ABADIANO V. MARTIR (REMEDIAL)

It is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal. such findings are binding and conclusive on the Court. The jurisdiction of the Court is limited only to review of ERRORS OF LAW, unless the case falls under the recognized exceptions, namely:

1. when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
2. when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
3. when there is grave abuse of discretion;
4. when the judgment is based of a misapprehension of facts;
5. when the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
7. when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
8. when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
9. when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and
10. when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

In the present case, we find that the trial court based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts, as well as on the supposed absence of evidence which is contradicted by the records.

Considering that the action is one for quieting of title and respondents anchored their claim to the property on the disputed Compra Y Venta, we find it necessary to say that it was incumbent upon the trial court to have resolved first the issue of the document's due execution and authenticity before determining its validity.

Respondents attached only a photocopy of the Compra Y Venta to their complaint and alleged that the original of said document was in the Register of Deeds, that they tried to obtain a copy but was refused. No other evidence but these assertions were presented.

The Rule states that when the original document is unavailable, has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produces in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

In the case at bar, respondents failed to establish that the offer in evidence of the document was made in accordance with any of the exceptions allowed under the Rule, and yet the trial court accepted the document as genuine and proceeded to determine its validity based on such assumption.

The trial court likewise brushed aside the apparent defect that the document presented contained the same notarial inscription as the Agreement on Partition. We stress that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity.

In this case, while it is true that the error in the notarial inscription would not have invalidated the sale - if indeed it took place - the same error would have meant that the document cannot be treated as a notarial document and thus, not entitled to the presumption of regularity. The document would be taken out of the realm of the public documents whose genuineness and due execution need not be proved.

Under the Property Registration Decree, no title to register land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Indefeasibility and imprescriptibility are the cornerstones of land registration proceedigns. Barring any mistake or use of fraud in the procurement of title, owners may rest secure on their ownership and possession once their title is registered under the protective mantle on the Torrens system.

Nonetheless, even if a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches.

The four basic elements of laches are:

1. conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
2. delay on asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
3. injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred.

The reason for the rule is not simply the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition which may have arisen during the period in which there has been neglect.

Though laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that petitioner is not guilty of laches. The evidence on record does not support such finding.

Petitioner had reasonable ground to believe that the property, being still in the name of his predecessor-in-interest, continued to be theirs, especially considering that the annotation of the purported sale was done only in 1982. According to petitioner, his father had told him that his inheritance was in the possession of their uncle, who knew likewise that the property was theirs.

That the petitioner and his co-heirs waited until the death of said uncle to try and occupy the land is understandable. They had to be careful about the actions they took, lest they sow dissent within the family. Further, they knew that their parents revered the uncle.

The Court has recognized that this reaction cannot be characterized as such delay as would amount to laches.

In sum, we find that petitioner is not guilty of such neglect or inaction as would bar his claim to the property in question. In contrast, it is most telling that respondents, who are claiming to have been in possession of the property by virtue of an alleged duly constituted sale for almost 60 years. have themselves failed within that long period to have the same property transferred in their name or even only to have the sale annotated on the title of the property.