PNCC V. MANDAGAN (LABOR)

In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal of the employee is for just or authorized cause. Failure to do so would mean that the dismissal is not justified. A dismissed employee is not required to prove his innocence of the charges leveled against him by his employer. Likewise, the determination of the existence and sufficiency of a just cause is to be exercised with fairness and in good faith and after observing due process.

Thus, we agree with the CA that PNCC failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Mandagan was indeed guilty of moonlighting as defined under the PNCC Code of employee Discipline, i.e., rendering for another employer without the knowledge or approval of management. In the manner in which the rule is phrased, since the words knowledge and approval are separated by the disjunctive OR, it is evident that even knowledge alone by the management of PNCC of the alleged moonlighting is tantamount to an implied approval and is sufficient to exonerate respondent from liability.

Therefore, it cannot be said that her appearance in the ejectment case of PNCC Corporate Comptroller was without the knowledge of management considering that the former PNCC top officers were the ones who asked her to do so. Moreover, when she filed her application for leave of absence during one of her hearings, she specifically stated in the leave form that her absence was due to the filing of the ejectment case and this application was approved by petitioner.

Loss of trust and confidence as a ground of dismissal has never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse of its subjective nature. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper, and unjustified. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought intended to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith. Let it not be forgotten that what is at stake here is the means of livelihood, the name, the reputation of the employee.

However, it should be remembered that petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation. The handling by the lawyers in its employ of cases of its employees, whether for a fee or not and despite the knowledge and approval of management while not absolutely prohibited is nonetheless, discouraged as it could only breed corruption and cause distraction from the very duties that the lawyers were precisely hired for. The fact that a number of lawyers in petitioner's employ have handled private cases, obviously with tolerance of petitioner, does not validate the practice or make it an acceptable rule of conduct. A wrong done by many does not make a right.

In light of the foregoing, we find respondent, though not entirely faultless, was indeed illegally dismissed from employment by petitioner.