QBE INSURANCE V. RABELLO (REMEDIAL)

As officers of the Court, however, SHERIFFS and deputy sheriffs are bound to discharge their duties with utmost case and diligence, particularly in implementing the orders of the court, for if they err, they will affect the efficacy of the process by which justice is administered.

In the instant case, respondent asserted that the manifestation he filed before the trial court stating that Rizal Surety had recently changed its corporate name to QBE Insurance was based on what he saw in the office of Rizal Surety and information relayed to him by its employees.

Respondent ought to be aware that execution could only be issued against a party and not against one who was not accorded his day in court and it was his bounden duty to see to it that the writ of execution would be implemented only upon properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. Property belonging to third persons cannot thus be levied upon.

Section 16 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that the moment a third party claim is filed, the sheriff is not bound to keep the property levied upon, unless the creditor insists that it should be continued, which may be done if such creditor files a bond sufficient to indemnify the sheriff for whatever damages he may be held liable should the third party succeed in vindicating his title in a proper action brought separately for the purpose.

If the third-party claim is sufficient, the sheriff upon receiving it is not bound to proceed with the levy of the property, unless he is given by the judgment creditor or his agent an indemnity bond against the claim.

The remedies just mentioned are without prejudice to any proper action that a third party claimant may deem suitable, to vindicate his claim to the property.

The proper remedy of TERCERIA would have for its object the recovery of the possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages resulting from the alleged wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third-party claim; and it may be brought against the sheriff, and such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded with the sheriff in the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment creditor himself.

PANOTES V. CITY TOWNHOUSE (REMEDIAL)

An action for REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of 5 years without being executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to reopen any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor's case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment.

The original judgment or the NHA Resolution sought to be revived was between Panotes and PROSECOR, nt between petitioner Bumatay and CTDC. In maintaining that CTDC is bound by the NHA Resolution, petitioner claims that CTDC is the successor-in-interest of PROSECOR.

The contract does notr include the transfer of rights of PROSECOR as owner-developer of the said subdivision. Clearly, there is no basis to conclude the CTDC is the successor-in-interest of PROSECOR.

It bears stressing that when CTDC nought Block 40, there was no annotation on PROSECOR's title showing that the property is encumbered. CTDC is thus a buyer in good faith and for value and as such, may not be deprived of the ownership of Block 40. Verily, the NHA Resolution may not be enforced against CTDC.

Clearly, providing an open space within the subdivision remains to be the obligation of PROSECOR, the owner-developer and the real party-in-interest in the case for revival of judgment.

Further, strangers to a case, like CTDC, are not bound by the judgment rendered by a court. It will not divest the rights of a party who has not and never been a party to a litigation. EXECUTION of a judgment can be issued only against a party to the action and not against one who did not have his day in court.