ESPINO V. VICENTE (Donation)

492 SCRA 330
June 22, 2006

Facts: Petitioner’s parents Emerenciana and Doroteo were owners of 2 untitled parcels of land, a portion of which they sold to a Marissa Delos Santos in 1995. Sometime in 1996, their nephew’s wife Emma made Emerenciana and Petitioner Marcelina sign a document to be used in titling the properties in their name. Being both illiterate, they did not know that the document they signed was actually a Deed of Donation in favour of Emma.

Issue: Whether the assailed deed of donation enjoys the legal presumption of due execution and validity

Held: A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or a right in favour of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites:

1. It should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers;
2. It should be free;
3. It should be spontaneous.

The parties’ intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like in any other contract, renders the donation voidable.

It is evident that fraud attended the act of respondent Emma when she procured the signatures of Marcelina and Emerenciana. There is fraud when through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced into a contract which without them, he would have agreed to. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.

ANCHETA V. GUERSEY-DALAYGON (Succession)

Binding Effect of Judgments
490 SCRA 140
June 8, 2006

Facts: Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate improvements at Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors. Two years after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter.

Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion and project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richard’s will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.

Issue: Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the circumstances.

Held: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.

However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.

Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

ABING V. WAEYAN (Coownership)

497 SCRA 202
July 31, 2006

Facts: In 1986, petitioner and respondent cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, they bought a house erected on a lot owned by Dino in Benguet. The tax declaration was thereafter transferred to respondent’s name.

In 1995, they decided to partition their properties as their relationship soured. Eventually, petitioner demanded respondent to vacate the annex structure when respondent failed to pay petitioner’s share in their properties. Petitioner alleged that he alone paid for the construction of the annex structure.

Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner.

Held: Any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common “in equal shares.” Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, respondent, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.