PARISH PRIEST OF VICTORIA V. RIGOR (CIVIL)

The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any iterpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his contention was different from that literally expressed.

The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills. It is the greatest rule in giving effect to a will.

From the testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say masses for the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.

On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in two situations: (a) during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for priesthood; and (b) in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated.

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria as envisaged in the will was likewise inoperative.

The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator in his favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee. The contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions does not support the view that the parish priest was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.

The CA correctly rules that this case is covered by Article 956 of the Civil Code which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in this the right of accretion exists."

This case is also covered by Article 960(2) which provides "legal succession takes place when the will does not dispose of all the belongings to the testator." There being mo substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands, the same should be distributed among the legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.

The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. If a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property recovered by the said legacy.

TANG SING PAN V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (CIVIL)

In Director of Lands v. Benitez, the Court categorically stated that publication is essential to establish jurisdiction in land registration and cadastral cases, without which the court cannot acquire jurisdiction thereon or obtain any authority to proceed therewith.

it is incumbent upon the petitioners to establish by positive proof that the publication requirement has been complied with, that with the fact that they are the ones who stood to be benefited by adjudication of the subject lot. Regrettably, they failed to present proof of publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing.

There being no indication at all from the records of the case that notice of the Order for Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation, without which the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, the decision rendered by the CFI confirming petitioners' title over the subject lot is void ab initio for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

SPOUSES GULLA V. HEIRS OF LABRADOR (CIVIL)

The trial court, the RTC, and the CA were one in ruling that the 562 sqm property is part of the public domain, hence, beyond the commerce of men and not capable of registration. In fact, the land is within the salvage zone fronting China Sea as well as the property covered by OCT P-13350 in the name of respondents.

The provision relied upon is Article 440 of the New Civil code, which states that " the ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially." This however, does not apply in this case, considering that the 562 sqm lot is a foreshore land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by ordinary flow of the tides.

Such property belongs to the public domain and is no longer needed for public use. Respondents thus have no possessory right over the property unless upon application, the government through the then Bureau of Lands had granted them permit.

There is no question that no such permit was issued or granted in favor of respondents. This being the case, respondents have no cause of action to cause petitioners' eviction from the subject property. The real party-in-interest to file a complaint against petitioners for recovery of possession of the subject property and cause petitioners' eviction therefrom is the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General. Consequently, petitioners cannot be required to pay any rentals to respondents for their possession of the property.

SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CONFERENCE CHURCH OF SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES V. NOREASTERN MINDANAO OF SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST (CIVIL)

Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another person who accepts it. The donation could not have been made in favor of an entity yet inexistent at the time it was made. Nor could it have been accepted as there was yet no one to accept it.

Further, according to Article 1477 of the Civil Code, the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof. On this, the noted author Arturo Tolentino had this to say:

"The execution of a public instrument xxx transfers the ownership from the vendor to the vendee who may thereafter exercise the rights of an owner over the same.

Here, transfer of ownership from spouses Cosio to respondent was made upon constructive delivery of the property when the sale was made through a public instrument. TCT No. 4468 was thereafter issued and it remains in the name of respondent.

SAN JUAN V. CRUZ (CIVIL)

The heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within the specified period, a legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for the estate of the deceased.

The pronouncement of this court in Lawas v. CA (relied upon by petitioner) that priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and that it is only in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, is no longer true.

RODRIGUEZ V. CA (CIVIL)

Issue: whether or not respondents Barrameda's adverse claim on the property should prevail over the levy on execution issued by another court in satisfaction of a judgment against respondents Calingo.

Ruling. NO, it cannot. Respondents Barrameda anchor their claim on the property on the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage executed by them and respondents Calingo. The Property Registration Decree requires that such document be registered with the Register of Deeds in order to be binding on third persons. The law provides:

Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner - An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases, or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.

RIVERA V. VILLANUEVA (CIVIL)

The cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927-1963 was adulterous, their property relations during those 36 years were not governed by Article 144 of the Civil Code, which applies only if the couple living together is not in any way incapacitated from getting married.

According to the doctrine laid down by Juaniza Agapay v. Palang, we expounded on this doctrine that in such relationship, it is necessary for each of the partners to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.

REPUBLIC/MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT V. BALTAZAR (CIVIL)

The juridical condition of co-ownership of things or right is terminated by:

1. the consolidation in only one of the owners of all the shares of the others;
2. the destruction of the thing or the loss of the right (co-ownership);
3. prescription in favor of a third person; and
4. the partition which converts into certain and definite parts the respective undivided shares of the co-owners.

Here, it is clear that upon the sale of the lots by respondent's brothers and sisters to petitioner, the right of co-ownership among them ceased or was lost.

We have held that there is juridical dissolution of co-ownership when the thing is sold, either publicly or privately, to third persons.

Likewise, a co-ownership is terminated by prescription in favor of a third person.

PREYSLER V. CA (CIVIL)

The CA was correct in its findings that the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested situation that preceded the controversy was solely the access of petitioner and his household to his property outside the subdivision for visits and inspections. At the time the writ was applied for in 1995, there was still no construction going on in the property. It was merely raw land. The use of the subdivision roads for ingress and egress of construction workers, heavy equipment, delivery of construction materials, and installation of power lines, are clearly not part of the status quo in the original writ. Along this time, the CA properly set aside the amended writ and reinstated the original writ.

However, under Article 656 of the New Civil Code, if the RIGHT OF WAY is indispensable for the construction, repair, improvement, alteration, or beautification of a building, a temporary easement is granted after payment of indemnity for the damage caused to the servient estate.

In our view, however, "indispensable" in this instance is not to be construed literally. Great convenience is sufficient. In the present case, the trial court found that irrespective of which route petitioner used in gaining access to his property, he has to pass private respondent's subdivision. Thus, we agree that petitioner may be granted a temporary easement. This temporary easement in the original writ differs from the permanent easement of right of way now being tried in the main case.

PELBEL MANUFACTURING CORP. V. CA (CIVIL)

The controlling law is the Public Land Act. It governs what were used to be known as public agricultural lands, or what are otherwise known as ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

Under the Public Land Act, there is a presumption that the land applied for belongs to the State, and that the occupants and possessors can only claim an interest in the land by virtue of their imperfect title or open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession thereof for a period prescribed by law.

This principle is rooted in the Regalian doctrine, under which the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. The basic doctrine is that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Any applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title has the burden of proving, by incontrovertible evidence, that:

1. the land applied for is alienable and disposable public land; and
2. the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land, in the concept of an owner, openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely, since 12 June 1945, or earlier.

Possession is open when it is visible and apparent to a common observer. Continuous possession consists of uninterrupted acts of non-permissive possession of property by the current occupants and their predecessors.

To be notorious, possession must be so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or at least by the people in the vicinity of the premises. Mere possession of land and the making of vague assertions to the public that a possessor is claiming the land are not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of open and notorious possession.

Bernardo, petitioner's common predecessor-in-interest failed to show that his alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration required by law. Bare and general allegations, without more, do not amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden to the oppositor, in this case, the Republic. Further, it militates against the claim of actual possession under a claim of ownership since June 1945, that the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 1980, or 5 years before the filing of the application.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY V. ALMEIDA (CIVIL)

When the petitioner received the Sinumpaang Salaysay, it should have noted that the effectivity of the said document commences at the time of the death of the author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako ay bawian ng Diyos ng aking buhay." Hence, in such period, all the interest of the person should cease to be heirs and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to the heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code:

Article 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights, and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.

By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has already passed away. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirs, in accordance with a will or by operation of law.

If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the decedent should transfer by operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other parties a property already initially paid for by the decendent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on succession and the law on sales and obligations.

HERBON V. PALAD (CIVIL)

As to the shares in the disputed parcel of land that are subject of the 2 deeds acquired during the marriage of Gonzalo and Remedios, they are also conjugal shares, such that upon the death of Gonzalo, one-half of the subject shares were automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Remedios, as her share in the conjugal partnership. Gonzalo's rights to the other half, including his conjugal share from his first marriage, were transmitted upon his death to his widow, Remedios and his children with the first wife Alejandra. upon the death of Remedios, the shares which she inherited from Gonzalo, are inherited in turn by her 3 sons, herein petitioners, being her compulsory heirs.

Thus, petitioners, as co-owners, have the right to possess and occupy the subject lot. Until there is partition, the New Civil Code provisions on co-ownership shall govern the rights of the parties. The specific shares of the parties cannot be resolved in this case since it is not clear from the records whether all of Gonzalo's children from his first marriage were alive at the time of his death.

An action for partition is the proper forum to determine the particular portions properly pertaining to petitioners and respondents, as well as the accounting of the profits or income received by petitioners from the use of the land.

HEIRS OF SALVADOR HERMOSILLA V. SPOUSES REMOQUILLO (CIVIL)

The CA, reversing the decision of the trial court, held that the Kasunduan was void because at the time of its execution in 1972, the Republic of the Philippines was still the owner of Lot 19, hence, no right thereover was transmitted by Jaime who was awarded the said lot in 1986, and consequently, no right was transmitted by Salvador through succession to petitioners. And it found no evidence of fraud in Jaime's act of having Lot 19, including the questioned property, registered in his and his wife's name in 1987.

As priorly stated, when the Kasunduan was executed in 1972 by Jaime in favor of Salvador - petitioners' predecessor-in-interest - Lot 19, of which the questioned property forms part, was still owned by the Republic. Nemo dat quod no habet, Nobody can give what he does not possess. Jaime could not thus have transferred anything to Salvador via the Kasunduan.

HEIRS OF REGALADO V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (CIVIL)

Marina's heirs as applicants in this land registration case "bear the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain." This they failed to discharge.

In addition, other than Marina's uncorroborated testimony given in a previous attempt to have the property registered, there is not proof to sustain the trial court's finding that Marina, her uncle, aunt, and other relatives have been residing in the property for more than 30 years and that she herself had been residing there for 15 years when a Tomas Antero executed the deed of assignment in her favor.

In fine, the trial court's finding that Marina had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of owner under a bona fide claim of ownership fails.

HEIRS OF MARCELINO CABAL V. SPOUSES CABAL (CIVIL)

It has been said that good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, the applicable provision is Article 448. Thus, the owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building, planting, or sowing, after payment to the builder, planter or sower of the necessary and useful expenses, and in the proper case, for pure luxury or mere pleasure.

The owner of the land may also oblige the builder, planter, sower to purchase and pay the price of the land. If the owner chooses to sell his land, the builder, planter, and sower must purchase the land, otherwise, the owner may remove the improvements thereon.

The builder, planter, or sower, however, is not obliged to purchase the land if its value is considerably more than the building, planting, or sowing. In such case, the builder, planter, or sower must pay rent to the owner of the land.

If the parties cannot come into terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof. The right to choose between appropriating the improvement or selling the land on which the improvement stands to the builder, planter, sower, is given to the owner of the land.

ESPINO V. VICENTE (CIVIL)

A DONATION is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or a right in favour of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposed the following requisites:

1. It should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers;
2. it should be free; and
3. it should be spontaneous.

The parties' intention must be clear and that attendance of vice of consent, like in any other contract, renders the donation voidable.

It s evident that fraud attended the act of respondent Emma when she procured the signatures of Marceline and Emerciana. There is fraud when through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induces into a contract which without them, he would have agreed to. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.

ANCHETA V. GUERSEY-DALAYGON (CIVIL)

A decree of distribution of the estate of the deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which if erroneous, may be corrected by a timely appeal, Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.

However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.

Petitioner's failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey's estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence, the CA decision annulling RTC orders must be upheld.

ABING V. WAEYAN (CIVIL)

Any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares.

Their property relationship is governed by the rules on CO-OWNERSHIP. and under this regime, they owned their properties in common "in equal shares." Being herself a co-wner of the structure in question, respondent, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.