EMPIRE EAST LAND HOLDINGS V. CAPITOL INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION (CIVIL LAW, CONSTRUCTIVE FULFILLMENT)

If we were to apply the civil law rule of CONSTRUCTIVE FULFILLMENT - the condition shall be deemed fulfilled if the creditor voluntarily prevented its fulfillment - then the submission of a guarantee bond may be deemed to have been complied with. But we cannot apply the rule to conditions (a) and (c), which remain as unfulfilled conditions-precedent. Since no proof was adduced that these two conditions were complied with, petitioner;s obligation to release the retention money had not yet arisen. We would like to emphasize that this is without prejudice to respondent's compliance with the unfulfilled conditions, after which release of the retention money must perforce follow.

FELSAN REALTY V. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (CIVIL LAW, CONTRACTS)

Considering that the parties entered into a contract, it shall constitute the law between them. The agreement between the parties is the formal expression of the parties' rights, duties, and obligations. Being the primary law between the parties, it governs the adjudication of their rights and obligations. when the terms of the contract are clear and leave no room for interpretation, the literal meaning of its stipulations, shall, therefore, control.

A court has no alternative but to enforce the contractual stipulations in the manner they have been agreed upon and written, The petitioner was, therefore, bound to respect the decision of the respondent not to continue on with the lease. Absent any allegation that a stipulation is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, it must be complied with in good faith.

PARAISO V. CA (GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, CERTIORARI, ELEMENTS OF A CONTRACT)

For a writ of certiorari to issue, the applicant must show that the court or tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged order. GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION is defined as such CAPRICIOUS and WHIMSICAL EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so grave as where the power is exercised in an ARBITRARY or DESPOTIC manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to a evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by of to act at all in contemplation of law.

In the instant case, CA gravely abused its discretion in disapproving the compromise agreement for the simple reason that respondent did not comply with the CA's resolutions requiring it to explain the formal defects in the agreement.

To elucidate, the absence of a specific date does not adversely affect the agreement considering that the date of execution is not an essential element of a contract. A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is essentially a contract PERFECTED BY MERE CONSENT, the latter being manifested by the MEETING OF THE OFFER AND THE ACCEPTANCE upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.

The CA should have allowed greater laxity in scrutinizing the compromise agreement, not only because the absence of a specific date is a mere formal defect, but also because the signatories to the compromise indicated the date when they signed the agreement beside their signatures.

From the foregoing, our inevitable conclusion is that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it disapproved the compromise agreement. However, rather than remanding the case to the appellate court, which will only further delay the lengthy litigation that the parties wish to end, the SC chose to act directly in the matter. Thus, on the basis of our finding that the compromise agreement is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, and good customs, the Court hereby approves the same.

LUCASAN V. PDIC (CIVIL, REDEMPTION, PROPERTY)

To avail of the remedy of QUIETING OF TITLE, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely:

1. the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of action; and


2. the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown in fact invalid or inoperative despite it prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Stated simply, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal title or at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.

Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case. Lucasan admitted that he failed to redeem the property during the redemption period, on account of his ten limited financial situation. It was only 15 years later that he manifested his desire to reacquire the properties. Clearly thus, he had lost whatever right ha had over the lots.

The payment of loans made by Lucasan cannot in any way operate to restore whatever right he had over the subject properties. Such payment only extinguished his loan obligations to the mortgagee banks and the liens which Lucasan claimed were subsisting at the time of the registration of the notice of embargo and certification of sale.

Neither can Lucasan capitalize on PBC's failure to file a petition for consolidation of ownership after the expiration of the redemption period. with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the obligor's right to redeem ans that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that is already vested in the purchaser.

Certainly, Lucasan no longer possess any legal or equitable title to or interest over the subject parcels of land; hence, he cannot validly maintain an action for quieting of title.

UNION BANK V. PACIFIC EQUIPMENT CORP (CIVIL)

SUPERVENING EVENTS refer to facts which transpire after the judgment has become final and executory, or to new circumstances which develop after the judgment has acquired finality, including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial, as they were not yet in existence at that time.

In such case, the court is allowed to admit evidence of new facts and circumstances and thereafter to suspend execution of the judgment and grant relief as may be warranted which may or may not result in its modification.

There is no supervening event in this case as it was an existing fact which petitioner ignored for the longest time, only to raise it later as a convenient excuse to evade its obligation under the writ of execution.

LABAYEN V. SERAFICA (CIVIL)

The lease contract contained the stipulation that the contract could be automatically cancelled if the lessee failed to pay the rentals or to comply with the stipulations in the contract. It was within the right of the respondent as lessor to avail himself of the automatic termination clause provided in the contract. Thus, whatever damages petitioners may have suffered as consequences of the termination of the lease contract and the consequent cancellation of its annotation in respondent's title would have to be borne by them alone.

THERE IS A MATERIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN DAMAGES AND INJURY. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.

Thus, there can be damage without without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal right. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone.

THE LAW AFFORDS NO REMEDY FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM AN ACT WHICH DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A LEGAL INJURY OR WRONG. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

UCPB V. SARINDERJIT BLUE RIVER NAVIGATION (CIVIL)

A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is a contract whereby parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It contemplates mutual concessions and mutual gains to avoid the expenses of litigation, or when litigation has already begun, to end it because of uncertainty of the result. The process of compromise has long been allowed in our jurisdiction and in the jurisdiction of other states as well.

The validity of the agreement is determined by compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts. Like any other contract, THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT MUST NOT BE CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND PUBLIC ORDER.