ACCESSORIES SPECIALIST V. ALABANZA (LABOR)

Petitioners aver that the action of the respondents for the recovery of unpaid wages, separation pay, and the 13th month pay has already prescribed since the action was filed almost 5 years from the time Jones severed his employment from ASI. Jones files his resignation on 31 October 1997, while the complaint before the La was instituted on 29 September 2002. Petitioners contend that the 3-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code had already set in, thereby barring all of respondent's money claims arising from their employer-employee relationship.

Based on the findings of fact of the LA, it was ASI which was responsible for the delay in the institution of the complaint. When Jones filed his resignation, he immediately asked for the payment of his money claims. However, the management of ASI promised him that he would be paid immediately after the claims of the rank-and-file employees had been paid. Jones relied on this representation. Unfortunately, the promise was never fulfilled even until the time of Jones' death.

In light of these circumstances, we can apply the principle of PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL, which is a recognized exception to the 3-year prescriptive period enunciated in Article 291 of the Labor Code.

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL may arise from the making of a promise, even though without consideration,

1. if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon, as in fact it was relied upon, and
2. if a refusal to enforce it would virtually sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice.

Promissory estoppel presupposes the existence of a promise on the part of one against whom estoppel is claimed. the promise must be plain and unambiguous and sufficiently specific so that the court can understand the obligation assumed and enforce the promise according to its terms.

In order to make out a claim of promissory estoppel, a party bears the burden of establishing the following elements: a promise was reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance; such promise did, in fact, induce such action or forbearance; and the party suffered detriment as a result.

All the requisites of promissory estoppel are present in this case. Jones relied on the promise of ASI that he would be paid as soon as the claims of all rank-and-file employees had been paid. If not for this promise that he had held on to until the time of his death, we see no reason why he would delay filing the complaint before the LA. Thus, we find ample justification not to follow the prescriptive period imposed under Article 291 of the Labor Code. Great injustice will be committed if we will brush aside the employee's claims on a mere technicality, especially when it was petitioner's own action that prevented respondent from interposing the claims within the required period.

Petitioners argue that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their appeal for failure to post the complete amount of the bond. They assert that they cannot post an appeal bond due to financial incapacity. They say that strict enforcement of the NLRC rules of procedure that appeal bond shall be equivalent to the monetary award is oppressive and would have the effect of depriving petitioners of their right to appeal.

Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, the posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the LA.

The filing of a bond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Non-compliance therewith renders the decision of the LA final and executory. This requirement is intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal. It is intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay or evade their obligation to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims.

Furthermore, we would like to reiterate that appeal is not a constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege. Thus, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements for perfecting an appeal must as a rule, be strictly followed.

The propriety of the monetary award of the LA is already binding upon this Court. Petitioners' failure to perfect their appeal in the manner and period required by the rules makes the award final and executory. Just as a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision.