VER-REYES V. CA (REMEDIAL)

Petitioner's belated act of applying for a notice of lis pendens, if allowed by the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite, would infringe on the right to due process of Engracia's heirs, who were never parties to the reconveyance suit between petitioner and respondent now pending appeal before the CA. While the notice of lis pendens would not create a right or lien over the property, it will definitely be an inconvenience or a burden, however slight, on the title of Engracia's heirs, especially when dealing with the same property in the concept of owners. Justice and fair play require that Engracia's heirs be rightfully informed of petitioner's claim over the same property by impleading them in the pending suit before the application for annotation of lis pendens be favorably acted upon.

VECTOR SHIPPING V. MACASA (REMEDIAL)

It is a well-settled doctrine that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court. This Court defined a question of law as distinguished from a question of fact, to wit:

A QUESTION OF LAW arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.

Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law, otherwise, it is a question of fact.

This Court is being asked to evaluate the pieces of evidence which were adequately passed upon by both the RTC and the CA. Without doubt, this matter is essentially factual in character and therefore, outside the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Petitioners ought to remember that this Court is not a trier of facts. It is not for this Court to weigh these pieces of evidence all over again.

Lastly, we cannot turn a blind eye to this gruesome maritime tragedy. We commiserate with all the victims, particularly with the Macasas who were denied justice for almost 2 decades in thsi case. To accept petitioners' submission that this Court, along with the RTc and the CA, should await the review by the Department of National Defense of the BMI findings, would in effect, limit the court's jurisdiction to expeditiously try, hear, and decide cases filed before them. It would not only prolong the Macasas' agony but would result in yet another tragedy at the expense of speedy justice. This, we cannot allow.

UNLAD RESOURCES V. DRAGON (CIVIL)

Mutual restitution is required in cases involving rescission under Article 1191. This means bringing the parties back to their original status prior to the inception of the contract. Article 1385 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 1385. Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract, together with their fruits, and the price with its interest; consequently, it can be carried out only when he who demands rescission can turn whatever he may be obligated to restore.

Neither shall rescission take place when the things which are the object of the contract are legally in the possession of third persons who did not act in bad faith.

In this case, indemnity for damages may be demanded from the person causing the loss.

Rescission has the effect of "unmaking a contract, or its undoing from the beginning, and not merely its termination." Hence, rescission creates the obligation to return the object of the contract. It can be carried out only when the one who demands rescission can turn whatever he may be obliged to restore. To rescind is to declare a contract void at its inception and to put an end to it as though it never was. It is not merely to terminate it and release the parties from further obligations to each other, but to abrogate it from the beginning and restore the parties to their relative positions as if no contract has been made.

Accordingly, when a decree for rescission is handed down, it is the duty of the court to require both the parties to surrender that which they have respectively received and to place each other as far as practicable in his original situation. The rescission has the effect of abrogating the contract in all parts.

Clearly, the petitioners failed to fulfill their end of the agreement, and thus, there was just cause for rescission. With the contract thus rescinded, the parties must be restored to the status quo ante, that is, before they entered into the Memorandum of Agreement.

UNIVERSAL STAFFING V. NLRC (LABOR)

Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, an unsatisfactory rating can be a just cause for dismissal only if it amounts to gross and habitual neglect of duties. Thus, the fact the an employee's performance is found to be poor or unsatisfactory does not necessarily mean that the employee is grossly and habitually negligent of his duties. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of case. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.

We reviewed the records of the case ans we agree with the NLRC and the CA that no substantial evidence was presented to substantiate the cause of Morales' dismissal. First, USSI failed o cite particular acts or instances that would validate its claim of Morales' poor performance. Second, no convincing proof was offered to substantiate Morales' alleged poor performance.

The notice of termination and the statement purportedly executed by USSi stating that Morales was dismissed due to her poor performance and for revealing secret information of potential clients do not constitute substantial evidence.

Besides, even assuming that Morales' performance was unsatisfactorily, USSI failed to demonstrate that her alleged poor performance amounted to gross and habitual neglect of duty, which would justify her dismissal.

Further, Morales was not accorded due process. Under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, the employer must send the employee who is about to be terminated, a written notice stating the cause/s for termination and must give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. There was no chowing that USSI warned Morales of her alleged poor performance. Likewise, Morales was not served the first notice apprising her of the particular acts or omissions on which her dismissal was based together with the opportunity to explain her side. The only notice given to Morales was the letter informing her that she was already terminated.

Certainly, there can be no other conclusion than that Morales was illegally dismissed and her employment contract was illegally terminated. The CA therefore committed no reversible error in sustaining the NLRC on this point.

With this finding, it is imperative that Morales be granted the monetary benefits due her. However, we rule that the CA erred in modifying the amounts awarded by the NLRC since as shown by the records, Morales did not appeal from the said NLRC decision; hence, the same attained finality as to Morales - the monetary awards had been laid to rest. This is in accord with the doctrine that a party who has not appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the appealed decision.

TABUADA V. RUIZ (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS)

While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly encouraged, the failure to consummate one does not warrant any procedural sanction, much less provide an authority for the court to jettison the case. Spec Pro No. 5198 should not have been terminated or dismissed by the trial court on account of the mere failure of the parties to submit the promised amicable settlement and/or the Motion for Judgment Based on an Amicable Settlement. given the non-contentious nature of special proceedings, which do not depend on the will of an actor, but on a state or condition of things or persons not entirely within the control of the parties interested, its dismissal should be ordered only in the extreme case where the termination of the proceedings is the some remedy consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the parties therein.

The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes the motu proprio dismissal of a case if the plaintiff fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court, cannot even be used to justify the convenient, though erroneous, termination of the proceedings therein. An examination of the 6 December 2004 Order readily reveals that the trial court neither required the submission of the amicable settlement or the aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned the parties that should they fail to submit the compromise within the given period, their case would be dismissed. Hence, it cannot be categorized as an order requiring compliance to the extent that its defiance becomes an affront to the court and the rules. and even if it were worded in coercive language, the parties cannot be forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only strongly encouraged, but are not obligated, to consummate a compromise. an order requiring submission of an amicable settlement does not find support in our jurisprudence and is premised on an erroneous interpretation and application of the law and rules.

Lastly, the Court notes that inconsiderate dismissals neither constitute a panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court.

ST. MARY'S FARM V. PRIMA REAL PROPERTIES (CIVIL)

In the instant case, it cannot readily be concluded that a particular signature appearing in those documents is not genuine for lack of proper identification and a more accurate comparison of the signatures. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies in the party making the allegation. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the petitioner failed to discharge this burden.

Further challenging the due execution of the board resolution bearing the Secretary's Certificaiton, petitioner wants us to consider the same as inadmissible on the ground that Atty. Agcaoili did not appear before a notary public for notarization. We do nt agree, because in the past, we have already held that the non-appearance of the party before the notary public who notarized the deed does not necessarily nullify or render the parties' transaction void ab initio. However, the non-apperance of the party exposes the notary public to administrative liability which warrants sanction by the Court. This fact notwithstanding, we agree with the respondent court that it is not to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the board resolution. To overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear, and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the certificate. In the absence of such proof, the document must be upheld. notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.

On the basis of this notarized board resolution, respondent had every reason to rely on Agana's authority to sell the subject property. Undeniably then, the respondent is an innocent purchaser for value in good faith.

A BUYER FOR VALUE IN GOOD FAITH is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in such property and pays full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the well-founded belief that the person from whom he receives the thing had title to the property and capacity to convey it.

To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show the he relied on the face of the title to the property. He need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is nto obliged to explore beyond the four corners of the title. Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the land; second, the latter is in possession thereof; and third, at the time of the sae, the buyer was nto aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property.

All the conditions enumerated in the aforementioned case are present in the case at bar, enough for us to consider Prima as a buyer in good faith.

In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has in his possession title to the property but whose capacity to sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves that he inquired into the title of the seller as well as into the latter's capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, he relied on the notarial acknowledgment found in the seller's duly notarized special power of attorney. He need not prove anything more for it is already the function of the notarial acknowledgment to establish the appearance of the parties to the document, its due execution and authenticity.

SOLIDBANK V. GATEWAY (REMEDIAL)

Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court provides the mechanics for the production of documents ans the inspection of the things during the pendency of a case. It also deals with the inspection of sources of evidence other than documents, such as land or other property in the possession or control of the other party.

The MODES OF DISCOVERY are accorded a broad and liberal treatment. Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits "fishing" for evidence, the only limitation being that the documents, papers, etc., sought to be produced are not privileged, that they are in the possession of the party ordered to produce them and that they are material to any matter involved in the action. The lament against a fishing expedition no longer precluded a party from prying into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. However, fishing for evidence that is allowed under the rules is not without limitations. In Security Bank v. CA, the Court enumerated the requisites in order that a party may compel the other party to produce or allow the inspection of documents or things, viz:

1. the party must file a motion for the production or inspection of documents or things, showing good cause therefor;
2. notice of the motion must be served to all other parties of the case;
3. the motion must designate the documents, papers, books, or tangible things which the party wishes to be produced and inspected;
4. such documents, etc, are not privileged;
5. such documents, etc. are in the possession, custody, or control of the other party.

Solidbank was able to show good cause for the production of the documents. It had also shown that said documents are material or contain evidence relevant to an issue involved in the action. However, Solidbank's motion was fatally defective and must be struck down because of its failure to specify with particularity the documents it requires Gateway to produce. Solidbank's motion for production and inspection of documents called for a blanket inspection. Solidbank's request for inspection of "all documents pertaining to, arising from, in connection with or involving the Back-end Services Agreement" was simply too broad and too generalized in scope.

The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the aforesaid order. It is not fair to penalize Gateway for not complying with the request of Solidbank for the production and inspection of documents, considering that the documents sought were not particularly described. Gateway and its officers can only be held liable for unjust refusal to comply with the modes of discovery if it is shown that the documents sought to be produced were specifically described, material to the action and in the possession, custody, or control of Gateway.

Neither can it be said that Gateway did not exert effort in complying with the order for production and inspection of documents since it presented the invoices representing the billings sent by Gateway in relation to the Back-end Services Agreement. Good faith effort to produce the required documents must be accorded to Gateway, absent any finding that it acted willfully, in bad faith or was at fault in failing to produce to documents sought to be produced.

SIEMENS V. DOMINGO (LABOR)

Issue: Whether or not there was constructive dismissal that would entitle Domingo to his monetary claims.

YES; Domingo was constructively dismissed from employment.

A diminution of pay is prejudicial to the employee and amounts to constructive dismissal. The gauge for constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would feel compelled to give up his employment under the prevailing circumstances.

CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL is defined as quitting when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely as the offer of employment involves a demotion in rank or diminution in pay. It exists when the resignation on the part of the employee was involuntary due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. It is brought about by the clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain shown by an employer which becomes unbearable to the employee. An employee who is forced to surrender his position through the employer's unfair or unreasonable acts is deemed to have been illegally terminated and such termination is deemed to be involuntary.

In the instant case, Domingo's resignation was brought about by the decision of the management of Siemens Philippines not to renew - or work for the renewal of - his consultancy contract with Siemens Germany which clearly resulted in the substantial diminution of his salary. The situation brought about the feeling of oppression which compelled Domingo to resign. The diminution in pay created an adverse working environment that rendered it impossible for Domingo to continue working for Siemens Philippines. His resignation from the company was in reality not his choice but a situation created by the company, thereby amounting to constructive dismissal.

SANTOS V. HEIRS OF LUSTRE (REMEDIAL)

Forum shopping exists when the elements if litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount o res judicata in the other. Among its elements are identity of the parties, identity of the subject matter, and identity of the causes of action in the two cases.

The dispute in this case centers on whether there exists identity of causes of action and identity of parties between Civil Case No. 1330 and Civil Case No. 2115.

Concededly, the causes of action in Civil Case No. 1330 and Civil Case no. 2115 are identical. There is identity of causes of action if the same evidence needed in the first case will sustain the second action, and this principle applies even if the reliefs sought in the two cases are different. Without a doubt, the same evidence will be necessary to sustain the causes of action in these two cases which are substantially based on the same series of transactions. In fact, similar reliefs are prayed for in the two cases. Both complaints ultimately seek the cancellation of the title of the alleged transferees and the recovery of the subject property.

Despite this similarity, however, we hold that respondents are not guilty of forum shopping because the element of identity of parties is not present.

The determination of whether there is identity of parties rests on the commonality of the parties' interest, regardless of whether they are indispensable parties or not. The issue of whether the additional parties are indispensable parties are not acquires real significance only when considering the validity of the judgment that will be rendered in the earlier case. This is so because if the additional parties are indispensable parties, then no valid judgment can be rendered against them in the earlier case in which they did not participate, and this will foreclose the application of res judicata which requires the existence of a final judgment.

without question, a co-owner may bring an action to recover the co-owned property without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. In such case, the other heirs are merely necessary parties.

However, if the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, as in civil Case No. 1330, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. The trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over the indispensable parties who are not impleaded in the case and judgment thereon cannot be valid and binding against them. a decision that is null and void for want of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court is not a decision in contemplation of law; hence, it can never become final and executory.

SALAS V. ABOITIZ ONE (LABOR)

As stated in the decision notice, Salas was terminated for neglect of duty and willful breach of trust. Gross negligence connotes want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of case. IT evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. To warrant removal from service, the negligence should not merely be gross, but also habitual.

If there is anything that Salas can be faulted for, it is his failure to promptly inform his immediate supervisor of the non-delivery of the requisitioned items. Nevertheless, such failure did not amount to gross neglect of duty or to willful breach of trust, which would justify his dismissal from service.

The CA also justified Salas' dismissal on ground of willful breach of trust. It lent credence to Aboitiz's posture that Salas was a warehouseman holding a position of trust and confidence. We disagree.

Salas, as material controller was tasked with monitoring and maintaining the availability and supply of Quickbox. There appears nothing to suggest that Salas' position was a highly or even primarily confidential position, so that he can be removed for loss of trust and confidence by the employer.

Indeed, an employer has the right, under the law, to dismiss an employee based on fraud or willful breach of the trust bestowed upon him by his employer or the latter's authorized representative. However, the loss of trust must be based not on ordinary breach but, in the language of Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, on willful breach. a breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, withouth justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly, or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. It should be genuine and not simulated; now should it appear as a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith or a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. It has never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse because of its subjective nature. There must, therefore, be an actual breach of duty committed by the employee which must be established by substantial evidence. In this case, Aboitiz utterly failed to establish the requirements prescribed by law and jurisprudence for a valid dismissal on the ground of breach of trust and confidence.

Undoubtedly, no just cause exists to warrant Salas' dismissal. Consequently, he is entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights, and to payment of backwages.

However, as Salas was not entirely faultless, and although such negligence would not justify Salas' termination from employment in view of the stringent condition imposed by the Labor Code on termination of employment due to gross and habitual neglect, the same cannot be condoned, much less tolerated.

PUREFOODS V. NAGKAKAISANG SAMAHAN

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court explicitly mandates that the petition for certiorari shall be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. When the petitioner is a corporation, inasmuch as corporate powers are exercised by the board, the certification shall be executed by a natural person authorized by the corporation's board of directors. Absent any authority from the board, no person, not even the corporate officers, can bind the corporation. Only individuals who are vested with authority by a valid resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of the corporation, and proof of such authority must be attached to the petition. Failure to attach to the certification any proof of signatory's authority is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

In the instant case, the senior vice president of the petitioner corporation signed the certificate of non-forum shopping. No proof of his authority to sign the said certificate was, however, attached to the petition. Thus, applying settled jurisprudence, we find that the CA committed no error when it dismissed the petition.

We must reiterate that the rules of procedure are mandatory, except only when for the most persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate to the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying therewith. While technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice, they are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets.

It is crystal clear that the closure of Sto Thomas farm was made in bad faith. Badges of bad faith are evident from the following acts of the petitioner:

1. it unjustifiably refused to recognize the STFWU's and the other unions' affiliation with PULO;
2. it concluded a new CBA with another union in another farm during the agreed indefinite suspension of the collective bargaining negotiations;
3. it surreptitiously transferred and continued its business in a less hostile environment; and
4. it suddenly terminated the STFWU members, but retained and brought the non-embers to the Malvar farm.

Petitioner presented no evidence to support the contention that it was incurring losses or that the subject farm's lease agreement was preterminated. Ineluctably, the closure of Sto Thomas farm circumvented the labor organization's right to collective bargaining and violated the members' right to security of tenure.

The releases and quitclaims, as well as the affidavits of desistance, signed by the concerned employees, who were then necessitous men at the time of execution of the documents, are declared invalid and ineffective. They will not bar the workers from claiming the full measure of benefits flowing from their legal rights.

PNB-REPUBLIC BANK V. CORDOVA (REMEDIAL)

Petitioner's appeal is deemed perfected as to it when it timely filed its first notice of appeal, following Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Incidentally, this perfected appeal is not docketed with the CA, because the trial court, which was still to resolve respondents' motion for reconsideration, had not yet transmitted the records of the case to the appellate court. Incumbent, nonetheless, on the part of the RTC is the elevation of the records after a resolution of the merits of respondents' motion.

Its appeal having been perfected, petitioner did not need to file a second notice of appeal even if the trial court granted, as it did, the other party's motion for reconsideration and modified the discussion to increase the monetary award.

An essential and logical implication of the said rule is that the filing of a second notice of appeal from the modified decision s a superfluity, if not a useless ceremony. It therefore, matters no longer whether that second notice is timely filed or not. Hence, in this case, petitioner's filing of a belated second notice of appeal does not affect or foreclose its already perfected appeal.

When the appeal is perfected as to petitioner's filing of the first notice in due time, the trial court, insofar as the petitioner is concerned, loses its jurisdiction over the case except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal. Obviously, the issue of the correctness of the decision is the subject of the perfected appeal. The trial court no longer had jurisdiction to reverse the February 18, 2002 decision, as modified by the appeal, which would have meant petitioner's abandonment of its appeal. Petitioner, with its appeal already perfected, cannot withdraw the same for the purpose of reviving the jurisdiction of the trial court and enabling it to take another course of action calling for the exercise of that jurisdiction. This is because by filing the notice of appeal, petitioner insofar as it is concerned has perfected its appeal to the CA, and it should be in that court where he may pursue any further remedy.

PARAISO V. CA (CIVIL, REMEDIAL)

For a writ of certiorari to issue, the applicant must show that the court or tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged order. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.

In the instant case, the appellate court gravely abused its discretion in disapproving the compromise agreement for the simple reason that respondent dis not comply with the CA's resolutions requiring it to explain the apparent formal defect in the agreement. The Court notes that the appellate court unnecessarily focused its attention on the defects in the form of the compromise agreement when these flaws in formality do not go into the validity of the parties' contract, and more importantly, when none of the parties assails its due execution.

To elucidate, the absence of a specific date does not adversely affect the agreement considering that the date of execution is not an essential element of a contract. A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is essentially a contract perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the case which are to constitute the contract. The CA should have allowed greater laxity in scrutinizing the compromise agreement, not only because the absence of a specific date is a mere formal defect, but also because the signatories to the compromise indicated the date when they signed the agreement beside their signatures. These signatories are also sufficiently authorized to enter into a compromise by the respective board of directors of the petitioner and the respondent. It is not amiss to state at this point that in National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia v. CA, we approved an undated compromise agreement.

ORTEGA V. PEOPLE (CRIMINAL)

Section 6 of RA 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:

Section 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility - A child 15 years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above 15 years but below 18 years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability here in established doe snot include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer. What is controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL (Child In Conflict With Law), is not the CICL's age at the time of the promulgation of the judgment bu the CICL's age at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of RA 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.

Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive application to the provisions of RA 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law - penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmaker's intent is most favorable to herein petitioner.

It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner's age was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under RA 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.