THE RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

The Rules on Electronic Evidence shall apply to cases pending after their effectivity. These Rules shall take effect on 1 August 2001.

RULE 1
COVERAGE

SECTION 1. SCOPE - Unless otherwise provided herein, these Rules shall apply whenever an electronic document or electronic data message, as defined in Rule 2 hereof, is offered or used in evidence.

SECTION 2. CASES COVERED - These Rules shall apply to all civil actions and proceedings, as well as quasi-judicial and administrative cases.

RULE 2
DEFINITION AND CONSTRUCTION

SECTION 1. DEFINITION OF TERMS -


e. "Digital signature" refers to an electronic signature consisting of a transformation of an electronic document or an electronic data message using an asymmetric or public cryptosystem such that a person having the initial untransformed electronic document and the signer's public key can accurately determine:

• whether the transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to the signer's public key; and


• whether the initial electronic document had been altered after the transformation was made.

h. "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols, or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, stored, processed, retrieved, or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message".

j. "Electronic signature" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in electronic form, representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedure employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating, signing, or approving an electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, an electronic signature included digital signatures.

k. "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.

SECTION 2. CONSTRUCTION - These Rules shall be liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination of cases.

The interpretation of these Rules shall also take into consideration the international origin of RA 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act.

RULE 3
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

SECTION 1. ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS AS FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF PAPER-BASED DOCUMENTS - Whenever a rule of evidence refers to the term writing, document, record, instrument, memorandum, or any other form of writing, such term shall be deemed t o include an electronic document as defined in these Rules.

SECTION 2. ADMISSIBILITY - An electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these Rules.

SECTION 3. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION - The confidential character of a privileged communication is not lost solely on the ground that it is in the form of an electronic document.

RULE 4
BEST EVIDENCE RULE

SECTION 1. ORIGINAL OF AN ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT - An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.

SECTION 2. COPIES OF EQUIVALENT OF THE ORIGINALS - When a document is in 2 or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by the other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicated shall not be admissible to the same extent as the original if:

1. A genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or
   
2. In the circumstances, it would be unjust or inequitable to admit the copy in lieu of the original.

RULE 5
AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

SECTION 1. BURDEN OF PROVING AUTHENTICITY - The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.

SECTION 2. MANNER OF AUTHENTICATION - Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:

1. By evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;


2. By evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the SC or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or


3. By other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

SECTION 3. PROOF OF ELECTRONICALLY NOTARIZED DOCUMENT - A document electronically notarized in accordance with the rules promulgated by the SC shall be considered as a public document and proved as a notarial document under the Rules of Court.

RULE 6
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES

SECTION 1. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE - an electronic signature or a digital signature authenticated in the manner prescribed hereunder is admissible in evidence as the functional equivalent of the signature of a person on a written document.

SECTION 2. AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES - an electronic signature may be authenticated in any of the following manner:

1. By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish a digital signature and verify the same;


2. By any other means provided by law; or


3. By any other means satisfactory to the judge as establishing the genuineness of the electronic signature.

SECTION 3. DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES - Upon the authentication of an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that:

1. The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;


2. The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of authenticating or approving the electronic document to which it is related or to indicate such person's consent to the transaction embodied therein'


3. The methods or processes utilized to affix or verify the electronic signature operated without error or fault.

SECTION 4. DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS RELATING TO DIGITAL SIGNATURES - Upon the authentication of a digital signature,it shall be presumed, in addition to those mentioned in the immediately preceding section, that:

1. The information contained in a certificate is correct;


2. The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate;


3. No cause exists to render a certificate invalid or revocable;


4. The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the time it was signed; and


5. a certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein.

RULE 7
EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

SECTION 1. FACTORS FOR ASSESSING EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT - In assessing the evidentiary weight of an electronic document, the following factors may be considered:

1. The reliability of the manner or method in which it was generated, stored, or communicated, including but not limited to input and output procedures, controls, tests, and checks for accuracy and reliability of the electronic data message or document, in the light of all the circumstances as well as any relevant agreement;
2. The reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified;
3. The integrity of the information and communication system in which it is recorded or stored, including but not limited to the hardware and computer programs or software used as well as programming errors;
4. The familiarity of the witness or the person who made the entry with the communication and information system;
5. The nature and quality of the information which went into the communication and information system upon which the electronic data message or electronic document was based;
6. Other factors which the court may consider as affecting the accuracy or integrity of the electronic documents or electronic data message.

SECTION 2. INTEGRITY OF AN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEM - In any dispute involving the integrity of the information and communication system in which an electronic document or electronic document data message is recorded or stored, the court may consider, among others, the following factors:

1. Whether the information and communication system or other similar device was operated in a manner that did not affect the integrity of the electronic document, and there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the information and communication system;
2. Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored by a party to the proceedings with interest adverse to that of the party using it; or
3. Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by a person who is not a party to the proceedings and who did not act under the control of the party using it.

RULE 8
BUSINESS RECORDS AS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE

SECTION 1. INAPPLICABILITY OF THE HEARSAY RULE - A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by electronic, optical, or other similar means at or near the time of or from transmission or supply of information by a person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the regular course of conduct of a business activity, and such was the regular practice to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation by electronic, optical, or similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witnesses, is excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence.

SECTION 2. OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION - The presumption provided for in Section1 of this Rule may be overcome by evidence of the untrustworthiness of the course of information or the method or circumstances of the preparation, transmission, or storage thereof.

RULE 9
METHOD OF PROOF

SECTION 1. AFFIDAVIT EVIDENCE - All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary weight of an electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiant or based on authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to testify on the matters contained therein.

SECTION 2. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEPONENT - The affiant shall be made to affirm the contents of the affidavit in open court and may be cross-examined as a matter of right by the adverse party.

RULE 11
AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC, VIDEO, AND EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE

SECTION 1. AUDIO, VIDEO, AND SIMILAR EVIDENCE - Audio, photographic, and video evidence of events, acts, or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented, or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained, or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.

SECTION 2. EPHEMERAL ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS - Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. In the absence or unavailability of such witnesses, other competent evidence may be admitted.

A recording of the telephone conversation or ephemeral electronic communication shall be covered by the immediately preceding section.

If the foregoing communications are recorded or embodied in an electronic document, the the provisions of Rule 5 shall apply.

ESPINO V. AMORA AND AMORA (REMEDIAL LAW)

We uphold the well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties. The rule however, is not absolute and admits of exceptions upon a showing of highly meritorious circumstances, such as:

1. when the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures;
2. when a lower court's inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
3. when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
4. when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case or fail to notice certain relevant facts which if properly considered will justify a different conclusion;
5. when there is a misappreciation of facts;
6. when the findings of cat are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record.

None of the laid down exceptions which would warrant a reversal of the assailed decision obtain herein.

BELLO V. NLRC (APPEAL FILED OUT OF TIME)

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of the due process. The perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory; noncompliance with this legal requirement is fatal and has the effect of making the judgment final and executory.

The period for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the time the counsel of record received a copy of the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

Accordingly, the 60-day period for filing the petition for certiorari with the CA should be counted from the receipt by the petitioner's counsel of a copy of the NLRC Decision reversing the Labor Arbiter. It should be noted that when the petitioner filed his MR, only 48 days remained of the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari. The petitioner however, filed his petition for certiorari 211 days from the receipt by his counsel of the Resolution denying the MR. In other words, the petition for certiorari was filed 163 days late.

As much as possible, appeals should not be dismissed on a mere technicality in order to afford the litigants the maximum opportunity for the adjudication of their cases on the merits. However, the failure to perfect an appeal is not a mere technicality as it raises a jurisdictional problem which deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal. After a decision is declared final and executory, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision of the case.

TOMAWIS V. TABAO-CAUDANG (COMPLETENESS OF SERVICE, FORUM SHOPPING, INJUNCTION, CES ELIGIBILITY)

Rule 13, Section 10: Completeness of service. Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of 10 days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after 5 days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier.

The rule on service by refistered mail contemplates 2 situations:

1. actual service, the completeness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registered mail; or
2. constructive notice, the completeness of which is determined upon expiration of 5 days from the date the addressee received the first notice from the postmaster.

The best evidence to prove that notice was sent would be a certification from the postmater to the effect that not only was notice issued or sent but also on how, when, and to whom the delivery was made.

In the instant case, there was no sufficient proof that the respondent actually received a copy of the Dec 15 resolution. Neither was there proof that a first notice was indeed received by her. As such, the rule on constructive notice cannot apply. Accordingly, since the respondent was not served a copy of the resolution, the decision sonld never attain finality. Consequently, there can be no valid basis for the issuance of the writ of execution.

Before a writ of execution may issue, there must necessarily be a final judgment or order that idsposes of the action or proceeding. The writ of execution is the means by which a pary can enforce a final judgment or order of the court. Absent a final judgment or order, there is nothing to enforce or execute; thus, there can be no valid writ of execution.

Injunction is a judicial writ, process, or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action. As a rule, to justify the injunctive relief prayed for, the movant must show:

1. the existence of a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and
2. that the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.

A clear legal right means one clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. The onus probandi is on movant to show that there exists a right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the acts sought to be enjoined. further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage.

Tomawis was appointed Regional Director. However, as he did not possess the requisite CES eligibility, his appointment was characterized merely as temporary. As such, he had no security of tenure. Upon appointment of Caudang to the position, Tomawis' right to the position ceased to exist. Thus, he should have vacated and relinquished the position and turned over the duties, funds, and properties of the office to Caudang.

Accordingly, his petition for injunction should have been denied outright by the court. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Lastly, the SC cannot sustain petitioner's claim that respondent is guilty of multiple forum shopping. There is forum shopping where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. true, respondent had previously instituted quo warranto proceedings involving the same contested position, and her petitions had been dismissed with finality by this Court. We, however, find that the issue in the instant case is based on a different set of facts.

RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE - AM No. 06-11-5-SC (REMEDIAL)

Section 1. Scope
This Rule shall apply whenever DNA evidence is offered, used, or proposed to be offered or used as evidence in all criminal and civil actions as well as special proceedings.

Section 2. Application of other Rules on Evidence
In all matters not specifically covered by this Rule, the Rules of Court and other pertinent provisions of law on evidence shall apply.

Section 3. Definition of Terms'
e. DNA testing - means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of the information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of determining with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological samples originates from the same person (direct identification) or if the biological samples originate from related persons (kinship analysis).

f. Probability of parentage - means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of the putative father compared with the probability of a random match of the two unrelated individuals in a given population.

Section 4. Application for DNA Testing Order
The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties.

Section 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing
Post-conviction DNA testing may be available, with no need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final and executory judgment provided that
a. a biological sample exists;
b. such sample is relevant to the case; and
c. the testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the judgment of conviction.

Section 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing
Remedy if the Results are Favorable to the Convict - The convict or prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict. In the case the court, after due hearing finds the petition to be meritorious, it shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict, unless continued detention is justified for a lawful cause.

Section 11. Confidentiality
DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall e confidential. Except upon order of the court, a DNA profile and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall only be released to any of the following, under such terms and conditions as may be set forth by the court:

1. person from whom the sample was taken;
2. person from whom the sample was taken;
3. lawyers of private complainants in a criminal action;
4. duly authorized law enforcement agencies; and
5. other persons determined by the court.

Whoever discloses, utilizes, or publishes in any form any information concerning a DNA profile without the proper court order shall be liable for indirect contempt of the court wherein such DNA evidence was offered, presented, or sought to be offered and presented.

Where the person from whom the biological sample was taken files a written verified request to the court that allowed the DNA testing for the disclosure of the DNA profile of the person and all results or other information obtained from the DNA testing, the same may be disclosed to the persons named in the written verified request.

Section 13. Applicability to Pending Cases
Except as provided in Sections 6 and 10 hereof, this Rule shall apply to cases pending at the time of its effectivity.

Effective 15 October 2007

NORTH COTABATO V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (CONSTI, REMEDIAL)

Nachura dissents from the ponencia of Carpio-Morales, even as he agrees that the MOA-AD is not an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Phils under international law.

He submits that because of SUPERVENING EVENTS, the petitions and petitions-in-intervention are no longer ripe for adjudication and that these cases have been rendered moot and academic. Accordingly, the petitions should be dismissed.

Locus Standi
The Court adopted the direct injury test, i.e., the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result. This mere procedural technicality may be and has in fact been waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, where the TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally.

By way of summary, taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided the following requirements are met:

1. the cases involve constitutional issues;


2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;


3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;


4. for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and


5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

Considering that the Court has discretion to relax this procedural technicality, and given the liberal attitude it has adopted in a number of earlier cases, the SC acknowledge the legal standing of the petitioners herein.

Ripeness for Adjudication
A mandatory requirement for the Court's exercise of the power of judicial review is the existence of an actual case or controversy. An ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY is a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims which can be resolved on the basis on existing law and jurisprudence.

But it is not enough that the controversy exists at the outset. To qualify for adjudication, it is necessary that the actual controversy be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed. This is to say that the case is ripe for judicial determination.

In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that at the time of the filing of the initial petitions up to the issuance of TRO, there was actual controversy. However, SUPERVENING EVENTS effectively eliminated the conflict of rights and opposite claims. THERE IS NO LONGER AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE PARTIES as the Peace Panel has been disbanded by the President along with the resounding declaration that the MOA-AD will not be signed in its present form or in any other form. The Memorandum issued by the Executive Secretary to the Solicitor General is unequivocal: "No matter what the SC ultimately decides, the government will not sign the MOA."

The subsequent events were sufficient to alter the course of these judicial proceedings, clearly affecting the ripeness of the case for adjudication. With an abandoned and unsigned MOA-AD and a dissolved Peace Panel, any purported controversy has virtually disappeared. Judicial review cannot be exercised where the incipient actual controversy does not remain extant until the termination of the case; this Court cannot provide reliefs for controversies that are no longer there.

Reliefs are unavailing, because the Peace Panel has been dissolved, and by the nature of things, rendered permanently unable to sign any agreement. Further, the MOA-AD sought to be nullified does not confer any rights now imposes any duties. It is, as of today, non-existent.

Mootness
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.

It is axiomatic that courts will decide cases otherwise moot and academic:

1. if there is grave violation of the Constitution;


2. the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest involved;


3. when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; or


4. when the case is capable of repetition yet evasive of review.

As to the first exception, there is no violation of the constitution. Thus, the dreaded constitutional infractions are at best, merely anticipatory, hypothetical, or conjectural. Neither will the second exception apply. Third, given the events that led to the issuance of the Court of a TRO to stop the signing, it would appear that there is no need for the Court to formulate controlling principles, precepts, and rules to guide the bench, the bar, and the public. A scrutiny of the factual antecedents of this case revels no such imperative exists. The fourth exception, that the issue is capable of repetition yet evasive of review is likewise inapplicable in this case.

While the petitions have previously embodied a live case or controversy, they now have been rendered extinct by the lifting of the questioned issuances. thus, nothing is gained by breathing life into a dead issue.

Moreover, without a justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the SC has no original jurisdiction. Be it remembered that they were filed directly with the SC, and thus invokes its original jurisdiction.

In short, the theory of capable of repetition yet evading review may be invoked only when this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. It cannot be used in the present controversy for declaratory relief over which the SC has no original jurisdiction.

CHAN V. CHAN (REMEDIAL)

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in comtemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion and hostility.

CABRERA V. COMELEC (ELECTION, REMEDIAL)

The Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Involving Municipal Barangay Officials clearly command, in no uncertain terms THE FILING OF THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE BRIEF and compliance with the required contents of the said brief. By express language, the failure to comply therewith shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the preliminary conference, which, in turn, shall be sufficient cause for the dismissal of the protest.

Petitioner admitted himself that his preliminary conference brief did not contain essential statements required by the Rules. His abject disregard of the express mandate of the Rules must bear dire consequences, for following the Rules, his protest must now be dismissed.

The Rules should not be taken lightly. They were purposely adopted to provide an expeditious and inexpensive procedure for the just determination of election cases before the courts.

The PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE ANS ITS GOVERNING RULES ARE NOT MERE TECHNICALITIES WHICH MAY BE IGNORED. They are tools meant to expedite the disposition of election cases and must perforce, be obeyed.

JUAN V. COMELEC (ELECTION, REMEDIAL)

A ballot indicates the voter's will. There is no requirement that the entries in the ballot be written nicely or that the name of the candidate be spelled accurately. In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot is presumed valid unless there is a clear reason to justify its rejection.

The object of appreciation of ballots is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be determined with reasonable certainty. When placed in issue, the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents which involves a question of fact is best left to the determination of the COMELEC.

The SC is not a trier of facts. The Court's jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of the COMELEC on this matter operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. Verily, only where grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the SC interfere with the COMELEC's judgment. Proof of such grave abuse of discretion is found wanting in this case.

TATAD V. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS (CONSTI, REM)

Despite the supervening resignation from post of former VP Teofisto Guingona as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Tatad prayed that COA's consent be declared as void from the beginning on the ground that the appointment was contrary to law and public policy because he was already beyond 70 years old at that time, as RA 7157 (Phil Foreign Service Act of 1991) prohibits appointments of those beyond 70 years old to ambassadorial posts. Tatad insisted that the resignation did not render the case moot as there must be a continuing determination of those responsible for the illegal act.

Tatad is mistaken. AN ISSUE BECOMES MOOT AND ACADEMIC WHEN IT CEASES TO PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY. In such a case, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. SC has consistently held that courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief will be granted.

As the present case lacks an actual controversy, any resolution of the issues preseted would not result in an adjudication of the rights of the parties, but would take the nature merely of an advisory opinion. COURTS ARE CALLED UPON TO RESOLVE ACTUAL CASES AND CONTROVERSIES, NOT TO RENDER ADVISORY OPINIONS.

PANG-ET V. MANACNES-DAO-AS (REM)

BARANGAY CONCILIATION

What is compulsory under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is that there be CONFRONTATION between the parties before a Lupon and that a certification be issued that NO CONCILIATION OR SETTLEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED, before a case falling within the authority of the Lupon may be instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication.

The only other precondition before any case may be filed before a court is that there has been personal confrontation between parties but despite earnest efforts to conciliate, THERE WAS A FAILURE TO AMICABLY SETTLE THE DISPUTE.

While spouses Manacnes appeared before the Lupon, they refused to sign the Agreement for Arbitration form, which would have signified their consent to submit the case for arbitration.