Showing posts with label labor law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label labor law. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

GOMA V. PAMPLONA PLANTATION (LABOR)


Article 280 of the Labor Code provides that there are two kinds of REGULAR EMPLOYEES, namely:
  1. Regular employees by nature of work - Those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer (regardless of length of service); and
  2. Regular employees by years of service - Those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed (regardless of nature of work).

If the law has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability, of that activity to the business.

Petitioner was engaged to perform carpentry work. His services were needed for a period of 2 years until such time that respondent decided not to give him work assignment anymore. Owing to his length of service, petitioner became a regular employee, by operation of law.

The principal test used to determine whether employees are PROJECT EMPLOYEES as distinguished from REGULAR EMPLOYEES, is whether or not the employees were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration or scope of which was specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project. In this case, apart from the respondent's bare allegation that petitioner was a project employee, it had not shown that petitioner was informed that he would be assigned to a specific project or undertaking. Neither was it established that he was informed of the duration and scope of such project or undertaking at the time of his engagement.

Well-settled is the rule that regular employees enjoy SECURITY OF TENURE and they can only be dismissed for just cause and with due process, i.e., after notice and hearing. In cases involving an employee's dismissal, the burden is on the employer to prove that the dismissal was legal. This burden was not amply discharged by the respondent in this case. The requirement of substantive due process was not complied with. In view of the non-observance of both substantive and procedural due process, petitioner's dismissal from employment is declared ILLEGAL.

Thursday, February 26, 2009

BISIG MANGGAGAWA SA TRYCO V. NLRC (LABOR)


The SC had no reason to deviate from the well-entrenched rule that FINDINGS OF FACT OF LABOR OFFICIALS, WHO ARE DEEMED TO HAVE ACQUIRED EXPERTISE IN MATTERS WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE JURISDICTION, ARE GENERALLY ACCORDED NOT ONLY RESPECT BUT EVEN FINALITY, AND BIND THE SC WHEN SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. This is particularly true when the findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA are in absolute agreement.

While the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVES. The free will of the management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied. This prerogative extends to the management's right to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including the freedom to transfer and reassign employees according to the requirements of its business.

Management prerogative of transferring and reassigning employees from one area of operation to another in order to meet the requirements of the business is therefore generally not constitutive of constructive dismissal.




Tuesday, February 24, 2009

AGULLANO V. CHRISTIAN PUBLISHING (LABOR)


The Constitution, statutes, and jurisprudence uniformly mandate that NO WORKER SHALL BE DISMISSED EXCEPT FOR A JUST OR VALID CAUSE PROVIDED BY LAW, AND ONLY AFTER DUE PROCESS IS PROPERLY OBSERVED. In recent decisions, the SC said that dismissals have two facets: (1) the legality of the act of dismissal, which constitutes substantive due process; and (2) the legality of the manner of dismissal, which constitutes procedural due process.

Though petitioner's habitual unexplained absences and tardiness constitute habitual and gross neglect of duties in compliance with the first facet of a valid dismissal (just cause), on the second requisite, i.e., procedural due process, the SC found employer's compliance with the twin-notice requirement sadly wanting and inadequate.

To reiterate, under the twin-notice rule, the employees must be given two (2) notices before employment could be terminated: (1) a first notice containing the specific causes or grounds for termination against them and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period; and (2) a second notice to communicate to the employees that grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.

The dismissal from employment was attended by a violation by the employer of procedural due process.

Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal or render it illegal or ineffectuall. The employer is to indemnify in the form of NOMINAL DAMAGES the employee for violations of his statutory rights and the indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer TO DISCOURAGE THE ABHORRENT PRACTICE OF "DISMISS NOW, PAY LATER.

Friday, February 20, 2009

MANILA HOTEL EMPLOYEES ASSOC. V. MANILA HOTEL CORP. (LABOR)



Defiance of the assumption order or a return-to-work order by a striking employee, whether a union officer or a member, is an illegal act and therefore, a valid ground for loss of employment status.

The assumption of jurisdiction by the SOLE over labor disputes causing or likely to cause a strike or a lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest is in the nature of a police power measure.

A return-to-work order is immediately executory notwithstanding the filing of an MR or any petition questioning its validity. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation, regardless of their motives.

As a general rule, the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not only because the Constitution imposes sympathy but because of the one-sided relation between labor and capital. The Court must take care however, that in the contest between labor and capital, the results achieved are fair and in conformity with the rules.