CHUA GAW V. CHUA (REMEDIAL)

If there was an error committed by the RTC in ascribing to the petitioner the respondent's testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel, it constitutes a harmless error which would not, in any way, change the result of the case.

In civil cases, that burden devolves upon the plaintiff who must establish her case by preponderance of evidence. The rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's evidence. Thus, it barely matters who with a piece of evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to consider the entirety of the evidence presented by both parties. Preponderance of evidence is then determined by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, culled from the evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.

A party who calls his adversary as a witness, therefore, is not bound by the latter's testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on. A rule that provides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him. This, the petitioner failed to do.

All parties to the case, therefore, are considered bound by the favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence. In arriving at a decision, the entirety of the evidence presented will be considered, regardless of the party who offered them in evidence. In this light, the more vital consideration is not whether a piece of evidence was properly attributed to one party, but whether it was accorded the apposite probative weight by the court. The testimony of an adverse witness is evidence in the case and should be given its proper weight, and such evidence becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach the witness or contradict his testimony.

The BEST EVIDENCE RULE as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to account for the original Moreover, production of the original may be dispensed with in the trial court's discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.

Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant case. Here, there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The petitioner never even denied their due execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition.

METROBANK V. CA (REMEDIAL)

Petitioner Metrobank is estopped from refusing the discharge of the real estate mortgage on the claim that the subject property still secures other unliquidated past due loans.

Respondent GTP, requested from Metrobank that it be furnished a copy of the full indebtedness secured by the real estate mortgage. In response thereto, Metrobank issued a statement of account which amount was immediately settled and paid the next day.

Metrobank is thus barred from taking a stand inconsistent with its representation upon which respondent GTP, as an innocent third person to the real mortgage agreement, place exclusive reliance.

For an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against a person relying thereon.

It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence is produced would operate to his prejudice and support the case of his adversary.

No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist.


Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going to establish the ultimate fact that the evidence is designed to prove, and the party to be affected by the proof, with an opportunity to do so, fails to deny or explain them, they may well be taken as admitted with all the effect of the inferences afforded.

The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own control, and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most unfavorable construction upon his silence, and infers that a disclosure would have shown the fact to be as claimed by the opposing party.

Verily, Metrobank's omission to present its evidence only created an adverse inference against its cause. Therefore, it cannot now be heard to complain since CA extended a reasonable opportunity to Metrobank that it did not avail.

PEOPLE V. EDUALINO (REMEDIAL)

Edualino raises the issue of the character of complainant Nantiza. It is argued that a responsible and decent married woman, who wan then 3 months pregnant, would not be out at 2 am gutting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a man to accompany her to drink beer. It is contended that complainant merely concocted the charge of rape to save her marriage since her husband had found out that she was using drugs and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle of herself when she tried to seduce accused-appellant on 11 May 1994 while she was under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

At the outset of this discussion, it should be pointed out that the MORAL CHARACTER of the rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The Court has rules that prostitutes can be victims of rape.

In the present case, even if Edualino's allegations that the victim was drunk and under the influence of drugs and that she cannot be considered a decent and responsible married woman, were true, said circumstances will not per se preclude a finding that she was raped.

The court cannot believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. We fail to understand how a false rape story can save a marriage under the circumstances averred by Edualino.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses pertain to minor matters and are even badges that the witnesses were unrehearsed and honest.

ALCARAZ V. TANGGA-AN (REMEDIAL)

Section 16 of Rule 70 the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership - When the defendant raises the DEFENSE OF OWNERSHIP in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

The issue of ownership is precisely what the petitioner spouses raised to justify their non-payment of rent and to resist eviction from the house they leased from respondents. Being indispensable to the resolution of the issue of possession, we herein render a provisional ruling on ownership.

Although TAX DECLARATIONS OR REALTY TAX PAYMENTS are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least a proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Sec. 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION that:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it.

After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for 2 years, the petitioner spouses are barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot.

We also note that the petitioner spouses rescinded the contract of lease without judicial approval. Due to the change in ownership of the land, the petitioner spouses decided to unilaterally cancel the contract because Virgilio supposedly became the new owner of the house after acquiring title to the lot.

They alleged that there was no reason anymore to perform their obligations as lessees because the lessor had ceased to be the owner of the house. But there is nothing in their lease contract that allows the parties to extrajudicially rescind the same in case of violation of the terms thereof.

Extrajudicial rescission of a contract is not possible without an express stipulation to that effect. What the petitioner spouses should have done was to file a special civil action for interpleader for the claimants to litigate their claims and to deposit the rentals in court.

PEOPLE V. WEBB (REMEDIAL)

Rule 113. Section 6. POWER OF THE COURT TO STOP FURTHER EVIDENCE - The court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive.

The trial court was but exercising its judgment on what it perceived to be a superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction thereof will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the evidence already on record.

Needless to state, the trial court cannot be faulted with lack of caution in denying respondent's motion considering that under the prevailing facts of the case, respondent had more than ample opportunity to adduce evidence in his defence. Certainly, a party cannot feign denial of due proceed where he had the opportunity to present his side. It must be borne in mind in this regard that due process is not a monopoly of the defense. Indeed, the State is entitled to due process as much as the accused. Furthermore, while a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is a truism that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

It is pointed out that the defense has already presented at least 57 witnesses and 464 documentary exhibits, many of them of the exact nature as those to be produced or testified to by the proposed foreign deponents. Under the circumstances, the SC sustains the proposition that the trial judge commits no grave abuse of discretion if she decides that the evidence on the matter sought to be proved in the US could not possibly add anything substantial to the defense evidence involved.

RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE - AM No. 06-11-5-SC (REMEDIAL)

Section 1. Scope
This Rule shall apply whenever DNA evidence is offered, used, or proposed to be offered or used as evidence in all criminal and civil actions as well as special proceedings.

Section 2. Application of other Rules on Evidence
In all matters not specifically covered by this Rule, the Rules of Court and other pertinent provisions of law on evidence shall apply.

Section 3. Definition of Terms'
e. DNA testing - means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of the information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of determining with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological samples originates from the same person (direct identification) or if the biological samples originate from related persons (kinship analysis).

f. Probability of parentage - means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of the putative father compared with the probability of a random match of the two unrelated individuals in a given population.

Section 4. Application for DNA Testing Order
The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties.

Section 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing
Post-conviction DNA testing may be available, with no need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final and executory judgment provided that
a. a biological sample exists;
b. such sample is relevant to the case; and
c. the testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the judgment of conviction.

Section 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing
Remedy if the Results are Favorable to the Convict - The convict or prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict. In the case the court, after due hearing finds the petition to be meritorious, it shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict, unless continued detention is justified for a lawful cause.

Section 11. Confidentiality
DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall e confidential. Except upon order of the court, a DNA profile and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall only be released to any of the following, under such terms and conditions as may be set forth by the court:

1. person from whom the sample was taken;
2. person from whom the sample was taken;
3. lawyers of private complainants in a criminal action;
4. duly authorized law enforcement agencies; and
5. other persons determined by the court.

Whoever discloses, utilizes, or publishes in any form any information concerning a DNA profile without the proper court order shall be liable for indirect contempt of the court wherein such DNA evidence was offered, presented, or sought to be offered and presented.

Where the person from whom the biological sample was taken files a written verified request to the court that allowed the DNA testing for the disclosure of the DNA profile of the person and all results or other information obtained from the DNA testing, the same may be disclosed to the persons named in the written verified request.

Section 13. Applicability to Pending Cases
Except as provided in Sections 6 and 10 hereof, this Rule shall apply to cases pending at the time of its effectivity.

Effective 15 October 2007