proper weight, and such evidence becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach the witness or contradict his testimony.

The BEST EVIDENCE RULE as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to account for the original Moreover, production of the original may be dispensed with in the trial court's discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.

Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant case. Here, there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The petitioner never even denied their due execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition.

BPI V. ROYECA (CIVIL, REMEDIAL)

The petition is partly meritorious.

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Thus, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment.

In Jimenez v. NLRC, the Court elucidated on who, between the plaintiff and defendant, has the burden to prove the affirmative defense of payment:

"As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.

When the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence contained in the record, the burden of proving that it has been extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such a defense to the claim of the creditor. Where the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence - as distinct from the general burden of proof - shifts to the creditor, who is then under a duty of producing some evidence to show non-payment. "

Petitioner insists that the respondents did not sufficiently prove the alleged payment. It avers that under the law and existing jurisprudence, DELIVERY OF CHECKS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PAYMENT.

Respondents on the other hand, postulate that they have established payment of the amount being claimed by the petitioner and unless the petitioner proves that the checks have been dishonored, they should not be made liable to pay the obligation again.

The divergence in this conflict of opinions can be narrowed down to the issue of whether the ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT was sufficient proof of payment. As correctly observed by the RTC, this is only proof that respondents delivered 8 checks in payment of the amount due. Apparently, this will not suffice to establish actual payment.

Settled is the rule that PAYMENT MUST BE MADE IN LEGAL TENDER. A check is not legal tender and therefore, cannot constitute a valid tender of payment. Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment. Mere delivery of checks does not discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the payment by commercial document is actually realized.

Because of the failure of respondents to present sufficient proof of payment, it was no longer necessary for the petitioner to prove non-payment, particularly proof that the checks were dishonored. The burden of evidence is shifted only if the party upon whom it is lodges was able to adduce preponderant evidence to prove its claim.

Further, it should be noted that the petitioner, as payee, did not have a legal obligation to inform the respondents of the dishonor of the checks. The respondents therefore cannot fault the petitioner for not notifying them of the non-payment of the checks because whatever rights were transgressed by such omission belonged only to the petitioner.

The creditor's possession of the evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not been discharged by payment. A promissory note in the hands of the creditor is a proof of indebtedness rather than proof of payment. In an action for REPLEVIN by a mortgagee, it is prima facie evidence that the promissory note has not been paid. Likewise, an uncanceled mortgage in the possession of the mortgagee gives rise to the presumption that the mortgage debt is unpaid.

Finally, the respondents posit that the petitioner's claim is barred by laches since it has been 3 years since the checks were issued. We do not agree. Laches is a recourse in equity. Equity however, is applied only in the absence, never in contravention of statutory law. Thus, laches cannot, as a rule, abate a collection suit files within the prescriptive period mandated by the New Civil Code. The petitioner's action was files within the 10-year prescriptive period provided under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code. Hence, there is no room for the application of laches.

AYSON V. PARAGAS (REMEDIAL)

It must be remembered that in EJECTMENT suits, the issue to be resolved is merely the physical possession over the property, i.e., possession de facto and not possession de jure, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by the party-litigants. Should the defendant in an ejectment case raise the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. The judgment rendered in such an action shall be conclusive only with respect to physical possession and shall in no wise bind the title to the realty or constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication of the merits on the issue of ownership. Therefore, such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting the title or ownership over the property, which action was precisely resorted to by respondent-spouses in this case.

The Deed of Absolute Sale is in reality, an equitable mortgage or a contract of loan secured by a mortgage. Article 1602 of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which a contract, purporting to be a sale, is considered only as a contract of loan secured by a mortgage, to wit:

1. when the price of the sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;
2. when the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
3. when upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or grating a new period is executed;
4. when the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price; when the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
5. in any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.

In this case, the evidence before the RTC had established that the possession of the subject property remained with respondent-spouses despite the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. In fact, testimonies during the trial showed that petitioner and his predecessors never disturbed the possession of the respondent-spouses until the filing of the ejectment case.

An equitable mortgage is a voidable contract. As such, it may be annulled within 4 years from the time the cause of action accrues. This case, however, not only involves a contract resulting from fraud, but covers a transaction ridden with threat, intimidation, and continuing undue influence which started when petitioner's adoptive father, Felix's superior, practically bullied respondent-spouses into signing the Deed of Absolute Sale under threat of incarceration. Thus, the 4-year period should start from the time the defect in the consent ceases. The complaint was filed well within the 4-year prescriptive period.

Regarding the finality of the adjudication of physical possession in favor of petitioner, it may be reiterated that the right of possession is a necessary incident of ownership. This adjudication of ownership of the property to respondent-spouses must include the delivery of possession to them since the petitioner has not shown a superior right to retain possession of the land independently of his claim of ownership which is herein rejected. Verily, to grant execution of the judgment in the ejectment case would work an injustice on respondent-spouses who had been conclusively declared the owners and thus, right possessors of the disputed land.

ARMA V. MONTEVILLA (JUDICIAL ETHICS)

A perusal of the records shows that the evidence adduced by the complainant is not sufficient to warrant disbarment.

DISBARMENT is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the former establishes its case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. The dubious character of the act done, as well as the motivation thereof, must be clearly demonstrated.

In this case, the complainant failed to discharge this burden. In addition, the complainant failed to refute the fact alleged by the respondent that the complaint is a vindictive charge of a stubborn client against her counsel who refused to extrajudicially execute a monetary judgment in order not to jeopardize honesty and loyalty to the other clients. It must be noted, likewise, that this Court affords protection not only to the aggrieved clients but also to members of the bar who are at times, maliciously charged.

However, it is worthy to note that respondent indeed fell short of her duty of meticulously ensuring that all pleadings are properly filed and served on the concerned parties. Atty. Montevilla was remiss when she passed on he filing of her Motion to Withdraw as Counsel to her client. Because of this negligence, the Motion to Withdraw was belatedly filed, and the eventual Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC decision was resultantly file out of time, thus, causing the dismissal of the complainant's case before the NLRC.

Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if through it, the end desired of reforming the errant lawyer is possible.

In this case, the negligence of the respondent is not so gross as to justify removal from the legal profession. that there is no material damage to the complainant may be considered as a mitigating circumstance and this being Atty, Montevilla's first offense, she should be entitled to some measure of forbearance. A penalty other than disbarment may satisfactorily forewarn the respondent and other members of the bar to be more cautious and diligent in the practice of their profession.

ACCESSORIES SPECIALIST V. ALABANZA (LABOR)

Petitioners aver that the action of the respondents for the recovery of unpaid wages, separation pay, and the 13th month pay has already prescribed since the action was filed almost 5 years from the time Jones severed his employment from ASI. Jones files his resignation on 31 October 1997, while the complaint before the La was instituted on 29 September 2002. Petitioners contend that the 3-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code had already set in, thereby barring all of respondent's money claims arising from their employer-employee relationship.

Based on the findings of fact of the LA, it was ASI which was responsible for the delay in the institution of the complaint. When Jones filed his resignation, he immediately asked for the payment of his money claims. However, the management of ASI promised him that he would be paid immediately after the claims of the rank-and-file employees had been paid. Jones relied on this representation. Unfortunately, the promise was never fulfilled even until the time of Jones' death.

In light of these circumstances, we can apply the principle of PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL, which is a recognized exception to the 3-year prescriptive period enunciated in Article 291 of the Labor Code.

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL may arise from the making of a promise, even though without consideration,

1. if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon, as in fact it was relied upon, and
2. if a refusal to enforce it would virtually sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice.

Promissory estoppel presupposes the existence of a promise on the part of one against whom estoppel is claimed. the promise must be plain and unambiguous and sufficiently specific so that the court can understand the obligation assumed and enforce the promise according to its terms.

In order to make out a claim of promissory estoppel, a party bears the burden of establishing the following elements: a promise was reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance; such promise did, in fact, induce such action or forbearance; and the party suffered detriment as a result.

All the requisites of promissory estoppel are present in this case. Jones relied on the promise of ASI that he would be paid as soon as the claims of all rank-and-file employees had been paid. If not for this promise that he had held on to until the time of his death, we see no reason why he would delay filing the complaint before the LA. Thus, we find ample justification not to follow the prescriptive period imposed under Article 291 of the Labor Code. Great injustice will be committed if we will brush aside the employee's claims on a mere technicality, especially when it was petitioner's own action that prevented respondent from interposing the claims within the required period.

Petitioners argue that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their appeal for failure to post the complete amount of the bond. They assert that they cannot post an appeal bond due to financial incapacity. They say that strict enforcement of the NLRC rules of procedure that appeal bond shall be equivalent to the monetary award is oppressive and would have the effect of depriving petitioners of their right to appeal.

Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, the posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the LA.

The filing of a bond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Non-compliance therewith renders the decision of the LA final and executory. This requirement is intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal. It is intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay or evade their obligation to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims.

Furthermore, we would like to reiterate that appeal is not a constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege. Thus, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements for perfecting an appeal must as a rule, be strictly followed.

The propriety of the monetary award of the LA is already binding upon this Court. Petitioners' failure to perfect their appeal in the manner and period required by the rules makes the award final and executory. Just as a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision.

SALVADOR V. MAPA (CONSTITUTIONAL, CRIMINAL, REMEDIAL)

Commenting on the petition, respondents argued that the petition suffers from a procedural infirmity which warrants its dismissal. they claimed that the PCGG availed of the wrong remedy in elevating the case to the SC.

Though captioned as a Petition for Review on Certiorari, we will treat this petition as one filed under Rule 65 since a reading of its contents reveals that petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman for dismissing the complaint. The averments in the complaint, not the nomenclature given by the parties, determine the nature of the action. In previous ruling, we have treated differently labeled actions as special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for reasons such as justice, equity, and fair play.

The issue of prescription has long been settled by this Court in the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto where the Court explained that the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense. This is now a well-settled doctrine which the court has applied in subsequent cases involving the PCGG and the Ombudsman.

Since the prescriptive period commenced to run on the date of the discovery of the offenses, ans since discovery could not have been made earlier than 8 October 1992, the date when the Committee was created, the criminal offenses allegedly committed by the respondents had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed on 14 October 1996.

Even the Ombudsman in its Manifestation and Motion conceded that the prescriptive period commenced on the date the Committee discovered the crime, and not from the date the loan documents were registered with the RD.

Likewise, we cannot sustain the Ombudsman's declaration that Administrative Order 13 and Memorandum 61 violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws for ostensibly inflicting punishment upon a person for an act done prior to their issuance and which was innocent when done.

The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption is in favor of constitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. Even this Court does not decide a question of constitutional dimension, unless that question is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.

Further, where petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality, we had the occasion to state that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in declaring unconstitutional the subject administrative and memorandum orders.

In any event, we hold that Administrative Order 13 and Memorandum Order 61 are not ex post facto laws.

An EX POST FACTO law has been defined as one

1. which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action;
2. which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed;
3. which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed;
4. which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

1. that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or
2. that which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.

The subject administrative and memorandum orders do not come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions.

Memorandum Order 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order 13 and Memorandum Order 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is therefore no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto.

PASRICHA V. DON LUIS DISON REALTY (REMEDIAL, CIVIL, CORPORATION)

We uphold the capacity of respondent company to institute the ejectment case. Although the SEC suspended and eventually revoked respondent's certificate of registration on 16 February 1995, records show that it instituted the action for ejectment on 15 December 1993. Accordingly, when the case was commenced, its registration was not yet revoked. Besides, as correctly held by the appellate court, the SEC later set aside its earlier orders of suspension and revocation of respondent's certificate, rendering the issue moot and academic.

UNLAWFUL DETAINER cases are summary in nature. In such cases, the elements to be proved and resolved are the fact of lease and the expiration or violation of its terms. Specifically, the essential requisites or unlawful detainer are:

1. the fact of lease by virtue of a contract, express or implied;
2. the expiration or termination of the possessor's right to hold possession;
3. withholding by lessee of possession of the land or building after the expiration or termination of the right to possess;
4. letter of demand upon the lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and
5. the filing of the action within 1 year from the date of the last demand received by the defendant.

It is undisputed that petitioners and respondents entered into 2 separate contracts of lease involving 9 rooms. Records likewise show that respondent repeatedly demanded that petitioners vacate the premises, but the latter refused to heed the demand; thus, they remained in possession of the premises.

What was clearly established by the evidence was petitioners' non-payment of rentals because ostensibly, they did not know to whom payment should be made. However, this did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they were not without any remedy. They should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code on consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader.

CONSIGNATION shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of the judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation on other cases.

In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced the effect of payment of the rentals. The rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not imputable to him. Tender of payment must be accompanied by consignation on order that the effect of payment may be produced.

INTERPLEADER is proper whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest in whole or in part is not disputed by claimants, he may bring an action against conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.

Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or the right to collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability.

Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making payments.

Moreover, Article 1673 of the Civil Code gives the lessor the right to judicially eject the lessees in case of non-payment of the monthly rentals. A contract of lease is a consensual, bilateral, onerous, and commutative contract by which the owner temporarily grants the use of his property to another, who undertakes to pay the rent therefor. For failure to pay the rent, petitioners have no right to remain in the leased premises.