LANDBANK V. SPOUSES ORILLA (REMEDIAL)

EXECUTION OF A JUDGMENT PENDING APPEAL is governed by Section 2(a) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in the special order after due hearing. As provided above, execution of the judgment or final order pending appeal is discretionary. As an exception to the rule that only a final judgment may be executed, it must be strictly construed. Thus, execution pending appeal should not be granted routinely but only in extraordinary circumstances.

The Rules of Court does not enumerate the circumstances which would justify the execution of the judgment or decision pending appeal. However, we have held that "good reasons" consist of compelling or superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages suffered should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment or final order. The existence of good reasons is what confers discretionary power on a court to issue a writ of execution pending appeal. These reasons must be stated in the order granting the same. Unless they are divulged, it would be difficult to determine whether judicial discretion has been properly exercised.

In this case, do good reasons exist to justify the grant by the SAC of the motion for execution pending appeal? The answer is a resounding YES.

The expropriation of private property under RA 6657 is a revolutionary kind of expropriation being a means to obtain social justice by distributing land to the farmers, envisioning freedom from the bondage to the land they actually till. As an exercise of police power, it puts the landowner, not the government, in a situation where the odds are practically against him. He cannot resist it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the property taken by the government. As expected, the landowner will exercise this right to the hilt, subject to the limitation that he can only be entitled to "just compensation." Clearly therefore, by rejecting and disputing the valuation of the DAR, the landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just compensation.

The SAC found that the valuation made by the petitioner, and affirmed by DAR, was unjustly way below the fair valuation of the landholding at the time of its taking by the DAR. The SAC, mindful also of the advanced age of the respondents at the time of the presentation of evidence for the determination of just compensation, deemed it proper to grant their motion for execution pending appeal with the objective of ensuring "prompt payment" of just compensation.

Contrary to the view of the petitioner, "prompt payment" of just compensation is not satisfied by the mere deposit with any accessible bank of the provisional compensation determined by it or by the DAR, and its subsequent release to the landowner after compliance with the legal requirements.

The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also payment within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.

REPUBLIC V. PHIL-VILLE (REMEDIAL)

Issue: Whether or not a final determination of just compensation in an expropriation proceeding must first be made before an order of expropriation may be issued by the court.

Jurisprudential law has already settled that condemnation suits involve two stages:

1. the order authorizing expropriation; and
2. the judgment on just compensation.

Petitioner Republic is correct in saying that an order of expropriation denotes the end of the first stage of expropriation. Its end then paves the way for the second stage - the determination of just compensation, and ultimately, payment. An order of expropriation puts an end to any ambiguity regarding the right of the petitioner to condemn the respondent's properties.

Because an order of expropriation merely determines the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of such exercise, its issuance does not hinge on the payment of just compensation. After all, there would be no point in determining just compensation if in the first place, the plaintiff's right to expropriate the property was not first clearly established.

To stress, payment of just compensation is not a condition sine qua non to the issuance of an order of expropriation. In expropriation proceedings, it is the transfer of title to the land expropriated that must wait until the indemnity is actually paid. This is made all the more clear when note is taken of the second paragraph of Section 4, Rule 67, which states that the defendant may appeal from the order of expropriation by filing a record on appeal, which appeal does not prevent the court form determining the just compensation to be paid.

Clearly, it is after the rendition of the order of expropriation that the court shall appoint commissioners to ascertain the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.

NAPOCOR V. CA (REMEDIAL)

Issue: At what point should the value of the land subject of expropriation be computed: at the time of taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain?

Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Hence, many rulings of this Court have equated just compensation with the value of the property as of the time of filing of the complaint.

The general rule however admits of an exception where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.

In the old case of Provincial Government of Rizal v. Caro de Araullo, the Court ruled that ..."the owners of the land have no right to recover damages for this unearned increment resulting from the construction of the public improvement (lengthening of Taft Avenue from Manila to Pasay) for which the land was taken. To permit them to do so would be to allow them to recover more than the value of the land at the time when it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just compensation and would discourage the construction of important public improvements.

In Municipality of La Carlota v. Spouses Felicidad Baltazar and Vicente Gan, Justice Fernando said ..."the owner as is the constitutional intent, is paid what he is entitled to according to the value of the property so devoted to public use as of the date of taking. From that time, he had been deprived thereof. He had no choice but to submit. He is not, however to be despoiled of such a right. No less than the fundamental law guarantee is just compensation. It would be an injustice to him certainly if from such a period, he could not recover the value of what was lost. There could be on the other hand, injustice to the expropriator if by a delay in the collection, the increment in price would accrue to the owner. The doctrine to which this Court has been committed is intended precisely to avoid contingency fraught with unfairness."

BRGY SAN ROQUE V. HEIRS OF PASTOR (REMEDIAL)

We agree with the petitioner that an EXPROPRIATION suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use.

As held in NAPOCOR v. Jocson, expropriation proceedings have two phases:

1. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, 'of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned for the public use or purpose described in the complaint.
2. The second phase is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the court with the held of three commissioners.

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government's exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

REPUBLIC V. ANDAYA (REMEDIAL)

Issue: Is the Republic liable for just compensation if in enforcing the legal easement of right-of-way on a property, the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable?

It is undisputed that there is a legal easement of right-of-way in favor of the Republic. We are unable t sustain Republic's argument that it is not liable to pay consequential damages if in enforcing the legal easement of Andaya's property, the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable.

TAKING in the exercise of the power of eminent domain occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property. Using this standard, there was undoubtedly a taking of the remaining area of Andaya's property.

True, no burden was imposed thereon and Andaya still retained title and possession of the property. But the nature and the effect of the floodwalls would deprive Andaya of the normal use of the remaining areas. It would prevent ingress and egress to the property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming form the Agusan River.

For this reason, in our view, Andaya is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less that the monetary equivalent of the land.

JC (Just Compensation) = FMV (Fair Market Value) + CD (Consequential Damages) - CB (Consequential Benefits) (CB should not exceed CD)

Eminent Domain is the substantive law. Expropriation is the procedural law. Public use or public purpose may cater only to a minority.