LU V. LU (REMEDIAL)

Under the Rules of Court, the proper mode to challenge such an order, which undoubtedly is interlocutory, is through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. This procedural defect, therefore, bars the Court from ruling on the propriety of such admission. We cannot take cognizance of proceedings before the RTC unless they are brought before us through the proper mode of review. To be sure, the Urgent Motion cannot be a substitute for the remedy of a special civil action for certiorari. Consequently, the amended complaint admittedly by the RTC stands.

With the issue of admission of the amended complaint resolved, the question of whether or not the original complaint should have been dismissed was mooted. Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that an amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. In this case, the orignal complaint was deemed withdrawn from the records upon the admission of the amended complaint.

It is settled that courts do not entertain a moot question. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value. This Court, therefore, abstains from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for.

To reiterate, the trial court's decision on the merits rendered the issue on the propriety of the injunction moot and academic, notwithstanding the fact that said decision has been appealed to the CA. Courts are called upon to resolve actual cases and controversies, not to render advisory opinions.

It is true that we have held in a number of cases that the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving the case. Courts will still decide cases otherwise, moot and academic if: first, there is grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

However, not one of the enumerated exceptions obtains in the instant case. Thus, a denial of the instant petition is warranted.

The Court had, in the past, laid down the test in determining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation by ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, the money claim being only incidental to or merely a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

In the current controversy, the main purpose of the complaint filed before the RTC was the annulment of the issuance of the LLDC shares of stocks because they had been allegedly issued for less than their par value. Thus, David sought the dissolution of the corporation and the appointment of receivers/management committee. To be sure, the annulment of the shares, the dissolution of the corporation and the appointment of receivers/management committee are actions which do not consist in the recovery of a sum of money. If in the end, a sum of money or real property would be recovered, it would simply be the consequence of such principal action. Therefore, the case before the RTC was incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since David paid the docket fees for an action the subject of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, as computed by the clerk of Court, the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Even assuming that the subject in the instant case is capable of pecuniary estimation, still the case should not be dismissed because the insufficiency of the fees actually paid was belatedly raised; David relied on the assessment made by the Clerk of Court; and if there is a deficiency, it may instead be considered a lien on the judgment that may hereafter be rendered.

While it is true that this Court had previously dismissed complaints for non-payment of docket fees, as in the early case of Manchester, these cases uniformly involved bad faith on the part of the plaintiff, such that the correct amount of damages claimed was not specifically stated. The Court, in such cases, concluded that there was bad faith on the part of the complainant and a clear intent to avoid payment of the required docket fee, thus, the dismissal of the case was warranted.

It may be recalled that despite the payment of insufficient fees, this Court refrained from dismissing the complaint/petition in IBC-13 v. Alonzo-Legasto, Yambao v. CA, and Ayala Land v. Carpo. In those cases, the inadequate payment was caused by the erroneous assessment made by the Clerk of Court. In IBC-13, we declared that the payment of the docket fees, as assessed, negates any imputation of bad faith to the respondent or any intent of the latter to defraud the government. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the respondent, and there was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply. In Yambao, this Court concluded that petitioners cannot be faulted for their failure to pay the required docket fees, for, given the prevailing circumstances, such failure was clearly not a dilatory tactic or intended to circumvent the Rules of Court. In Ayala Land, the Court held that despite the jurisdictional nature of the rule on payment of docket fees, the appellate court still had the discretion to relax the rule in meritorious cases.

In the instant case, David paid the docket fees as assessed by the Clerk of Court. Even if the amount was insufficient, fraud and bad faith cannot be attributed to David to warrant the dismissal of his complaint. Consistent with the principle of liberality in the interpretation of the Rules, in the interest of substantial justice, this Court had repeatedly refrained from dismissing the case on the ground alone. Instead, it considered the deficiency in the payment of the docket fees as a lien on the judgment which must be remitted to the Clerk of Court of the court a quo upon the execution of the judgment.

It has been consistently held that there is no power, the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case than the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action of the defendant and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it.