MANDAUE DINGHOW DIMSUM HOUSE V. NLRC (LABOR, REMEDIAL, CORPORATION CODE)

There are 3 issues which require resolution in this case:

1. Whether the non-filing of the Motion for Reconsideration before resorting to certiorari is justified;
2. Whether the Alias Writ of Execution was validly issued despite the finality of the NLRC decision; and
3. Whether the Doctrine of Piercing the Veil of corporate Fiction was properly invoked.

The first issue, the SC resolved in the affirmative.

Section 1 , Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states that in order to avail oneself of the special civil action for certiorari, one must be left with no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of an assailed decision is deemed a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law. The well-established rule is that an MR is a indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. the purpose of such rule is to afford the erring court or agency an opportunity to rectify the error/s it may have committed without the intervention of a higher court. The requisite motion is not only an expeditious remedy of an aggrieved party but it also obviates an improvident and unnecessary recourse to appellate proceedings. Failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC before availing oneself of the special civil action for certiorari is a fatal infirmity.

However, this rule is subject to certain recognized exceptions, to wit:

1. where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
2. where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised ans passed upon in the lower court;
3. where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question ans any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable;
4. where, under the circumstances, an MR would be useless;
5. where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
6. where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
7. where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
8. where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
9. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

The instant case falls squarely within the first of the enumerated exceptions as the NLRC decision is a patent nullity considering that the LA and the NLRC were devoid of any jurisdiction to alter or modify the NLRC decision which already attained finality.

Correlatively, we answer the second issue in the negative.

The Order and the Alias Writ of Execution issued by the LA are null and void for lack of jurisdiction and for altering the tenor of the NLRC decision. The private respondents did not assail this ruling; thus, the same became final and executory and the correction made by NLRC which is substantial can no longer be allowed.

It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolutions of the court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties. Once a decision or order becomes final and executory, it is removed from the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further alter or amend it. It thereby becomes immutable and unalterable and any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. An order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.

On the third issue, we rule in the negative.

It must be emphasized that a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it a swell as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. Because of this, the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction must be exercised with caution.

This Court has reiterated in several c ases the rule that corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employees done with malice or bad faith. It has been held that bad faith does not connote bad judgments or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.

In this case, it it worth mentioning that the LA in his decision expressly absolved Uytengsu from any liability, holding that the latter did not act in bad faith and in excess of his authority. such finding was not assailed by the private respondents nor did the NLRC in its decision overrule the same. The liability of Uytengsu was never discussed in the said NLRC decision which to the detriment of the private respondents, had lapsed into finality.