FERMIN AND TUGAS V. PEOPLE (CRIMINAL)

A LIBEL is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.

To say that the article, in its entirety, is not libelous disturbs one's sensibilities; it would certainly prick one's conscience. There is evident imputation of the crime of malversation, or vices or defects for being fugitives from the law. and of being a wastrel. The attribution was made publicly, considering that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation. The victims were identified and identifiable. More importantly, the article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainants.

Petitioner claims that there was no malice on her part because allegedly, the article was merely a fair and honest comment on the fact that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez was issued a warrant of arrest for her conviction for estafa before Judge Palattao's court.

It can be gleaned form her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make defamatory imputations against complainants. Thus, petitioner cannot, by simply making a general denial, convince us that there was no malice on her part. Verily, not only was there malice in law, the article being malicious in itself, but there was also malice in fact, as there was motive to talk ill against complainants during the electoral campaign.

Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of public interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious, or unrelated to a public officer's performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. While complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers such as petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives.

In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the conviction of petitioner for libel should be upheld.

With respect to the penalty to be imposed for this conviction, we note that the Court issued on 25 January 2008, Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 entitled Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases. The circular expresses a preference for the imposition of a FINE rather than imprisonment, given the circumstances attendant in the cases cited therein in which only a fine was imposed by the Court on those convicted of libel. It also states that, if the penalty imposed is merely a fine but the convict is unable to pay the same, the RPC provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should apply.

However, the Circular likewise allows the court, in the exercise of sound discretion, the option to impose imprisonment as penalty, whenever the imposition of a fine alone would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice.