LARANO V. CALENDACION (REMEDIAL)

Issue: Whether the complaint is one for unlawful detainer.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. The test for determining the sufficiency of those allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff.

In UNLAWFUL DETAINER, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.

Applied to the present case, petitioner, as vendor, must comply with two requisites for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit:

1. there must be failure to pay the installment due or comply with the conditions of the Contract to Sell (cause of action); and
2. there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in Rule 70, namely: 15 days in case of land and 5 days in case of buildings (jurisdictional requirement).

The first requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer, while the second refers to the jurisdiction requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued.

Both demands - to pay installment due or adhere to the terms of the Contract to Sell and to vacate are necessary to make the vendee deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be filed. It is the vendor's demand for the vendee to vacate the premises and the vendee's refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of the possession. Such refusal violates the vendor's right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer. However, prior to the institution of such action, a demand from the vendor to pay the installment due or comply with the conditions of the Contract to Sell and to vacate the premises is required under the rule.

Thus, mere failure to pay the installment due or violation of the terms of the Contract to Sell does not automatically render a person's possession unlawful. Furthermore, the giving of such demand must be alleged in the complaint; otherwise, the MTC cannot acquire jurisdiction.

It is clear from the foregoing that the allegations in the Complaint failed to constitute a case of unlawful detainer. What is clear is that in the Complaint, petitioner alleged that respondents had violated the terms of the Contract to Sell. However, the Complaint failed to state the petitioner made demands upon respondents to comply with the conditions of the contract - the payment of the installments and the accounting and delivery of the harvests. When the complaint does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC does not have jurisdiction to hear the case.

JAVELOSA V. CA (REMEDIAL)

In FORCIBLE ENTRY cases, the prescriptive period is counted from the date of defendant's actual entry on the land; in UNLAWFUL DETAINER, from the date of last demand to vacate.

Hence, to determine whether the case was filed on time, there was a necessity to ascertain whether the complaint was one for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. In light of these consideration, the Court ruled that since the main distinction between the two actions is when and how defendant entered the land, the determinative facts should be alleged in the complaint.

It is settled that prior physical possession is indispensable only in actions for forcible entry but not in unlawful detainer. Since we have ruled that the MTC case filed against petitioner is one for unlawful detainer, petitioner's prior possession of the land is of no moment. Private respondents are entitled to its possession from the time title was issued in their favor as registered owners. An action for unlawful detainer may be filed when possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of their right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied.

We find that private respondents have adequately proved that they are entitled to possess the subject land as the registered owners thereof. The age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over the land is entitled to possession thereof. Except for the bare claim that the title of private respondents was obtained in bad faith, petitioner has pointed to no right to justify his continued possession of the subject property.

Be that as it may, we reiterate the rule that the award of possession de facto over the subject land to private respondents would not constitute res judicata as to the issue of ownership thereof, which issue is still litigated before the RTC where the case for annulment of mortgages and foreclosure proceedings is pending.

The one-year period should be counted:

• unlawful detainer - from the date of last demand to vacate.
• forcible entry - from accrual of cause of action (dispossession).

REFUGIA V. CA (REMEDIAL)

Issue: Whether the MTC, as well as the RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, have jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership in an action for unlawful detainer where the issue of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the question of ownership.

As the law on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases now stands, even where the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the MTCs, nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve the issue of ownership albeit only to determine the issue of possession as set forth in Section 33(2) of BP 129.

In the case at bar, petitioners failed to show that they were legally entitled to continue occupying the unit in question. On the considerations detailed, we agree with the position of respondent CA that petitioners would in effect be occupying the premises by mere tolerance. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The status of petitioners is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner.