Showing posts with label Laches. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Laches. Show all posts

Friday, June 26, 2009

FIGUEROA V. PEOPLE (CIVIL)


The Court, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should however be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. ESTOPPEL BY LACHES, to bar a litigant from asserting the court's absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.

Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not duffer any harm.

Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of estoppel by laches unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforces, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes. In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their Cavalry once more after more or less 15 years. The same, however, does not obtain in this instant case.

We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely - only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great case and the equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction is null an void for want of jurisdiction.

Friday, May 22, 2009

ABADIANO V. MARTIR (REMEDIAL)


It is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal. such findings are binding and conclusive on the Court. The jurisdiction of the Court is limited only to review of ERRORS OF LAW, unless the case falls under the recognized exceptions, namely:

  1. when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
  2. when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
  3. when there is grave abuse of discretion;
  4. when the judgment is based of a misapprehension of facts;
  5. when the findings of fact are conflicting;
  6. when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
  7. when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
  8. when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
  9. when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and
  10. when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

In the present case, we find that the trial court based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts, as well as on the supposed absence of evidence which is contradicted by the records.

Considering that the action is one for quieting of title and respondents anchored their claim to the property on the disputed Compra Y Venta, we find it necessary to say that it was incumbent upon the trial court to have resolved first the issue of the document's due execution and authenticity before determining its validity.

Respondents attached only a photocopy of the Compra Y Venta to their complaint and alleged that the original of said document was in the Register of Deeds, that they tried to obtain a copy but was refused. No other evidence but these assertions were presented.

The Rule states that when the original document is unavailable, has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produces in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

In the case at bar, respondents failed to establish that the offer in evidence of the document was made in accordance with any of the exceptions allowed under the Rule, and yet the trial court accepted the document as genuine and proceeded to determine its validity based on such assumption.

The trial court likewise brushed aside the apparent defect that the document presented contained the same notarial inscription as the Agreement on Partition. We stress that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity.

In this case, while it is true that the error in the notarial inscription would not have invalidated the sale - if indeed it took place - the same error would have meant that the document cannot be treated as a notarial document and thus, not entitled to the presumption of regularity. The document would be taken out of the realm of the public documents whose genuineness and due execution need not be proved.

Under the Property Registration Decree, no title to register land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Indefeasibility and imprescriptibility are the cornerstones of land registration proceedigns. Barring any mistake or use of fraud in the procurement of title, owners may rest secure on their ownership and possession once their title is registered under the protective mantle on the Torrens system.

Nonetheless, even if a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches.

The four basic elements of laches are:

  1. conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
  2. delay on asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
  3. injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred.

The reason for the rule is not simply the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition which may have arisen during the period in which there has been neglect.

Though laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that petitioner is not guilty of laches. The evidence on record does not support such finding.

Petitioner had reasonable ground to believe that the property, being still in the name of his predecessor-in-interest, continued to be theirs, especially considering that the annotation of the purported sale was done only in 1982. According to petitioner, his father had told him that his inheritance was in the possession of their uncle, who knew likewise that the property was theirs.

That the petitioner and his co-heirs waited until the death of said uncle to try and occupy the land is understandable. They had to be careful about the actions they took, lest they sow dissent within the family. Further, they knew that their parents revered the uncle.

The Court has recognized that this reaction cannot be characterized as such delay as would amount to laches.

In sum, we find that petitioner is not guilty of such neglect or inaction as would bar his claim to the property in question. In contrast, it is most telling that respondents, who are claiming to have been in possession of the property by virtue of an alleged duly constituted sale for almost 60 years. have themselves failed within that long period to have the same property transferred in their name or even only to have the sale annotated on the title of the property.















Thursday, April 9, 2009

DURISOL V. CA (REMEDIAL)


The RTC, formerly the CFI, is an court of general jurisdiction. All cases, the jurisdiction over which is not specifically provided for by law to be within the jurisdiction of any other court, fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC. But the RTC is also a court of limited jurisdiction over, among others, cadastral and land registration cases. All proceedings involving title to real property, or specifically land registration cases, including incidents such as the issuance or owner's duplicate certificate of title, are matters cognizable by the RTC.

It has been ruled that the RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving possession of land, except forcible entry and unlawful detainer.

A judgment rendered by a trial court for alleged lack of jurisdiction cannot be considered void where the party who has the right to challenge it failed to do so at the first instance.

Indeed, it was only 2 decades after the institution of the case at bar, when the issue of jurisdiction was first raised. However, it is already too late since the judgment had already attained finality, considering that more than 4 years have elapsed without any action from petitioner.

Rule 47, Section 3 expressly provides that a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction must be files before it is barred by laches or estoppel. Hence, it has been held that while jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at any time of the proceedings, this rule presupposes that laches or estoppel has not supervened.






Wednesday, March 25, 2009

SAN ROQUE REALTY V. REPUBLIC (EXPROPRIATION, LACHES, LAND REGISTRATION)


In Republic v. Lim, we emphasized that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation in paid.

Without FULL PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Thus, the Republic's failure to pay just compensation precluded the perfection of its title over the lot sought to be expropriated. In fact, we went even further and recognized the right of the unpaid owner to recover the property if within 5 years from the decision of the expropriation court, the expropriator fails to effect payment of just compensation.

Time and again, we have declared that EMINENT DOMAIN cases are to be strictly construed against the expropriator. The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is an indispensable requisite for the exercise of the State's sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe this requirement renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed public purpose. To disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over private rights.

From the records of this case and our previous findings in the related case, the Republic manifestly failed to present clear and convincing evidence of full payment of just compensation and receipt thereof by the property owners. More importantly, if the Republic had actually made full payment of just compensation, in the ordinary course of things, it would have led to the cancellation of title, or at least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the government on the certificate of title.

The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the Republic's interest arising from the exercise of it's power or eminent domain is in consonance with the Land Registration Act. There is no showing that the Republic complied with the aforesaid registration requirement.

From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic to cause the registration of the subject properties in its name or record the decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, not only did the Republic fail to register the subject properties in its name, it failed to do so for 56 years.

This brings us to the question: Is the Republic, by its failure or neglect to assert its claim, barred by laches?

LACHES is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel or laches by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. This rule, however, admits of exceptions. One exception is when the strict application of the rule will defeat the effectiveness of a policy adopted to protect the public, such as the Torrens system.

Very telling of the Republic's silence and inaction, whether intentional or by sheer negligence, is the testimony of Infante, the Republic's witness in the proceedings before the RTC, testifying that several surveys were conducted on a number of expropriated lots, which surveys showed that the subject lot was still registered in the name of the original owners. As such, Infante recommended in his report that legal action be taken. Yet despite aforesaid recommendation, title to subject lot remained registered in the name of the original owners, ans subsequently, its transferees. This silence and unexplained inaction by the Republic clearly constitute laches.

The trial court correctly held that title registered under the Torrens system is notice to the whole world. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and the law will not oblige him to go beyond what appears on the face thereof to determine the condition of the property.

An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the certificate of title, bought the property from the registered owner, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before ha has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.