IN RE TOLEDO (ADMINISTRATIVE)

OCA's recommendations as to the charge of immorality are untenable.

This Court has previously defined IMMORAL CONDUCT as the conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.

This Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral but grossly immoral and the same must be established by clear and convincing proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. Likewise, the dubious character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated.

Thus, to warrant disciplinary action, we must examine if respondent's relationship with his common-law wife qualifies as grossly immoral conduct.

In disbarment cases, this Court has ruled that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behaviour. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct will depend on the surrounding circumstances.

While the court has the power to regulate official conduct and to a certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to make for our employees, decisions about their personal lives, especially those that will affect their and their family's future, such as whether they should or should not be married.

There was no allegation that the two have been flaunting their status as common-law husband and wife, or that their cohabitation is attended by scandalous circumstances. Thus, the comportment of respondent and his common-law wife cannot be characterized as willful, flagrant, shameless or showing a moral indifference as to warrant the exercise of this Court's disciplinary power.

DELA VICTORIA V. ORIG-MALOLOY-ON (JUDICIAL CONDUCT)

The Court will never shirk its responsibility to impose discipline upon erring court employees and magistrates, nor hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that serve only to disrupt, rather than promote, the orderly administration of justice.

Considering that he was a former judge and had been engaged in the practice of law for 30 years, Dela Victoria is expected to be conversant with the scope and application of Rule 114, Section 17(c) of the Rules of Court which he invokes. He should have known that he could not insist on the acceptance of the cash bond in favor of his clients without the necessary order from the court granting his motion to post the same. In fact, his assertion that he had already made arrangements with the MTCC Executive Judge when there was actually no proper court order amounts to an attempt to mislead Maloloy-on into processing the unauthorized temporary release of his clients.

Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play, and nobility in the conduct of the litigation and their relations with the clients, the opposing parties, the other counsel, and the courts. They are duty-bound to avoid improprieties, which give the appearance of influencing the court. Dela Victoria failed in this regard.

LACUROM V. JUDGE TIENZO (JUDICIAL CONDUCT, MEMORANDUM DECISIONS)

Indeed, as a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake committed by judges in the performance of their official duties renders them administratively liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, acts done in the ri official capacity, even though erroneous, do not always constitute misconduct.

Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption, or malice may be the subject of disciplinary actions. For administrative liability to attach, respondent judge must be shown to have moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other similar motive. Verify, judges may not be held administratively liable for any of their official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as they acted in good faith.

However, SC finds respondent judge administratively liable for decision in civil case 4884.

the memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. Simply put, the memorandum decision authorized under BP 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

It is obvious that the decision rendered by the respondent judge failed to conform to this requirement. The cryptic decision simply referenced the appealed decision of the MTCC and forthwith found the same as compliant with procedural due process under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Ineluctably, respondent judge transgressed the constitutional directive.

Although not every judicial error signifies ignorance of the law which warrants administrative sanction, this holds true only in instances of tolerable misjudgment. Where however, an elementary constitutional mandate is violated, the blunder constituted IGNORANCE OF THE LAW.

CEBU V. LEE GAKO (JUDICIAL CONDUCT)

For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order of the judge must not only be erroneous, but most importantly, it's issuance is motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other similar motives; because mere error of judgment is not a ground for disciplinary proceedings. To follow a different rule will mean a deluge of complaints, legitimate or otherwise, and our magistrates will be immersed in answering charges against them rather than performing their judicial functions. As said earlier, appropriate judicial remedies are available to the complainant: an appeal or a petition for certiorari to assail the allegedly erroneous orders; hence, recourse to an administrative action against the judge is improper.

PACQUING V. JUDGE GOBARDE (JUDICIAL CONDUCT)

Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. Judges are enjoined to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions efficiently, fairly, AND WITH REASONABLE PROMPTNESS.

Mandatory rules prescribing the time to render judgment and to resolve pending incidents within 90 days from the time of submission for resolution are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.

The failure to decide a case within the required period is inexcusable as it constitutes GROSS INEFFICIENCY AND NEGLECT OF DUTY warranting administrative sanction.