Showing posts with label Estafa. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Estafa. Show all posts

Sunday, June 28, 2009

LUCES V. DAMOLE (ADMINISTRATIVE, CRIMINAL)


Also known as swindling, ESTAFA is committed by any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned in the RPC. Specifically, the elements of estafa through misappropriation or conversion are (1) that the money, goods, or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under ant other obligation involving the duty to deliver or return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

As to the PO cards covered by Trust Receipt No. 4103, the prosecution sufficiently established that they were used by petitioner herself and her relatives as evidenced by the copies of the PO cards they actually used bearing their names. Although there was no prohibition for petitioner to use or for her relatives to purchase the PO cards, they should have paid the corresponding price, and petitioner should have remitted the proceeds to the private complainant. There being no adequate explanation why she personally used and allowed her relatives to use the cards, there is ample circumstantial evidence for estafa. Using the PO cards as owner is conversion.

The essence of estafa under Article 315 par. 1(b) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the prejudice of the owner. The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without a right.

Wednesday, June 10, 2009

PEOPLE V. VALENZUELA (CRIMINAL, REMEDIAL)


It is a well entrenched rule doctrine that jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject matter of an action is conferred by law. It is determined by the material allegations of the complaint of information and the law at the time the action was commenced. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. Thus, the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon the a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Ounce jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.

In the instant case, the RTC has the jurisdiction over the subject matter because the law confers on it the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa. The allegations are clear. the RTC also has jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. the RTC likewise acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents because they voluntarily submitted to the RTC's authority.

When the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to resolve.

Thus, based on the law and material allegations of the information filed, the RTC erroneously concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter on the premise that the case before it is purely an agrarian dispute. Notably, while the RTC has criminal jurisdiction conferred on it by law, the DARAB, on the other hand, has no authority to try criminal cases at all.

But even if we uphold the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the instant criminal case, we still deny the petition.

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, share tenancy has been outlawed for being contrary to public policy as early as 1963, with the passage of RA 3844. What prevails today, under RA 6657, is agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship, and all instances of share tenancy have been automatically converted into leasehold tenancy. In such a relationship, the tenant's obligation is simply to pay rentals, not to deliver the landowner's share. Given this dispensation, the petitioner's allegation that the respondents misappropriated the landowner's share of the harvest as contained in the information is untenable. Accordingly, the respondents cannot be held liable for estafa under the Revised Penal Code.