RULE ON EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS

SECTION 1. APPLICABILITY OF THE RULE - Unless otherwise provided, this Rule shall govern the examination of child witnesses who are victims of crime, accused of a crime, and witnesses to crime. It shall apply in all criminal proceedings and non-criminal proceedings involving child witnesses.

SECTION 3. CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULE - This Rule shall be liberally construed to uphold the best interests of the child and to promote maximum accommodation of child witnesses without prejudice to the constitutional rights of the accused.

SECTION 4. DEFINITIONS -

(a) A "child witness" is any person who at the time of giving testimony is below 18. In child abuse cases, a child includes one over 18 but is found by the court as unable to fully take care of himself or protect himself form abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.

(c) "Facilitator" means a person appointed by the court to pose questions to a child.

(d) "Record regarding a child" or record means any photograph, videotape, audiotape, film, handwriting, typewriting, electronic recording, computer data or printout, or other memorialization, including any court document, pleading, or any copy or reproduction of any of the foregoing that contains the name, description, address, school, or any other personal identifying information about a child or his family and that is produced or maintained by a public agency, private agency, or individual.

(f) A "support person" is a person chosen by the child to accompany his to testify at or attend a judicial proceeding or deposition to provide emotional support for him.

(g) "Best interest of the child" means the totality of the circumstances and conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to his physical, psychological, and emotional development. It also means the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the child.

(i) "In-depth investigative interview" or "disclosure interview" as an inquiry or proceeding conducted by duly trained members of a multidisciplinary team or representatives of law enforcement or child protective services for the purpose of determining whether child abuse has been committed.

SECTION 6. COMPETENCY - Every child witness is presumed qualified to be a witness. However, the court shall conduct a competency examination of a child, motu proprio or on motion of a party, when it finds that substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court.

(b) BURDEN OF PROOF - To rebut the presumption of competence enjoyed by a child, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging his competence.

(c) PERSONS ALLOWED AT COMPETENCY EXAMINATION - Only the following are all lowed to attend a competency examination:

1. the judge and necessary court personnel;


2. the counsel for the parties;


3. the guardian ad litem;


4. one or more support persons for the child; and


5. the defendant, unless the court determines that competence can be fully evaluated in his absence.

(d) CONDUCT OF EXAMINATION - Examination of a child as to his competence shall be conducted only by the judge. Counsel for the parties, however, can submit questions to the judge that he may, in his discretion, ask the child.

SECTION 7. OATH OR AFFIRMATION - Before testifying, a child shall take an oath or affirmation to tell the truth.

SECTION 8. EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS - The examination of a child witness presented in a hearing or any proceeding shall be done in open court. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.

The party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem of such child witness may, however, move that the court allow his to testify in the manner provided in this Rule.

SECTION 9. INTERPRETER FOR CHILD -

(a) When a child does not understand the English or Filipino language or is unable to communicate in said languages due to his developmental level, fear, shyness, disability, or other similar reason, an interpreter whom the child can understand and who understands the child may be appointed by the court, motu proprio or upon motion, to interpret for the child.

(b) If a witness or member of the family of the child is the only person who can serve as an interpreter for the child, he shall not be disqualified and may serve as the interpreter of the child. The interpreter however, who is also a witness, shall testify ahead of the child.

(c) An interpreter shall take an oath of affirmation to make a true and accurate interpretation.

SECTION 10. FACILITATOR TO POSE QUESTIONS TO CHILD -

(a) the court may, motu proprio or upon motion, appoint a facilitator if it determines that the child is unable to understand or respond to questions asked. the facilitator may be a child psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker, guidance counselor, teacher, religious leader, parent, or relative.

(b) If the court appoints a facilitator, the respective counsels for the parties shall pose questions to the child only through the facilitator. The questions shall either be in the words used by counsel, or if the child is not likely to understand the same, in words that are comprehensible to the child and which convey the meaning intended by counsel.

(c) the facilitator shall take an oath or affirmation to pose questions to the child according to the meaning intended by counsel.

SECTION 11. SUPPORT PERSONS -

(a) A child testifying at a judicial proceeding or making a deposition shall have the right to be accompanied by one or two persons of his own choosing to provide him emotional support.

1. Both support persons shall remain within the view of the child during his testimony.


2. One of the support persons may accompany the child to the witness stand, provided the support person does not completely obscure the child form the view of the opposing party, judge, or hearing officer.


3. The court may allow the support person to hold the hand of the child or take other appropriate steps to provide emotional support to the child in the course of the proceedings.


4. The court shall instruct the support persons not to prompt, sway, or influence the child during his testimony.

(b) If the support person chosen by the child is also a witness, the court may disapprove the choice if it is sufficiently established that the attendance of the support during the testimony of the child would pose a substantial risk of influencing or affecting the content of the testimony of the child.

(c) If the support person who is also a witness is allowed by the court, his testimony shall be presented ahead of the testimony of the child.

SECTION 13. COURTROOM ENVIRONMENT - To create a more comfortable environment for the child, the court, may, in its discretion, direct and supervise the location, movement, and deportment of all persons in the courtroom including the parties, their counsel, child, witnesses, support persons, guardian ad litem, facilitator, and court personnel. The child may be allowed to testify from a place other than the witness chair. The witness chair or other place from which the child testifies may be turned to facilitate his testimony but the opposing party and his counsel must have a frontal or profile view of the child during the testimony of the child. The witness chair or other place from which the child testifies may also be rearranged to allow the child to see the opposing party and his counsel, if he chooses to look a t them, without turning his body or leaving the witness stand. The judge need not wear his judicial robe.

Nothing in this section or nay other provision of law, except official in-court identification provisions shall be construed to require a child to look at the accused.

Accommodations for the child under this section need not be supported by a finding of trauma to the child.

SECTION 19. MODE OF QUESTIONING - The court shall exercise control over the questioning of children so as to (1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth; (2) ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child; (3) protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment; and (4) avoid waste of time.

The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.

SECTION 20. LEADING QUESTIONS - The court may allow leading questions in all stages of examination of a child if the same will further the interests of justice.

SECTION 22. CORROBORATION - Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a child. his testimony, if credible by itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to the standard of proof required in criminal and non-criminal cases.

SECTION 23. EXCLUDING THE PUBLIC - When a child testifies, the court may order the exclusion form the courtroom of all persons, including members of the press, who do not have a direct interest in the case... The court may motu proprio exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced during trial is of such character as to be offensive to decency or public morals.

SECTION 25. LIVE-LINK TELEVISION TESTIMONY IN CRIMINAL CASES WHERE THE CHILD IS A VICTIM OR A WITNESS -

(a) The prosecutor, counsel, or the guardian ad litem may apply for an order that the testimony of the child be taken in a room outside the courtroom and be televised to the courtroom by a live-link television.

Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this section, he shall consult the prosecutor or counsel and shall defer to the judgment of the prosecutor or counsel regarding the necessity of applying for an order. In case the guardian ad litem is convinced that the decision of the prosecutor or counsel regarding not to apply will cause the child serious emotional trauma, he himself may apply for the order.

The person seeking such an order shall apply at least 5 days before trial date, unless the court finds on the record that the need for such an order was not reasonably foreseeable.

(b) The court may motu proprio hear and determine, with notice to parties, the need for taking the testimony of the child through live-link television.

(c) The judge may question the child in chambers, or in some comfortable place other than the courtroom, in the presence of the support person, guardian ad litem, prosecutor, and counsel for the parties. the questions of the judge shall not be related to the issues at trial but to the feelings of the child about testifying in the courtroom.

(d) The judge may exclude any person, including the accused, whose presence or conduct causes fear to the child.

(e) The court shall issue an order granting or denying the use of live-link television and stating the reasons therefor. It shall consider the following factors:

1. The age and level of development of the child;


2. His physical and mental health, including any mental or physical disability;


3. Any physical, emotional, or psychological injury experienced by him;


4. The nature of the alleged abuse;


5. Any threats against the child;


6. His relationship with the accused or adverse party;


7. His reaction to any prior encounters with the accused in court or elsewhere;


8. His reaction prior to trial when the topic of testifying was discussed with him by parents or professionals;


9. Specific symptoms of stress exhibited by the child in the days prior to testifying;


10. Testimony of expert or lay witnesses;


11. The custodial situation of the child and the attitude of the members of his family regarding the events about which he will testify; and


12. Other relevant factors, such as court atmosphere and formalities of court procedure.

(f) The court may order that the testimony of the child be taken by live-link television if there is a substantial likelihood that the child would suffer trauma from testifying in the presence of the accused, his counsel or the prosecutor as the case may be. the trauma must be of a kind which would impair the completeness or truthfulness of the testimony of the child.

(g) If the court orders the taking of testimony by live-link television:

1. The child shall testify in a room separate from the courtroom in the presence of the guardian ad litem; one or both of his support persons; the facilitator and interpreter, if any; a court officer appointed by the court; persons necessary to operate the closed-circuit television equipment, and other persons whose presence is determined by the court to be necessary to the welfare and well-being of the child;


2. The judge, prosecutor, accused, and counsel for the parties shall be in the courtroom. the testimony of the child shall be transmitted by live-link television into the courtroom for viewing and hearing by the judge, prosecutor, counsel for the parties, accused, victim, and the public unless excluded.


3. If it is necessary for the child to identify the accused at trial, the court may allow the child to enter the courtroom for the limited purpose of identifying the accused, or the court may allow the child to identify the accused by observing the image of the latter on a television monitor.


4. The court may set other conditions and limitation on the taking of the testimony that it finds just and appropriate, taking into consideration the best interests of the child.

(h) The testimony of the child shall be preserved... which shall be made part of the court record and shall be subject to a protective order as provided in Section 31 (b).

SECTION 27. VIDEOTAPE DEPOSITION -

(a) The prosecutor, counsel, or guardian ad litem may apply for an order that a deposition be taken of the testimony of the child and that it be recorded and preserved on videotape. Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this section, he shall consult with the prosecutor or counsel subject to pars. 2 and 3 of Section 25(a).

(b) If the court finds that the child will not be able to testify in open court at trial, it shall issue an order that the deposition of the child be taken and preserved by videotape.

(c) The judge shall preside at the videotaped deposition of a child. Objections to deposition testimony or evidence, or parts thereof, and the grounds for the objection shall be stated and shall be ruled upon at the time of the taking of deposition. The other persons who may be permitted to be present at the proceeding are:

1. the prosecutor;


2. the defense counsel;


3. the guardian ad litem;


4. the accused subject to subsection (e);


5. other persons whose presence is determined by the court to be necessary to the welfare and well-being of the child;


6. one or both of his support persons, the facilitator and interpreter, if any;


7. the court stenographer; and


8. persons necessary to operate the videotape equipment.

SECTION 28. HEARSAY EXCEPTION IN CHILD ABUSE CASES - A statement made by a child describing any act or attempted act of child abuse, not otherwise admissible under the hearsay rule, may be admitted in evidence in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding subject to the following rules:

(a) Before such hearsay statement may be admitted, its proponent shall make known to the adverse party the intention to offer such statement and its particulars to provide him a fair opportunity to object. If the child is available, the court shall, upon motion of the adverse party, require the child to be present at the presentation of the hearsay statement for cross-examination by the adverse party. When the child is unavailable, the fact of such circumstance must be proved by the proponent.

(b) In ruling on the admissibility of such hearsay statement, the court shall consider the time, content, and circumstances thereof which provide sufficient indicia of reliability. It shall consider the following factors:

1. whether there is motive to lie;


2. the general character of the child;


3. whether more than one person heard the statement;


4. the timing of the statement and the relationship between the declarant child and witness;


5. cross-examination could not show the lack of knowledge of the declarant child;


6. the possibility of faulty recollection of the declarant child is remote; and


7. the circumstances surrounding the statement are such that there is no reason to suppose the declarant child misrepresented the involvement of the accused.

(c) The child witness shall be considered unavailable under the following situations:

1. is deceased, suffers from physical infirmity, lack of memory, mental illness, or will be exposed to severe psychological injury; or
2. is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means.

(d) when the child witness is unavailable, his hearsay testimony shall be admitted only if corroborated by other admissible evidence.

SECTION 30. SEXUAL ABUSE SHIELD RULE -

(a) INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE - The following evidence is not admissible in any criminal proceeding involving alleged child sexual abuse:

1. evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior; and
2. evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged victim.

(b) EXCEPTION - Evidence of specifil instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim to prove that a person other than the accused was the sourse of semen, injury, or other physical evidence shall be admissible.

SECTION 33. EFFECTIVITY - 15 December 2000.

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPOSIBILITY

Promulgated 21 June 1998

CHAPTER I. THE LAWYER AND THE SOCIETY

CANON 1. A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes.
CANON 2. A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity, and effectiveness of the profession.

CANON 3. A lawyer, in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified, and objective information or statement of facts.

CANON 4. A lawyer shall participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice.

CANON 5. A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating the law and jurisprudence.

CANON 6. These canons shall apply to lawyers in government services in the discharge of their tasks.

CHAPTER II. THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

CANON 7. A lawyer shall at all times, uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.
CANON 8. A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
CANON 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

CHAPTER III. THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS

CANON 10. A lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court.
CANON 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
CANON 12. A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
CANON 13. A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

CHAPTER IV. THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT

CANON 14. A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.
CANON 15. a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealing and transactions with his clients.
CANON 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
CANON 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18. A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
CANON 19. A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
CANON 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
CANON 21. A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated.
CANON 22. A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstance.

THE RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

The Rules on Electronic Evidence shall apply to cases pending after their effectivity. These Rules shall take effect on 1 August 2001.

RULE 1
COVERAGE

SECTION 1. SCOPE - Unless otherwise provided herein, these Rules shall apply whenever an electronic document or electronic data message, as defined in Rule 2 hereof, is offered or used in evidence.

SECTION 2. CASES COVERED - These Rules shall apply to all civil actions and proceedings, as well as quasi-judicial and administrative cases.

RULE 2
DEFINITION AND CONSTRUCTION

SECTION 1. DEFINITION OF TERMS -


e. "Digital signature" refers to an electronic signature consisting of a transformation of an electronic document or an electronic data message using an asymmetric or public cryptosystem such that a person having the initial untransformed electronic document and the signer's public key can accurately determine:

• whether the transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to the signer's public key; and


• whether the initial electronic document had been altered after the transformation was made.

h. "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols, or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, stored, processed, retrieved, or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message".

j. "Electronic signature" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in electronic form, representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedure employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating, signing, or approving an electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, an electronic signature included digital signatures.

k. "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.

SECTION 2. CONSTRUCTION - These Rules shall be liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination of cases.

The interpretation of these Rules shall also take into consideration the international origin of RA 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act.

RULE 3
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

SECTION 1. ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS AS FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF PAPER-BASED DOCUMENTS - Whenever a rule of evidence refers to the term writing, document, record, instrument, memorandum, or any other form of writing, such term shall be deemed t o include an electronic document as defined in these Rules.

SECTION 2. ADMISSIBILITY - An electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these Rules.

SECTION 3. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION - The confidential character of a privileged communication is not lost solely on the ground that it is in the form of an electronic document.

RULE 4
BEST EVIDENCE RULE

SECTION 1. ORIGINAL OF AN ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT - An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.

SECTION 2. COPIES OF EQUIVALENT OF THE ORIGINALS - When a document is in 2 or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by the other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicated shall not be admissible to the same extent as the original if:

1. A genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or
   
2. In the circumstances, it would be unjust or inequitable to admit the copy in lieu of the original.

RULE 5
AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

SECTION 1. BURDEN OF PROVING AUTHENTICITY - The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.

SECTION 2. MANNER OF AUTHENTICATION - Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:

1. By evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;


2. By evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the SC or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or


3. By other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

SECTION 3. PROOF OF ELECTRONICALLY NOTARIZED DOCUMENT - A document electronically notarized in accordance with the rules promulgated by the SC shall be considered as a public document and proved as a notarial document under the Rules of Court.

RULE 6
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES

SECTION 1. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE - an electronic signature or a digital signature authenticated in the manner prescribed hereunder is admissible in evidence as the functional equivalent of the signature of a person on a written document.

SECTION 2. AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES - an electronic signature may be authenticated in any of the following manner:

1. By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish a digital signature and verify the same;


2. By any other means provided by law; or


3. By any other means satisfactory to the judge as establishing the genuineness of the electronic signature.

SECTION 3. DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES - Upon the authentication of an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that:

1. The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;


2. The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of authenticating or approving the electronic document to which it is related or to indicate such person's consent to the transaction embodied therein'


3. The methods or processes utilized to affix or verify the electronic signature operated without error or fault.

SECTION 4. DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS RELATING TO DIGITAL SIGNATURES - Upon the authentication of a digital signature,it shall be presumed, in addition to those mentioned in the immediately preceding section, that:

1. The information contained in a certificate is correct;


2. The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate;


3. No cause exists to render a certificate invalid or revocable;


4. The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the time it was signed; and


5. a certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein.

RULE 7
EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

SECTION 1. FACTORS FOR ASSESSING EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT - In assessing the evidentiary weight of an electronic document, the following factors may be considered:

1. The reliability of the manner or method in which it was generated, stored, or communicated, including but not limited to input and output procedures, controls, tests, and checks for accuracy and reliability of the electronic data message or document, in the light of all the circumstances as well as any relevant agreement;
2. The reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified;
3. The integrity of the information and communication system in which it is recorded or stored, including but not limited to the hardware and computer programs or software used as well as programming errors;
4. The familiarity of the witness or the person who made the entry with the communication and information system;
5. The nature and quality of the information which went into the communication and information system upon which the electronic data message or electronic document was based;
6. Other factors which the court may consider as affecting the accuracy or integrity of the electronic documents or electronic data message.

SECTION 2. INTEGRITY OF AN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEM - In any dispute involving the integrity of the information and communication system in which an electronic document or electronic document data message is recorded or stored, the court may consider, among others, the following factors:

1. Whether the information and communication system or other similar device was operated in a manner that did not affect the integrity of the electronic document, and there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the information and communication system;
2. Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored by a party to the proceedings with interest adverse to that of the party using it; or
3. Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by a person who is not a party to the proceedings and who did not act under the control of the party using it.

RULE 8
BUSINESS RECORDS AS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE

SECTION 1. INAPPLICABILITY OF THE HEARSAY RULE - A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by electronic, optical, or other similar means at or near the time of or from transmission or supply of information by a person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the regular course of conduct of a business activity, and such was the regular practice to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation by electronic, optical, or similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witnesses, is excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence.

SECTION 2. OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION - The presumption provided for in Section1 of this Rule may be overcome by evidence of the untrustworthiness of the course of information or the method or circumstances of the preparation, transmission, or storage thereof.

RULE 9
METHOD OF PROOF

SECTION 1. AFFIDAVIT EVIDENCE - All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary weight of an electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiant or based on authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to testify on the matters contained therein.

SECTION 2. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEPONENT - The affiant shall be made to affirm the contents of the affidavit in open court and may be cross-examined as a matter of right by the adverse party.

RULE 11
AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC, VIDEO, AND EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE

SECTION 1. AUDIO, VIDEO, AND SIMILAR EVIDENCE - Audio, photographic, and video evidence of events, acts, or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented, or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained, or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.

SECTION 2. EPHEMERAL ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS - Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. In the absence or unavailability of such witnesses, other competent evidence may be admitted.

A recording of the telephone conversation or ephemeral electronic communication shall be covered by the immediately preceding section.

If the foregoing communications are recorded or embodied in an electronic document, the the provisions of Rule 5 shall apply.

THE RULE ON WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

SECTION 1. HABEAS DATA - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to one person whose right to privacy in life, liberty, or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

SECTION 2. WHO MAY FILE - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

1. Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children, and parents; or
2. Any ascendant, descendant, or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

SECTION 3. WHERE TO FILE - RTC where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected, or stored, at the option of the petitioner.

The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of government offices.

SECTION 4. WHERE RETURNABLE; ENFORCEABLE - When the writ is issued by an RTC or any judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge.

When issued by the CA or Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any RTC of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected, or stored.

When issued by the SC or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the CA or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any RTC of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected, or stored.

The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

SECTION 5. DOCKET FEES - No docket fees shall be required from an indigent petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be docketed and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to subsequent submission of proof of indigency not later than 15 days from filing thereof.

SECTION 6. PETITION - A verified petition for a writ of habeas data should contain:

1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the resident;
2. The manner the right to privacy is violated of threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty, or security of the aggrieved party;
3. the actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
4. The location of the files, registers, or databases, the government office, ans the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information if known;
5. The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression, or destruction of the data base or information of flies kept by the respondent.
   
   In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and
   
6. Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.

SECTION 7. ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT - Upon filing of the petition, the court, justice, or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on the face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court ans cause it to be serves within 3 days form issuance, or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than 10 working days form date of issuance.

SECTION 9. HOW THE WRIT IS SERVED - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or bay a person deputized by the court, justice, or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.

SECTION 13. PROHIBITED PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS - The following pleadings and motions are prohibited:

1. Motion to dismiss
2. Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper, and other pleadings;
3. Dilatory motion for postponement;
4. Motion for bill of particulars;
5. Counterclaim or cross-claim;
6. Third-party complaint;
7. Reply;
8. Motion to declare respondent in default;
9. Intervention;
10. Memorandum;
11. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and
12. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order.

SECTION 14. RETURN; FILING - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice, or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence.

SECTION 15. SUMMARY HEARING - The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice, or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues ans determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.

SECTION 16. JUDGMENT - The court shall render judgment within 10 days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, the court shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied.

Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officers as may be designated by the court, justice, or judge within 5 working days.

SECTION 19. APPEAL - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the SC under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.

The period of appeal shall be 5 working days from date of notice of the judgment or final order.

The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases.

SECTION 20. INSTITUTION OF SEPARATE ACTIONS - The filing of a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil, or administrative actions.

SECTION 21. CONSOLIDATION - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.

When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for writ of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action.

After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition.

SECTION 22. EFFECT OF FILING OF A CRIMINAL ACTION - When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved party by motion in the criminal case.

SECTION 23. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS - This Rule shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

SECTION 25. EFFECTIVITY - 2 February 2008.

NOVICIO V. PEOPLE (CRIMINAL LAW)

On the first issue, Novicio invokes self-defense. Thus, it was incumbent upon his to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. for in invoking self-defense, the accused admits killing or seriously wounding the victim and accordingly, has the burden of justifying his act.

The requisites of SELF-DEFENSE are:

1. unlawful aggression;
2. reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and
3. lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

We have reviewed the records of the RTC and the CA and we find no justification to deviate from the findings and is conclusion that Novicio has not adequately discharged his burden of proving the elements of self-defense.

On the second issue, it is Novicio's postulation that the lone gunshot wound of victim does not establish intent to kill. However, the number of wounds inflicted is not the sole consideration in proving intent to kill.

An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated, or attempted stage, is the INTENT TO KILL the victim of the offenders immediately before or simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.

In Adame v. CA, a single gunshot wound was inflicted on the victim but this Court convicted the accused therein of crustrated homicide. It is worth stressing that Novicio used a gun in this case and if not for victim's act of shoving the table at him, Novicio could have fired a second shot.

Further, the nature and location of the wound should also be considered. By positive testimony of the doctor, the wound sustained by victim could cause death if left untreated. This Court has repeatedly held that if the victim's wound would normally cause death, then the last act necessary to produce homicide would have been performed and the death would have resulted were it not for the timely medical attention given to the victim.

Conviction, affirmed.

UY V. SANO (DISBARMENT)

This is a disbarment case filed by complainant Uy against respondent Sano for allegedly notarizing several documents despite the expiration of his commission.

It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege with conditions.

It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those whoa re qualified and authorized may act as notaries public. It must be underscored that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making it admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost case the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.

To be sure, the requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer's act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefor as reprehensible, constituting as it does, not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public documents. For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission, and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.

SAN ROQUE REALTY V. REPUBLIC (EXPROPRIATION, LACHES, LAND REGISTRATION)

In Republic v. Lim, we emphasized that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation in paid.

Without FULL PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Thus, the Republic's failure to pay just compensation precluded the perfection of its title over the lot sought to be expropriated. In fact, we went even further and recognized the right of the unpaid owner to recover the property if within 5 years from the decision of the expropriation court, the expropriator fails to effect payment of just compensation.

Time and again, we have declared that EMINENT DOMAIN cases are to be strictly construed against the expropriator. The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is an indispensable requisite for the exercise of the State's sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe this requirement renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed public purpose. To disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over private rights.

From the records of this case and our previous findings in the related case, the Republic manifestly failed to present clear and convincing evidence of full payment of just compensation and receipt thereof by the property owners. More importantly, if the Republic had actually made full payment of just compensation, in the ordinary course of things, it would have led to the cancellation of title, or at least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the government on the certificate of title.

The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the Republic's interest arising from the exercise of it's power or eminent domain is in consonance with the Land Registration Act. There is no showing that the Republic complied with the aforesaid registration requirement.

From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic to cause the registration of the subject properties in its name or record the decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, not only did the Republic fail to register the subject properties in its name, it failed to do so for 56 years.

This brings us to the question: Is the Republic, by its failure or neglect to assert its claim, barred by laches?

LACHES is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel or laches by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. This rule, however, admits of exceptions. One exception is when the strict application of the rule will defeat the effectiveness of a policy adopted to protect the public, such as the Torrens system.

Very telling of the Republic's silence and inaction, whether intentional or by sheer negligence, is the testimony of Infante, the Republic's witness in the proceedings before the RTC, testifying that several surveys were conducted on a number of expropriated lots, which surveys showed that the subject lot was still registered in the name of the original owners. As such, Infante recommended in his report that legal action be taken. Yet despite aforesaid recommendation, title to subject lot remained registered in the name of the original owners, ans subsequently, its transferees. This silence and unexplained inaction by the Republic clearly constitute laches.

The trial court correctly held that title registered under the Torrens system is notice to the whole world. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and the law will not oblige him to go beyond what appears on the face thereof to determine the condition of the property.

An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the certificate of title, bought the property from the registered owner, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before ha has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.

SIERRA V. LOPEZ (CRIMINAL PROCEDURE)

Rule 112 Section 3 lays down the basic procedure in PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, as follows:

1. The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of complainant and his witnesses, as we ll as other supporting documents TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
   
2. Within 10 days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.
   
   The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense.
   
   Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party.
   
3. Within 10 days from receipt of subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavits and that his witnesses ans other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
   
4. If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within 10 days, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.
   
5. The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and the issues to be clarified from a party or a witness. the parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine. they may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.
   
   The hearing shall be held within 10 days from submission of the counter-affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be terminated within 5 days.
   
6. Within 10 days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.

This provision of the Rules does not require confrontation between the parties. Preliminary investigation is ordinarily conducted through submission of affidavits and supporting documents, through exchange of pleadings.

The new rule on Criminal Procedure do not require as a condition sine qua non to the validity of the proceedings in the PI the presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach him were made, and an opportunity to controvert evidence of the complainant is accorded him. the obvious purpose of the rule is to block attempts of unscrupulous respondents to thwart the prosecution of offenses by hiding themselves or by employing dilatory tactics.

Since confrontation between the parties is not imperative, it follows that it is not necessary that the counter-affidavit of respondent be sworn to before the investigating prosecutor himself. It can be sworn to before another prosecutor. In fact, this is specifically provided in the rules.

LAstly, we hold that the investigating prosecutors did not abuse their discretion when they denied the request of the complainant for the conduct of clarificatory questioning. The conduct of such, under the rules, is discretionary upon the prosecutor. Indeed, we already held in Webb v. De Leon that the decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator, and the investigator alone.

MANDAUE DINGHOW DIMSUM HOUSE V. NLRC (LABOR, REMEDIAL, CORPORATION CODE)

There are 3 issues which require resolution in this case:

1. Whether the non-filing of the Motion for Reconsideration before resorting to certiorari is justified;
2. Whether the Alias Writ of Execution was validly issued despite the finality of the NLRC decision; and
3. Whether the Doctrine of Piercing the Veil of corporate Fiction was properly invoked.

The first issue, the SC resolved in the affirmative.

Section 1 , Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states that in order to avail oneself of the special civil action for certiorari, one must be left with no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of an assailed decision is deemed a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law. The well-established rule is that an MR is a indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. the purpose of such rule is to afford the erring court or agency an opportunity to rectify the error/s it may have committed without the intervention of a higher court. The requisite motion is not only an expeditious remedy of an aggrieved party but it also obviates an improvident and unnecessary recourse to appellate proceedings. Failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC before availing oneself of the special civil action for certiorari is a fatal infirmity.

However, this rule is subject to certain recognized exceptions, to wit:

1. where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
2. where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised ans passed upon in the lower court;
3. where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question ans any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable;
4. where, under the circumstances, an MR would be useless;
5. where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
6. where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
7. where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
8. where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
9. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

The instant case falls squarely within the first of the enumerated exceptions as the NLRC decision is a patent nullity considering that the LA and the NLRC were devoid of any jurisdiction to alter or modify the NLRC decision which already attained finality.

Correlatively, we answer the second issue in the negative.

The Order and the Alias Writ of Execution issued by the LA are null and void for lack of jurisdiction and for altering the tenor of the NLRC decision. The private respondents did not assail this ruling; thus, the same became final and executory and the correction made by NLRC which is substantial can no longer be allowed.

It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolutions of the court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties. Once a decision or order becomes final and executory, it is removed from the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further alter or amend it. It thereby becomes immutable and unalterable and any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. An order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.

On the third issue, we rule in the negative.

It must be emphasized that a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it a swell as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. Because of this, the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction must be exercised with caution.

This Court has reiterated in several c ases the rule that corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employees done with malice or bad faith. It has been held that bad faith does not connote bad judgments or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.

In this case, it it worth mentioning that the LA in his decision expressly absolved Uytengsu from any liability, holding that the latter did not act in bad faith and in excess of his authority. such finding was not assailed by the private respondents nor did the NLRC in its decision overrule the same. The liability of Uytengsu was never discussed in the said NLRC decision which to the detriment of the private respondents, had lapsed into finality.

TOLEDO V. TOLEDO (DISBARMENT, JUDICIAL CONDUCT, VIOLATION OF CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY )

This Court has previously defined IMMORAL CONDUCT as that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.

This Court has held that to justify SUSPENSION or DISBARMENT, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral, and the same must be established by clean and convincing proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. Likewise, the dubious character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated.

Thus, to warrant disciplinary action, we must examine if respondent's relationship with his common-law wife as "grossly immoral conduct."

In disbarment cases, this Court has ruled that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behaviour. whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct" will depend on the surrounding circumstances."

Based on the allegations in the Complaint and in respondent's Comment, we cannot conclude that his act of cohabiting with a woman and begetting children by her without the benefit of marriage falls within the category of "grossly immoral conduct."

While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and to a certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to make, for our employees, decisions about their personal lives, especially those that will so affect their and their family's future, such as whether they should or should not be married.

ROSE AOAS V. PEOPLE (EVIDENCE)

Considering that there is no direct evidence pointing to Aoas as the perpetrator of the crime, the trial court relied solely on circumstantial evidence.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. It is founded on experience, observed facts, and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.

In order that conviction be had, the following must concur:

1. There is more than one circumstance;
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. The combination of the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person.

The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven must be consistent with one other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. The circumstances must be proved, and not themselves presumed. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has committed the offense.

Prosecution has failed to show that the circumstances invoked completely discount the possibility that persons other than Aoas could have perpetrated the crime. Thus, where the proven facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty ans is not sufficient to convict the accused.

We find that the conviction of Aoas does not pass the test of moral certainty. when inadequate and uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence cannot sustain a conviction.

ESPINO V. AMORA AND AMORA (REMEDIAL LAW)

We uphold the well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties. The rule however, is not absolute and admits of exceptions upon a showing of highly meritorious circumstances, such as:

1. when the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures;
2. when a lower court's inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
3. when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
4. when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case or fail to notice certain relevant facts which if properly considered will justify a different conclusion;
5. when there is a misappreciation of facts;
6. when the findings of cat are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record.

None of the laid down exceptions which would warrant a reversal of the assailed decision obtain herein.

DELA VICTORIA V. ORIG-MALOLOY-ON (JUDICIAL CONDUCT)

The Court will never shirk its responsibility to impose discipline upon erring court employees and magistrates, nor hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that serve only to disrupt, rather than promote, the orderly administration of justice.

Considering that he was a former judge and had been engaged in the practice of law for 30 years, Dela Victoria is expected to be conversant with the scope and application of Rule 114, Section 17(c) of the Rules of Court which he invokes. He should have known that he could not insist on the acceptance of the cash bond in favor of his clients without the necessary order from the court granting his motion to post the same. In fact, his assertion that he had already made arrangements with the MTCC Executive Judge when there was actually no proper court order amounts to an attempt to mislead Maloloy-on into processing the unauthorized temporary release of his clients.

Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play, and nobility in the conduct of the litigation and their relations with the clients, the opposing parties, the other counsel, and the courts. They are duty-bound to avoid improprieties, which give the appearance of influencing the court. Dela Victoria failed in this regard.

PEPSICO V. EMERALD PIZZA (REMEDIAL LAW)

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, the party who stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the rules means material interest, as interest in issue ans to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.

The purpose of the rule is to protect parties against undue and unnecessary litigation ans to ensure that the court will have the benefit of having before it the real adverse parties in the consideration of the case. This rule is however not to be narrowly and restrictively construed, and its application should neither be dogmatic nor rigid at all times but viewed in consonance with extant realities and practicalities. Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties-in-interest, weather plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to the said contract.

The subsequent execution of the amendatory agreement only by and between Emerald and Pizza Hut does not in any way relieve PepsiCo of the obligations it assumed as a franchisor in the settlement agreement. Let it be noted that the said amendatory agreement came into being merely to formally implement the stipulations in the settlement.

Notably, however, while PepsiCo was properly impleaded as a party defendant, Pizza hut, an indispensable party, was not. An INDISPENSABLE PARTY is a party-in-interest, without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant. JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IS MANDATORY. their presence is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case. Thus, without their presence to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present.

Nevertheless, the NON-JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF ACTION and the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiff/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.

Hence, as no final ruling on this matter can be had without impleading Pizza Hut, its inclusion is necessary for the effective and complete resolution of the case and in order to accord all parties the benefit of due process and fair play.

REPUBLIC V. SANTUA (LTD, TORRENS TITLE)

ISSUE: Whether or not tax declarations, survey plans, and technical descriptions are sufficient bases for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title.

NO.

A tax declaration, as pronounced by the Court in Heirs of Eulalio Ragua v. CA, is not a reliable source for the reconstitution of a certificate of title. At most, the tax declaration can only be prima facie evidence of possession or a claim of ownership, which however is not the issue in a reconstitution proceeding. A reconstitution of title does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title but merely determines whether a reissuance of such title is proper.

As for the survey plans and technical descriptions, the Court has previously dismissed the same as not the documents referred to in Section 3(f) but merely additional documents that should accompany the petition for the reconstitution as required by law. Moreover, a survey plan or technical description prepared at the instance of a party cannot be considered in his favor, the same being self-serving. Further, in Lee v. Republic, the Court declared the reconstitution based on a survey plan and technical descriptions void for lack of factual support.


RECONSTITUTION OF A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE denotes RESTORATION in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to the piece of land. It partakes of a land registration proceeding. Thus, it must be granted upon clear proof that the titles sought to be restored was indeed issued to the petitioner. In this regards, Section 3 of RA 26 enumerates the documents regarded as valid and sufficient bases for reconstitution of a transfer certificate of title.

Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the resources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

1. Owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
2. Co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
3. Certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
4. Deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;
5. Document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property the description of which is given in said documents, is mortgaged, leased, or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and
6. Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

The Court has already settled in a number of cases that following the principle of ejusdem generis in statutory construction, and document mentioned in Section 3 should be interpreted to refer to documents similar to those previously enumerated therein. As aptly observed by the petitioner, the documents enumerated in Section 3 are documents that had been issued or are on file with the register of deeds, thus, highly credible.

Once again, we caution the courts against the hasty and reckless grant of petitions for reconstitution. Strict observance of the rules is vital to prevent parties from exploiting reconstitution proceedings as a quick but illegal way to obtain Torrens certificate of titles over parcels of land which turn out to be already covered by existing titles. Courts should bear in mind that should the petition for reconstitution be denied for lack of sufficient basis, the petitioner is not left without a remedy. He may still file an application for confirmation of his title under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, if he is in fact the lawful owner.