ESTINOZO V. CA (REMEDIAL)

Immediately apparent is that the petition is the wrong remedy to question the appellate court's issuances. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the CA may file a verified petition for review on certiorari. Considering that, in this case, appeal by certiorari was available to petitioner, she effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a special civil action for certiorari, a limited form of review and a remedy of last resort, which lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The nature of the questions of law intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence. It may well be that those questions of law will treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or final order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The remedy is appeal, not certiorari as a special civil action.

Even granting arguendo that the instant certiorari petition is an appropriate remedy, still this Court cannot grant the writ prayed for because we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA in the challenged issuances. The rule as it stands now without exception, is that the 15-day reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, except in cases before this Court, as one of the last resort, which may, in its sound discretion grant the extension requested.

It is well to point out that with petitioner's erroneous filing of a motion for extension of time and with her non-filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review from the CA's decision, the challenged decision has already attained finality and may no longer be reviewed by this Court. The instant Rule 65 petition cannot even substitute for the lost appeal - certiorari is not a procedural device to deprive the winning party of the fruits of the judgment in his or her favor. When e decision becomes final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court will have the power to review the said judgment. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation and this will set to naught the main role of the courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.

We reiterate what we state din Amatorio v. People, that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure.

As a final note, we remind party-litigants and their lawyers to refrain from filing frivolous petitions for certiorari. The 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of Section 8 of Rule 65, as amended by AM No. 07-7-12-SC, now provide that:

x x x

However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without merit or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. In such event, the court may award in favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the petitioner and counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under Rules 139 and 139-B of the Rules of Court.

The Court may impose motu proprio based on RES IPSA LOQUITOR, other disciplinary sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.

SALVADOR V. MAPA (CONSTITUTIONAL, CRIMINAL, REMEDIAL)

Commenting on the petition, respondents argued that the petition suffers from a procedural infirmity which warrants its dismissal. they claimed that the PCGG availed of the wrong remedy in elevating the case to the SC.

Though captioned as a Petition for Review on Certiorari, we will treat this petition as one filed under Rule 65 since a reading of its contents reveals that petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman for dismissing the complaint. The averments in the complaint, not the nomenclature given by the parties, determine the nature of the action. In previous ruling, we have treated differently labeled actions as special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for reasons such as justice, equity, and fair play.

The issue of prescription has long been settled by this Court in the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto where the Court explained that the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense. This is now a well-settled doctrine which the court has applied in subsequent cases involving the PCGG and the Ombudsman.

Since the prescriptive period commenced to run on the date of the discovery of the offenses, ans since discovery could not have been made earlier than 8 October 1992, the date when the Committee was created, the criminal offenses allegedly committed by the respondents had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed on 14 October 1996.

Even the Ombudsman in its Manifestation and Motion conceded that the prescriptive period commenced on the date the Committee discovered the crime, and not from the date the loan documents were registered with the RD.

Likewise, we cannot sustain the Ombudsman's declaration that Administrative Order 13 and Memorandum 61 violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws for ostensibly inflicting punishment upon a person for an act done prior to their issuance and which was innocent when done.

The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption is in favor of constitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. Even this Court does not decide a question of constitutional dimension, unless that question is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.

Further, where petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality, we had the occasion to state that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in declaring unconstitutional the subject administrative and memorandum orders.

In any event, we hold that Administrative Order 13 and Memorandum Order 61 are not ex post facto laws.

An EX POST FACTO law has been defined as one

1. which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action;
2. which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed;
3. which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed;
4. which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

1. that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or
2. that which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.

The subject administrative and memorandum orders do not come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions.

Memorandum Order 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order 13 and Memorandum Order 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is therefore no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto.

PEOPLE V. TERRADO (REMEDIAL)

The special civil action for CERTIORARI is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

By GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.

It should be remembered that as a rule, factual matters cannot be normally inquired into by the Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding. As earlier stressed, the present recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal.

At least, the mistakes ascribed to the trial court are not errors of jurisdiction correctible by the specila civil action for certiorari, but errors of judgment which is correctible by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The mere fact that a court erroneously decide a case does not necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction. Thus, assuming arguedo that the trial court committed a mistake in its judgment, the error does not vitiate the decision, considering that it has jurisdiction over the case. For this reason, the dismissal of the instant petition is called for.

In our jurisdiction, availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal may be allowed in cases where petitioner has clearly shown that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

however, and more serious than the procedural infraction, if the petition merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, we would run afoul of the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, which is proscribed by the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy. Verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable.

LUMBRE V. CA (REMEDIAL)

The extraordinary writ of CERTIORARI may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in comtemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.

Thus, certiorari as a special civil action can prosper only when the following requisites concur:

1. a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
2. there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for annulling or modifying the proceeding.

Both requisites are absent in this case.

Non-filing of an appellant's brief or a memorandum of appeal is one of the explicitly recognized grounds to dismiss the appeal, as provided in Section 1(e) Rule 50 of the Rules of Court:

Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal - An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals on its own motion or on that of the appellee, of the following grounds:

x x x x

(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules.

Petitioners and their counsel do not deny their procedural infractions, but they as this Court's indulgence to relax the rules. Unfortunately for petitioners, their plea is not entirely for this Court to decide. If we grant this prayer, we would effectively be faulting the CA for its faithful compliance with the rules of procedure.

The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Rules 44 and 50, which are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases before the CA, truly cannot be ignored. The rules provide for a system under which suitors may be heard in the correct form and manner at the prescribed time in an orderly confrontation before a judge whose authority is acknowledged. We cannot simply turn a blind eye to, and tolerate, the transgressions of these rules; to do so would be a disavowal of our own pronouncements. In sum, we cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the CA which merely followed the said rules in dismissing the appeal.

Finally, if it appears that the consequences for incurring procedural infractions before the CA and for pursuing the wrong remedial tack are ostensibly harsh, it should be remembered that there is no innate right to appeal. APPEAL is a statutory right, which may be exercised only within the prescribed limits. For failure to duly comply with the said Rules and to undertake a timely appeal despite the existence of such remedy, the petitioners must bear the consequences.

TUASON V. RD OF CALOOCAN (REMEDIAL)

The Decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function or an exercise of jurisdiction which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause.

These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power as everyone knows being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law, the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as Chief Executive and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the Martial Law regime.

PD 293 wherefore is declared to be unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts.