AYSON V. PARAGAS (REMEDIAL)

It must be remembered that in EJECTMENT suits, the issue to be resolved is merely the physical possession over the property, i.e., possession de facto and not possession de jure, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by the party-litigants. Should the defendant in an ejectment case raise the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. The judgment rendered in such an action shall be conclusive only with respect to physical possession and shall in no wise bind the title to the realty or constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication of the merits on the issue of ownership. Therefore, such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting the title or ownership over the property, which action was precisely resorted to by respondent-spouses in this case.

The Deed of Absolute Sale is in reality, an equitable mortgage or a contract of loan secured by a mortgage. Article 1602 of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which a contract, purporting to be a sale, is considered only as a contract of loan secured by a mortgage, to wit:

1. when the price of the sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;
2. when the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
3. when upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or grating a new period is executed;
4. when the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price; when the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
5. in any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.

In this case, the evidence before the RTC had established that the possession of the subject property remained with respondent-spouses despite the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. In fact, testimonies during the trial showed that petitioner and his predecessors never disturbed the possession of the respondent-spouses until the filing of the ejectment case.

An equitable mortgage is a voidable contract. As such, it may be annulled within 4 years from the time the cause of action accrues. This case, however, not only involves a contract resulting from fraud, but covers a transaction ridden with threat, intimidation, and continuing undue influence which started when petitioner's adoptive father, Felix's superior, practically bullied respondent-spouses into signing the Deed of Absolute Sale under threat of incarceration. Thus, the 4-year period should start from the time the defect in the consent ceases. The complaint was filed well within the 4-year prescriptive period.

Regarding the finality of the adjudication of physical possession in favor of petitioner, it may be reiterated that the right of possession is a necessary incident of ownership. This adjudication of ownership of the property to respondent-spouses must include the delivery of possession to them since the petitioner has not shown a superior right to retain possession of the land independently of his claim of ownership which is herein rejected. Verily, to grant execution of the judgment in the ejectment case would work an injustice on respondent-spouses who had been conclusively declared the owners and thus, right possessors of the disputed land.

ACCESSORIES SPECIALIST V. ALABANZA (LABOR)

Petitioners aver that the action of the respondents for the recovery of unpaid wages, separation pay, and the 13th month pay has already prescribed since the action was filed almost 5 years from the time Jones severed his employment from ASI. Jones files his resignation on 31 October 1997, while the complaint before the La was instituted on 29 September 2002. Petitioners contend that the 3-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code had already set in, thereby barring all of respondent's money claims arising from their employer-employee relationship.

Based on the findings of fact of the LA, it was ASI which was responsible for the delay in the institution of the complaint. When Jones filed his resignation, he immediately asked for the payment of his money claims. However, the management of ASI promised him that he would be paid immediately after the claims of the rank-and-file employees had been paid. Jones relied on this representation. Unfortunately, the promise was never fulfilled even until the time of Jones' death.

In light of these circumstances, we can apply the principle of PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL, which is a recognized exception to the 3-year prescriptive period enunciated in Article 291 of the Labor Code.

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL may arise from the making of a promise, even though without consideration,

1. if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon, as in fact it was relied upon, and
2. if a refusal to enforce it would virtually sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice.

Promissory estoppel presupposes the existence of a promise on the part of one against whom estoppel is claimed. the promise must be plain and unambiguous and sufficiently specific so that the court can understand the obligation assumed and enforce the promise according to its terms.

In order to make out a claim of promissory estoppel, a party bears the burden of establishing the following elements: a promise was reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance; such promise did, in fact, induce such action or forbearance; and the party suffered detriment as a result.

All the requisites of promissory estoppel are present in this case. Jones relied on the promise of ASI that he would be paid as soon as the claims of all rank-and-file employees had been paid. If not for this promise that he had held on to until the time of his death, we see no reason why he would delay filing the complaint before the LA. Thus, we find ample justification not to follow the prescriptive period imposed under Article 291 of the Labor Code. Great injustice will be committed if we will brush aside the employee's claims on a mere technicality, especially when it was petitioner's own action that prevented respondent from interposing the claims within the required period.

Petitioners argue that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their appeal for failure to post the complete amount of the bond. They assert that they cannot post an appeal bond due to financial incapacity. They say that strict enforcement of the NLRC rules of procedure that appeal bond shall be equivalent to the monetary award is oppressive and would have the effect of depriving petitioners of their right to appeal.

Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, the posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the LA.

The filing of a bond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Non-compliance therewith renders the decision of the LA final and executory. This requirement is intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal. It is intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay or evade their obligation to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims.

Furthermore, we would like to reiterate that appeal is not a constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege. Thus, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements for perfecting an appeal must as a rule, be strictly followed.

The propriety of the monetary award of the LA is already binding upon this Court. Petitioners' failure to perfect their appeal in the manner and period required by the rules makes the award final and executory. Just as a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision.