CRISOLOGO V. TRABAJO (JUDICIAL ETHICS)

It is settled that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.

However, the judge's inexcusable failure to observe the basic laws and rules will render them administratively liable. When the law is so simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith cosntitutes gross ignorance of the law. In any case, to constitute GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, it is not enough that the subject decision, order, or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law anf jurisprudence but most importantly, such decision, roder, or act must be attended by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations, are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.

The allowance of disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. There is no doubt that she acted in good faith and denied the motion for intervention because it would only cause delay, to the prejudice of the original parties, the civil case which had already been pending for almost a decade. Under the rules on intervention, these are valid considerations in allowing or disallowing. There is no showing that respondent judge was motivated by any ill-will in denying the conplainant's motion for intervention; hence, she could not be sanctioned.

Complainant erroneously thought that when respondent failed to act on his notice of appeal, le lost his right to appeal the court's order denying his motion for intervention and that his only remedy was to file a peition for certiorari with the CA which he in fact, did. He failed to consider that a party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him, upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time and upon payment of the docket fees. The notice of appeal does not require the approval of the court. The function of the notice of appeal is merely to notify the trial court that the appellant was availing of the right to appeal and not to seek the court's permission that he be allowed to pose an appeal.