FERRER V. OMBUDSMAN (ADMINISTRATIVE)

FIRST. Under Rule II, Section 2 of Admin Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), the investigating officer, upon evaluation of the complaint, shall recommend whether it may be:

1. dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
2. referred to respondent for comment;
3. endorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;
4. forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;
5. referred for administrative adjudication; or
6. subjected to a preliminary investigation.

Therefore, the prerogative as to whether or not a complaint may be given due course belongs exclusively to the Office of the Ombudsman, through its assigned investigation officer, who in this case was GIO Gruta. Concurring with the recommendation of Gio Ginez-Jabalde to dismiss the complaint, similarly approved by then Ombudsman Desierto, does not necessarily indicate that Gio Gruta did not exercise her independent judgment in this case in concluding that the complaint lodged by petitioner lacks merit. To conduct a preliminary investigation when deemed unnecessary as the same issues being raised had already been resolved would be superfluous.

As regards petitioner's allegation of denial of his right to due process, it should be remembered that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given an opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

SECOND. Petitioner posits that the Office of the Ombudsman erred in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to investigate charges of violation of RA 5487 (Private Security Agency Law) for purposes of determining the probable criminal liability of respondents who were officials of NFA. This is erroneous.

The jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute criminal cases pertains to violations of RA 3019, RA 1379, RA 6713, Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 of the Revised Penal Code, and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to office.

On the other hand, in RA 5487, it is the Philippine National Police that exercises general supervision over the operation of all private detective and watchman security guard agencies. It has the exclusive authority to regulate and to issue the required licenses to operate security and protective agencies. In this case, in the absence of a declaration form the PNP that a violation of the said law was committed by Metroguard and DASIA, the act of the NFA officials in awarding the security service contracts to the said agencies after a showing that their bids were the most advantageous to the government is presumed to be valid.

Verily, the Court has almost always adopted and quite aptly, a POLICY OF NON-INTERFERENCE in the exercise of the Ombudsman's constitutionally mandated powers. The Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a complaint outright without going through a preliminary investigation. To insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as RA 6770, saw it fit to endow that office with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers, virtually free from legislative, executive, or judicial intervention. If the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his judgment call.

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION is an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism, No such circumstance obtains in this case.

PEOPLE V. TERRADO (REMEDIAL)

The special civil action for CERTIORARI is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

By GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.

It should be remembered that as a rule, factual matters cannot be normally inquired into by the Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding. As earlier stressed, the present recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal.

At least, the mistakes ascribed to the trial court are not errors of jurisdiction correctible by the specila civil action for certiorari, but errors of judgment which is correctible by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The mere fact that a court erroneously decide a case does not necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction. Thus, assuming arguedo that the trial court committed a mistake in its judgment, the error does not vitiate the decision, considering that it has jurisdiction over the case. For this reason, the dismissal of the instant petition is called for.

In our jurisdiction, availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal may be allowed in cases where petitioner has clearly shown that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

however, and more serious than the procedural infraction, if the petition merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, we would run afoul of the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, which is proscribed by the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy. Verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable.

PARAISO V. CA (GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, CERTIORARI, ELEMENTS OF A CONTRACT)

For a writ of certiorari to issue, the applicant must show that the court or tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged order. GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION is defined as such CAPRICIOUS and WHIMSICAL EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so grave as where the power is exercised in an ARBITRARY or DESPOTIC manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to a evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by of to act at all in contemplation of law.

In the instant case, CA gravely abused its discretion in disapproving the compromise agreement for the simple reason that respondent did not comply with the CA's resolutions requiring it to explain the formal defects in the agreement.

To elucidate, the absence of a specific date does not adversely affect the agreement considering that the date of execution is not an essential element of a contract. A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is essentially a contract PERFECTED BY MERE CONSENT, the latter being manifested by the MEETING OF THE OFFER AND THE ACCEPTANCE upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.

The CA should have allowed greater laxity in scrutinizing the compromise agreement, not only because the absence of a specific date is a mere formal defect, but also because the signatories to the compromise indicated the date when they signed the agreement beside their signatures.

From the foregoing, our inevitable conclusion is that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it disapproved the compromise agreement. However, rather than remanding the case to the appellate court, which will only further delay the lengthy litigation that the parties wish to end, the SC chose to act directly in the matter. Thus, on the basis of our finding that the compromise agreement is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, and good customs, the Court hereby approves the same.