HEIRS OF SALVADOR HERMOSILLA V. SPOUSES REMOQUILLO (CIVIL)

The CA, reversing the decision of the trial court, held that the Kasunduan was void because at the time of its execution in 1972, the Republic of the Philippines was still the owner of Lot 19, hence, no right thereover was transmitted by Jaime who was awarded the said lot in 1986, and consequently, no right was transmitted by Salvador through succession to petitioners. And it found no evidence of fraud in Jaime's act of having Lot 19, including the questioned property, registered in his and his wife's name in 1987.

As priorly stated, when the Kasunduan was executed in 1972 by Jaime in favor of Salvador - petitioners' predecessor-in-interest - Lot 19, of which the questioned property forms part, was still owned by the Republic. Nemo dat quod no habet, Nobody can give what he does not possess. Jaime could not thus have transferred anything to Salvador via the Kasunduan.

HEIRS OF REGALADO V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (CIVIL)

Marina's heirs as applicants in this land registration case "bear the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain." This they failed to discharge.

In addition, other than Marina's uncorroborated testimony given in a previous attempt to have the property registered, there is not proof to sustain the trial court's finding that Marina, her uncle, aunt, and other relatives have been residing in the property for more than 30 years and that she herself had been residing there for 15 years when a Tomas Antero executed the deed of assignment in her favor.

In fine, the trial court's finding that Marina had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of owner under a bona fide claim of ownership fails.

HEIRS OF MARCELINO CABAL V. SPOUSES CABAL (CIVIL)

It has been said that good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, the applicable provision is Article 448. Thus, the owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building, planting, or sowing, after payment to the builder, planter or sower of the necessary and useful expenses, and in the proper case, for pure luxury or mere pleasure.

The owner of the land may also oblige the builder, planter, sower to purchase and pay the price of the land. If the owner chooses to sell his land, the builder, planter, and sower must purchase the land, otherwise, the owner may remove the improvements thereon.

The builder, planter, or sower, however, is not obliged to purchase the land if its value is considerably more than the building, planting, or sowing. In such case, the builder, planter, or sower must pay rent to the owner of the land.

If the parties cannot come into terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof. The right to choose between appropriating the improvement or selling the land on which the improvement stands to the builder, planter, sower, is given to the owner of the land.

ESPINO V. VICENTE (CIVIL)

A DONATION is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or a right in favour of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposed the following requisites:

1. It should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers;
2. it should be free; and
3. it should be spontaneous.

The parties' intention must be clear and that attendance of vice of consent, like in any other contract, renders the donation voidable.

It s evident that fraud attended the act of respondent Emma when she procured the signatures of Marceline and Emerciana. There is fraud when through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induces into a contract which without them, he would have agreed to. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.

ANCHETA V. GUERSEY-DALAYGON (CIVIL)

A decree of distribution of the estate of the deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which if erroneous, may be corrected by a timely appeal, Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.

However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.

Petitioner's failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey's estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence, the CA decision annulling RTC orders must be upheld.

ABING V. WAEYAN (CIVIL)

Any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares.

Their property relationship is governed by the rules on CO-OWNERSHIP. and under this regime, they owned their properties in common "in equal shares." Being herself a co-wner of the structure in question, respondent, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.

My fave mantra

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COMMISSIONER V. ESTATE OF TODA (TAX)

Tax avoidance and tax evasion are the 2 most common ways used by taxpayers in escaping from taxation.

TAX AVOIDANCE is the tax-saving device within the means sanctioned by law. This method should be used by the taxpayer in good faith and at arms length.

TAX EVASION, on the other hand, is a scheme used outside of those lawful means and when availed of, it usually subjects the taxpayer to further or additional civil or criminal liabilities.

Tax evasion connotes the integration of 3 factors:

1. the end to be achieved, i.e., the payment of less than that known by the taxpayer to be legally due or the non-payment of tax when it is shown that s tax is due;
2. an accompanying state of mind which is described as being evil, in bad faith, willful, or deliberate, and not accidental; and
3. and a course of action which is unlawful.

All these factors are present in the instant case. Here, it is obvious that the objective of the sale of Altonaga was to reduce the amount of tax to be paid especially that the transfer from him to RMI would then subject the income to only 5% individual capital gains tax, and not 35% corporate income tax. Altonaga's sole purpose of acquiring and transferring title of the subject properties on the same day was to create a TAX SHELTER.

Altonaga never controlled the property and did not enjoy the normal benefits and burdens of ownership. The sale to him was merely a tax ploy, a sham, and without business purpose and economic substance. Doubtless, the execution of the 2 sales was calculated to mislead the BIP with the end in view of reducing the consequent income tax liability.

In a nutshell, the intermediary transaction, i.e., the sale of Altonaga, which was prompted more on the mitigation of tax liabilities than for legitimate business purposes constitutes one of tax evasion.

To allow a taxpayer to deny tax liability on the ground that the sale was made through another and distinct entity when it is proved that the latter was merely a conduit is to sanction a circumvention of our tax laws. Hence, the sale of Altonaga should be disregarded for income tax purposes. The 2 sale transactions should be treated as a single direct sale by CIC to RMI.

Has the period of assessment prescribed?

NO. Section 222 of the Tax Reform Act reads:

Sec. 222. Exceptions as to period of limitation of assessment and collection of taxes: (a) In the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or pf failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court after the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within 10 years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission: Provided that in fraud assessment which has become final and executory, the fact of fraud shall be judicially taken cognizance of in the civil or criminal action for collection thereof.

Put differently, in cases of

1. fraudulent returns;
2. false returns with intent to evade tax; and
3. failure to file a return, the period within which to assess tax is 10 years from discovery of the fraud, falsification, or omission as the case may be.

As stated above, the prescriptive period to assess the correct taxes in case of false returns is 10 years from the discovery of the falsity. The false return was filed on t15 April 1990 and the falsity thereof was claimed to have been discovered only on 8 March 1991. The assessment for the 1989 deficiency income tax of CIC was issued 9 January 1995. clearly, the issuance of the correct assessment for deficiency income tax was well within the prescriptive period.

Is respondent Estate liable for the 1989 deficiency income tax of CIS?

A corporation has a juridical personality distinct and separate from the persons owning or composing it. Thus, the owners or stockholders of a corporation may not generally be made to answer for the liabilities of a corporation and vice versa. There are however, certain instances in which personal liability may arise. It has been held in a number of cases that personal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along albeit not necessarily, with the corporation may validly attach when:

1. He assents to the (a) patently unlawful act of the corporation; (b) bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs; or (c) conflict of interest, resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders, or other persons;
2. He consents to the issuance of watered down stocks, or having knowledge therof, does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto;
3. He agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or
4. He is made, by specific provision of law, to personally answer for his corporate action.

It is worth noting that when the late Toda sold his shares of stock to Choa, he knowingly and voluntarily held himself personally liable for all tax liabilities of CIC and the buyer for the years 1987, 1988, and 1989.

ABELLO V. COMMISSIONER (TAX)

Contribution to campaign funds of political candidates subject to DONOR'S TAX as donation under the Civil Code, as they were made without any consideration or compensation therefor. Petitioners had argued that the consideration for contribution was not liberality but the election to office of a candidate that could redound to their benefit.

COMMISSIONER V. BAIER-NICKEL (TAX)

Source of income is activity that produced the income, not the physical source of the income or its location. Payee may be Filipino, but that alone does not make it Philippine-sourced, if activities/services resulting in the income are actually performed abroad. No contradiction with BOAC case on activity test. BOAC actually followed activity test.

COMMISSIONER V. REYES (TAX)

Under Section 228, an ASSESSMENT must state the facts and the law on which it is based. Otherwise, it is invalid. This is not satisfied when taxpayer is simply informed in writing of the investigation being conducted and the recommendation for the assessment of ESTATE TAX.

In these circumstances, there is denial of due process because taxpayer cannot adequately respond to the assessment. Here, there was lack of basis and insufficiency of the gross figures and details of the itemized deduction indicated in the notice letter. The assessment was based on estimates that appear to have been arbitrarily and capriciously arrived at.

COMMISSIONER V. PHILIPPINE GLOBAL (TAX)

If the PROTEST is not a request for reinvestigation, but only a request for cancellation or reconsideration of the assessment, the filing of the protest does not toll the running of the prescriptive period to collect.

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING V. COMMISSIONER (TAX)

An appeal to the CTA from the inaction of the Commissioner on a protested assessment is optional as the taxpayer can wait for the actual decision before appealing. However, the exercise of one option excludes the other. Thus, if you appeal from the inaction, you can no longer appeal from the actual decision.

COMMISSIONER V. ISABELA CULTURAL CORPORATION (TAX)

Accrual of expense must be made even when the amount cannot be exactly determined, so long as a right to receive already exists and the amount can be estimated.

DIZON V. CTA (TAX)

For purposes of computing the value of the net estate for ESTATE TAX PURPOSES, the value of the liabilities against an estate is to be determined as of the time of death.

Post-death developments effectively reducing the value of these liabilities do not require a reduction of the amount of these liabilities for estate tax purposes.

BPI V. COMMISSIONER (TAX)

A REQUEST FOR REINVESTIGATION which is not granted by the Commissioner does not toll the running of the 3-year period for collection after the assessment is issued.

PEOPLE V. GALLEGO (REMEDIAL)

In People v. Teehankee, we explained the procedure for OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION and the test to determine the admissibility of such identification, viz:

"Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to cafe with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographers are shown to the witness to identify suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect form a group of persons lined up for the purpose.

In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES TEST where they consider the following factors:

1. the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
2. the witness' degree of attention at that time;
3. the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness;
4. the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification
5. the length of time between the crime and the identification; and
6. the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

Using the Totality of Circumstances Test, we find that the identification of Gallego as Lamata's assailant through a show-up is credible.

Gallego is a complete stranger to the witnesses. no ill-motive can be ascribed against them to falsely testify against him. Absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for them to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, as their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit.

In light of the positive identification of Gallego as Lamata's assailant, the accused's defense of denial and alibi must fail. Time and again, this Court has ruled that POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED will prevail over the DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND ALIBI. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission. This, the accused failed to do so. A borne out by the testimonies of the defense witnesses, Gallego's house (where Gallego supposedly was at the time Lamata was stabbed) was only about 3 to 4 kilometers from the scene of the crime - a distance which by motorcycle could be negotiated in 10 minutes.

PEOPLE V. ONG (REMEDIAL)

Rule 116 Sec.1 (a) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec.1. Arraignment and plea; how made -

(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complainant or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.

The arraignment of the appellants who are Chinese nationals violates the above rule. Their Certificate of Arraignment states that they were informed of the accusations against them. It does not, however, indicate whether the Information was read in the language or dialect known to them.

What leaps from the records of the case is the inability of appellants to fully or sufficiently comprehend any other language than Chinese and any of its dialect. Despite the inability, however, the appellants were arraigned on an Information written in the English language.

We again emphasize that the requirement that the Information should be read in a language or dialect known to the accused is mandatory. It must be strictly complied with as it is intended to protect the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. the constitutional protection is part of due process. Failure to observe the rules necessarily nullifies the arraignment.

We further hold that the prosecution failed to establish its claim of entrapment.

A BUY-BUST OPERATION is a form of ENTRAPMENT, which is recent years has been accepted as a valid means of arresting violators of Dangerous Drugs Law. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. Its opposite is INSTIGATION or INDUCEMENT, wherein the police or its agent lures the accused into committing the offense in order to prosecute him. Instigation is deemed contrary to public policy and considered as an ABSOLUTORY CAUSE.

In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The confidential informant who had knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. his testimony was given instead by a police officer who had no personal knowledge of the same. On this score, such police officer's testimony is HEARSAY and possesses no probative value unless it can be shown that the same falls within the exceptions to the hearsay rule. To impart probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the appellant solely on this basis would be to render nugatory his constitutional RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESS against him, in this case, the informant, and to examine his for his truthfulness. As the prosecution failed to prove all the material details of the buy-bust operation, its claim that there was valid entrapment of the appellants mus fail.

METROBANK V. CA (REMEDIAL)

Petitioner Metrobank is estopped from refusing the discharge of the real estate mortgage on the claim that the subject property still secures other unliquidated past due loans.

Respondent GTP, requested from Metrobank that it be furnished a copy of the full indebtedness secured by the real estate mortgage. In response thereto, Metrobank issued a statement of account which amount was immediately settled and paid the next day.

Metrobank is thus barred from taking a stand inconsistent with its representation upon which respondent GTP, as an innocent third person to the real mortgage agreement, place exclusive reliance.

For an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against a person relying thereon.

It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence is produced would operate to his prejudice and support the case of his adversary.

No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist.


Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going to establish the ultimate fact that the evidence is designed to prove, and the party to be affected by the proof, with an opportunity to do so, fails to deny or explain them, they may well be taken as admitted with all the effect of the inferences afforded.

The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own control, and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most unfavorable construction upon his silence, and infers that a disclosure would have shown the fact to be as claimed by the opposing party.

Verily, Metrobank's omission to present its evidence only created an adverse inference against its cause. Therefore, it cannot now be heard to complain since CA extended a reasonable opportunity to Metrobank that it did not avail.

PEOPLE V. PADRIGONE (REMEDIAL)

Pedrigone assails the procedural irregularities committed by the prosecution and by the trial court. He claims that the prosecution SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE by not presenting Rowena, the rape victim, when the latter should have had her sane moments. As a consequence, the trial court deprived Pedrigone of the opportunity to cross-examine her when she was allegedly declared before the Chief of Police that it was only Pedrigone who raped her which declaration became the basis for the latter's conviction.

Besides, the non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply if:

1. the evidence is at the disposal of both parties;
2. the suppression was not willful;
3. it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and
4. the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.

Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case.

FIRST: The defense had the opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecutor did not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness stand.

SECOND: Rowena was certified to be suffering from Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition and thus, cannot stand judicial proceedings yet. The non-presentation therefore, of Rowena was not willful.

THIRD: In any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister.

PEOPLE V. EDUALINO (REMEDIAL)

Edualino raises the issue of the character of complainant Nantiza. It is argued that a responsible and decent married woman, who wan then 3 months pregnant, would not be out at 2 am gutting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a man to accompany her to drink beer. It is contended that complainant merely concocted the charge of rape to save her marriage since her husband had found out that she was using drugs and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle of herself when she tried to seduce accused-appellant on 11 May 1994 while she was under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

At the outset of this discussion, it should be pointed out that the MORAL CHARACTER of the rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The Court has rules that prostitutes can be victims of rape.

In the present case, even if Edualino's allegations that the victim was drunk and under the influence of drugs and that she cannot be considered a decent and responsible married woman, were true, said circumstances will not per se preclude a finding that she was raped.

The court cannot believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. We fail to understand how a false rape story can save a marriage under the circumstances averred by Edualino.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses pertain to minor matters and are even badges that the witnesses were unrehearsed and honest.

IBAAN RURAL BANK V. CA (EVIDENCE)

Essentially, 2 issues are raised for resolution:

1. What was the period of redemption: 2 years as unilaterally fixed by the sheriff in the contract, or 1 year as fixed by law?
2. May respondent court properly award attorney's fees solely on the basis of the refusal of the bank to allow redemption?

When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale in the Register of Deeds, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its contents. For 2 years, it did not object to the 2-year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be said that petitioner consented to the 2-year redemption period especially since it had time to object but did not.

When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as consent. By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to believe that they had 2 years within which to redeem the mortgage.

After the lapse of 2 years, petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period of redemption was only 1 year and that the period had already lapsed.

ESTOPPEL IN PAIS arises when one, by his acts, representations, or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.

In affirming the decision of the trial court, CA relied on Lazo v. Republic Surety where the court held that the 1-year period of redemption provided in Act 3135 is only directory and can be extended by agreement of the parties. True, but it bears noting that in Lazo, the parties voluntarily agreed to extend the redemption period. This is not so in the instant case. There was no voluntary agreement. In fact, the sheriff unilaterally and arbitrarily extended the period of redemption to 2 years in the certificate of sale. The parties were not even in privy to the extension made by the sheriff. Nonetheless, as above discussed, the bank cannot after the lapse of 2 years insist that the redemption period was 1 year only.

Additionally, the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of a property. The fact alone that he is allowed the right to redeem clearly demonstrates the solicitousness of the law in giving him another opportunity, should his fortune improve, to recover his lost property.

Lastly, petitioner is a banking institution on whom the public expects diligence, meticulousness, and mastery of its transactions. Had petitioner diligently reviewed the certificate of sale, it could have easily discovered that the period was extended 1 year beyond the usual period of redemption. Banks, being greatly affected with public interest, are expected to exercise a degree of diligence in the handling of its affairs higher than that expected of an ordinary business firm.

On the second issue, the award of attorney's fees must be disallowed for lack of legal basis. The fact that private respondents were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect and enforce their claim does not justify the award of attorney's fees. The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the public policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. The award of attorney's fees must be deleted where the award of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated.

ALCARAZ V. TANGGA-AN (REMEDIAL)

Section 16 of Rule 70 the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership - When the defendant raises the DEFENSE OF OWNERSHIP in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

The issue of ownership is precisely what the petitioner spouses raised to justify their non-payment of rent and to resist eviction from the house they leased from respondents. Being indispensable to the resolution of the issue of possession, we herein render a provisional ruling on ownership.

Although TAX DECLARATIONS OR REALTY TAX PAYMENTS are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least a proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Sec. 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION that:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it.

After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for 2 years, the petitioner spouses are barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot.

We also note that the petitioner spouses rescinded the contract of lease without judicial approval. Due to the change in ownership of the land, the petitioner spouses decided to unilaterally cancel the contract because Virgilio supposedly became the new owner of the house after acquiring title to the lot.

They alleged that there was no reason anymore to perform their obligations as lessees because the lessor had ceased to be the owner of the house. But there is nothing in their lease contract that allows the parties to extrajudicially rescind the same in case of violation of the terms thereof.

Extrajudicial rescission of a contract is not possible without an express stipulation to that effect. What the petitioner spouses should have done was to file a special civil action for interpleader for the claimants to litigate their claims and to deposit the rentals in court.

GOYENA V. LEDESMA-GUSTILO (REMEDIAL)

Although the general rule is that the SC is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing and revising only errors of law, it is nonetheless subject to the following exceptions which have been laid down in a number of decision of this court:

1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures;
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
3. When there is grave abuse of discretion;
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. When the findings of facts are conflicting;
6. When the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to those of the trial court;
7. When the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;
8. When the findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
10. When the findings of fact of the CA is premised on the supposed absence of evidence ans id contradicted by the evidence on record.

ALVARICO V. SOLA (REMEDIAL)

Even assuming that Sola acquired title tot eh disputed property in bad faith, only the State can institute REVERSION PROCEEDINGS under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act. Thus:

Sec. 101. All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, suh that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain.

Only the Solicitor General of the officer acting in his stead may do so. Since Sola's title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. Clearly then, Alvarico has no standing at all to question the validity of Sola's title. It follows that he cannot recover the property because to begin with, he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.

Anent Alvarico's contention that it was the intention of Fermina Sola for Amelita Sola to hold the property in trust for him, we held that if this was really the intention of Fermina, then this should have been clearly stated in the Deed of Self-Adjudication executed in 1983, in the Deed of Donation executed in 1984, or in a subsequent instrument. Absent any persuasive proof of that intention in any written instrument, we are not prepared to accept Alvarico's bare allegation concerning the donor's state of mind.

CARO V. SUCALDITO (REMEDIAL)

Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST or one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit." Corollarily, LEGAL STANDING has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.

Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. In this case, the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a free patent, cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance.

As held in Lucas v. Durian: the proper party to bring the action was the government, to which the property would revert.

As declared in Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio: plaintiff, being a mere homestead applicant, was not the real party-in-interest to institute an action for reconveyance.

If the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party-in-interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action. In fact, a final judgment may be invalidated if the real party-in-interest are not included. Final judgments are nullified when indispensable parties are not impleaded.

In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of public land. Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon. respondents have no personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in such a suit.

I HAVE A DREAM

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What we say is equally important as how we say it.

TRES REYES V. MAXIM TEA HOUSE (REMEDIAL)

Tres Reyes filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration which the LA considered as a wrong mode.

We are constrained to conclude that the appellate court had no basis for concluding that the NLRC had gravely abused its discretion when the NLRC gave due course to the motion and treated it as an appeal.

In labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. They are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and where their strict application would result in the frustration rather than promotion of substantial justice, technicalities must be avoided. Technicalities should not be permitted to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. Where the ends of substantial justice shall be better served, the application of technical rules or procedure may be relaxed.

There being no clear showing that Tres Reyes was culpable for gross negligence, Tres Reyes' dismissal is illegal.

REXLON REALTY V. CA (REMEDIAL)

Pursuant to Section 2 Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the grounds to annul a judgment of a lower court are:

• extrinsic fraud; and
• lack of jurisdiction.

We find that the issuance of a new owner;s duplicate certificates of title by the trial court in favor of respondent David is indeed tainted with extrinsic fraud.

However, the document denominated as "Absolute Deed of Sale" where the signature of respondent David as seller has not been controverted, states that the latter has fully received payment for the said dale and has bound himself to cede and deliver to petitioner Rexlon as vendee, his rights, interest, participation and title over the said parcels of land.

The Court is presented in the case at bar with the issue of whether such misrepresentation or fraud of David can be characterized as extrinsic fraud so as to merit the annulment of the trial court's decision granting David's petition for the issuance of new owner's duplicate certificates.

Extrinsic fraud contemplates a situation where a litigant commits acts outside of the trial of the case, "the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, a real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy.

The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. Hence, the Court has held that extrinsic fraud is present in cases where a party:

1. is deprived of his interest in land, because of a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact they are;
2. applies for and obtains adjudication and registration in the name of a co-owner of land which he knows has not been allotted to him in partition;
3. intentionally conceals facts and connives with the land inspector, so that the latter would include in the survey plan the bed of a navigable stream;
4. deliberately makes a false statement that there are no other claims;
5. induces another not to oppose an application;
6. deliberately fails to notify the party entitled to notice; or
7. misrepresents the identity of the lot to the true owner, causing the latter to withdraw his opposition.

Fraud, in these cases, goes into and affects the jurisdiction of the court; thus, a decision rendered on the basis of such fraud becomes subject to annulment.

In consonance with the Straight Times case, holding that "the use of forged instruments or perjured testimonies during trial is not an extrinsic fraud, because such evidence does not preclude the participation of any party in the proceedings. While a perjured testimony may prevent a fair and just determination of a case, it does not bar the adverse party from rebutting or opposing the use of such evidence. Further, it should be stressed that extrinsic fraud pertains to an act committed outside of the trial, The alleged fraud in this case was perpetrated during trial," David's act of misrepresentation, though not constituting extrinsic fraud, is still an evidence of absence of jurisdiction. We held that if an owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, the authenticity and genuineness of the owner's duplicate in the possession of Rexlon and the Absolute Deed of Sale in its favor have not been disputed. As there is no proof to support actual loss of the said owner's duplicate copies of said certificate of title, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction and the new titles issued in replacement thereof are void.

QBE INSURANCE V. RABELLO (REMEDIAL)

As officers of the Court, however, SHERIFFS and deputy sheriffs are bound to discharge their duties with utmost case and diligence, particularly in implementing the orders of the court, for if they err, they will affect the efficacy of the process by which justice is administered.

In the instant case, respondent asserted that the manifestation he filed before the trial court stating that Rizal Surety had recently changed its corporate name to QBE Insurance was based on what he saw in the office of Rizal Surety and information relayed to him by its employees.

Respondent ought to be aware that execution could only be issued against a party and not against one who was not accorded his day in court and it was his bounden duty to see to it that the writ of execution would be implemented only upon properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. Property belonging to third persons cannot thus be levied upon.

Section 16 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that the moment a third party claim is filed, the sheriff is not bound to keep the property levied upon, unless the creditor insists that it should be continued, which may be done if such creditor files a bond sufficient to indemnify the sheriff for whatever damages he may be held liable should the third party succeed in vindicating his title in a proper action brought separately for the purpose.

If the third-party claim is sufficient, the sheriff upon receiving it is not bound to proceed with the levy of the property, unless he is given by the judgment creditor or his agent an indemnity bond against the claim.

The remedies just mentioned are without prejudice to any proper action that a third party claimant may deem suitable, to vindicate his claim to the property.

The proper remedy of TERCERIA would have for its object the recovery of the possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages resulting from the alleged wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third-party claim; and it may be brought against the sheriff, and such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded with the sheriff in the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment creditor himself.

PEOPLE V. CORPUZ (REMEDIAL)

It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses and probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by this Court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial court in observing and monitoring at close range, the conduct, deportment, and demeanor of the witnesses as they testify before the trial court. However, this principle does not apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood, or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.

The exception obtains in this case.

In the case at bar, we have carefully reviewed the records of the case and found that the prosecution failed to establish that appellant as secretary had control, management, or direction of the recruitment agency. She was tasked to hold document employment contracts from the foreign employers. She did not entertain applicants and she had no discretion over how the business was managed.

The trial court's finding that appellant, being the secretary of the agency, had control over its business, is not only non sequitur but has no evidentiary basis. where it is shown that the employee was merely acting under the direction of his superior and was unaware that this acts constituted a crime, he may not be criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of his employer.

Anent the issue of whether or not appellant knowingly and intentionally participated in the commission of the crime charged, we find that she did not.

In the case at bar, as the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove appellant's active participation in the illegal recruitment activities of the agency, appellant is acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt.

PAL V. CA (REMEDIAL)

It is a well-entrenched principle that absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion or any palpable error in its findings, this Court will not question the probative weight accorded by the lower courts to the various evidence presented by the parties.

It is also well established that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal except on very strong and cogent grounds.

In fine, the findings of the trial court, as sustained by the CA, have to be respected. As we have consistently held, trial courts enjoy the unique advantage of observing at close range the demeanor, deportment, and conduct of witnesses as they give their testimonies. Thus, assignment to declaration on the witness stand is best done by them who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh firsthand the testimony of a witness.

As to moral damages, it should be stresses that moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are not punitive in nature. While there is no hard and fast rule for determining what would be a fair amount of moral damages, generally, the amount awarded should be commensurate with the actual loss or injury suffered.

LANDBANK V. DE LEON (REMEDIAL)

The DAR and Landbank both filed separate appeals using different modes. DAR filed a petition for review while Landbank interposed an ordinary appeal by filing a notice of appeal.

The petition for review was given due course while the ordinary appeal was dismissed primarily holding that Landbank availed of the wrong mode of appeal.

In affirming the dismissal by the appellate court of Landbank's ordinary appeal, this Court held that in section 60 of RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) is clear in providing petition for review as the appropriate mode of appeal from decision of the Special Agrarian Courts.

Section 61 (the provision on which Landbank bases its argument for review as the correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts) merely makes a general reference to the Rules of Court and does not categorically prescribe ordinary appeal as the correct way of questioning decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.

We ruled that the Rules of Court do not categorically prescribe ordinary appeal as the exclusive mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. further, rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the SC.

On account of the absence of jurisprudence interpreting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657 regarding the proper way to appeal decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts, as well as the conflicting decisions of the CA thereon, Landbank cannot be blamed for availing of the wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation and reliance on the Buenaventura ruling, Landbank acted on the mistaken belief that an ordinary appeal is the appropriate manner to question decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.

We hold that our Decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of appeal from judgments of Special Agrarian Courts, is a rule of procedure which affects substantive rights. If our ruling is given retroactive application, it will prejudice Landbank's right to appeal because pending appeals in the CA will be dismissed outright on mere technicality thereby sacrificing substantial merits thereof. It would be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending case involving a party who already invoked a contrary view and who acted in good faith thereon prior to the issuance of said doctrine.

ESCUETA AND BALOLOY V. LIM (REMEDIAL)

PRE-TRIAL is mandatory. The notices of pre-trial had been sent to both the Baloloys and their former counsel of record. Being served with notice, he is charges with the duty of notifying the party represented by him. He must see to it that his client receives such notice and attends the pre-trial. What the Baloloys and their former counsel have alleged instead in their motion is the belated receipt of the special power of attorney, not that they have not received the notice or been informed of the scheduled pre-trial. Not having raised the ground of lack of a special power of attorney in their motion, they are not deemed to have waived it. Certainly, they cannot raise it at this late stage of the proceedings. For lack of representation, Baloloy was properly declared in default.

Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court sates:

SEC 3. TIME FOR FILING PETITION; CONTENTS AND VERIFICATION - a petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not mroe that 6 months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense as the cas may be.

There is no reason for the Baloloys to ignore the effects of the above rule. the 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment, or proceedings and not from the date he actually read the same.

Further, no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence exists in order that the PETITION FOR RELIEF may be granted.

JMM PROMOTIONS V. CA (REMEDIAL)

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Pure issues of fact may not be the proper subject of APPEAL BY CERTIORARI under Rule 45 of the Rules of court as this mode of appeal is generally confined to questions of law. We therefore take this opportunity again to reiterate that only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised before the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45.

The issues propounded by petitioner involve only questions of fact previously raised and satisfactorily rules upon by the courts a quo.

Findings of finality by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the courts because of the special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. Moreover, it is a time-honoured rule that "the factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by the SC and they carry even more weight when the CA affirms the factual findings of the trial court.

DURISOL V. CA (REMEDIAL)

The RTC, formerly the CFI, is an court of general jurisdiction. All cases, the jurisdiction over which is not specifically provided for by law to be within the jurisdiction of any other court, fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC. But the RTC is also a court of limited jurisdiction over, among others, cadastral and land registration cases. All proceedings involving title to real property, or specifically land registration cases, including incidents such as the issuance or owner's duplicate certificate of title, are matters cognizable by the RTC.

It has been ruled that the RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving possession of land, except forcible entry and unlawful detainer.

A judgment rendered by a trial court for alleged lack of jurisdiction cannot be considered void where the party who has the right to challenge it failed to do so at the first instance.

Indeed, it was only 2 decades after the institution of the case at bar, when the issue of jurisdiction was first raised. However, it is already too late since the judgment had already attained finality, considering that more than 4 years have elapsed without any action from petitioner.

Rule 47, Section 3 expressly provides that a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction must be files before it is barred by laches or estoppel. Hence, it has been held that while jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at any time of the proceedings, this rule presupposes that laches or estoppel has not supervened.

AUGUSTO V. RISOS (REMEDIAL)

Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that an APPEAL may be taken only from a final order, and not from an interlocutory one.

A FINAL ORDER is one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. An order or judgment is deemed final if it finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and concludes them until it is reversed or set aside.

Where no issue is left for future consideration, except the fact of compliance with the terms of the order, such order is final and appealable. In contrast, an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of the case.

In this case, the order of the public respondent directing the petitioners to produce the owner's copy of the OCT in the Office of the RD for the annotation of the private respondent's interest over the property is merely interlocutory and not final; hence, not appealable by means of a writ of error.

ALFREDO V. BORRAS (REMEDIAL)

In a PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI under Rule 45, this Court reviews only errors of law and not errors of facts. The factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on this Court. This applies with greater force when both the trial court and the CA are in complete agreement on their factual findings. In this case, there is no reason to deviate from the findings of the lower courts. The facts relied upon by the trial court and appellate courts are borne out by the record. We agree with the conclusions drawn by the lower courts from these facts.

The action is not barred by prescription and laches. In reality, the ultimate relief sought by respondents is the RECONVEYANCE to them of the subject land. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. The body of the pleading or complaint determines the nature od the action, not its title Or heading. Thus. the present action should be treated as one for reconveyance.

To determine when the prescriptive period commenced in an action for reconveyance, plaintiff's possession of the disputed property is material. an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The 10-year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a SUIT FOR QUIETING OF TITLE, an action that is IMPRESCRIPTIBLE.

Neither is the action barred by laches. We have defined LACHES as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable time, to do that which, by the exercise of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either had abandoned it or declined to assert it. Respondents discovered in January 1994 the subsequent sale of the subject land and they filed this case in March 1994. Plainly, they did not sleep on their rights.

SERRANO V. CA (REMEDIAL)

Generally, the EXECUTION UPON A FINAL JUDGMENT is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party. It is the ministerial and mandatory duty of the trial court to enforce its own judgment once it becomes final and executory.

It may happen however, that new facts and circumstances may develop or occur after a judgment had been rendered and while an appeal therefrom is pending; or new matters had developed after the appeal has been dismissed and the appealed judgment had become final and executory, which the parties were not aware of an could not have been aware of prior to or during the trial or during the appeal, as they were not yet in existence at that time.

It is required, however, that the supervening facts and circumstances must either have a direct effect upon the matter already litigated and settled or create a substantial change in the rights or relations of the parties therein which should render execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible, or inequitable or when it becomes imperative in the interest of justice.

RCBC V. MAGWIN MARKETING CORP (REMEDIAL)

Whether the dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute was unconditionally reconsidered, reversed, and set aside to reinstate the civil case and have it ready for pre-trial are matters which should have been clarified and resolved in the first instance by the court a quo.

Complaint was for recovery of sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment. Petitioner did not cause the case to be set for pre-trial.

A complaint may be dismissed due to plaintiff's fault:

1. if he fails to appear during a scheduled trial, especially on the date for the presentation of his evidence in chief, or when so required at the pre-trial;
2. if he neglects to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or
3. if he does not comply with the rules or any order of the court. None of these was obtaining in the civil case.

In fine, petitioner cannot be said to have lost interest in fighting the civil case to the end. a court may dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur bu the real test of the judicial exercise of such power is whether under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of fitting assiduousness in not acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude.

PANOTES V. CITY TOWNHOUSE (REMEDIAL)

An action for REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of 5 years without being executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to reopen any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor's case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment.

The original judgment or the NHA Resolution sought to be revived was between Panotes and PROSECOR, nt between petitioner Bumatay and CTDC. In maintaining that CTDC is bound by the NHA Resolution, petitioner claims that CTDC is the successor-in-interest of PROSECOR.

The contract does notr include the transfer of rights of PROSECOR as owner-developer of the said subdivision. Clearly, there is no basis to conclude the CTDC is the successor-in-interest of PROSECOR.

It bears stressing that when CTDC nought Block 40, there was no annotation on PROSECOR's title showing that the property is encumbered. CTDC is thus a buyer in good faith and for value and as such, may not be deprived of the ownership of Block 40. Verily, the NHA Resolution may not be enforced against CTDC.

Clearly, providing an open space within the subdivision remains to be the obligation of PROSECOR, the owner-developer and the real party-in-interest in the case for revival of judgment.

Further, strangers to a case, like CTDC, are not bound by the judgment rendered by a court. It will not divest the rights of a party who has not and never been a party to a litigation. EXECUTION of a judgment can be issued only against a party to the action and not against one who did not have his day in court.

CITY OF ILIGAN V. PRINCIPAL MANAGEMENT GROUP (REMEDIAL)

The ascertainment of good reasons for EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Normally, its finding will not be disturbed by a reviewing court, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.

Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reads:

SECTION 2. DISCRETIONARY EXECUTION -

(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal - On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.

Discretionary execution may only issue upon GOOD REASONS to be stated in a special order after due hearing.

There are 3 requisites for the execution of a judgment pending appeal:

1. a motion must be filed by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
2. there must be good reasons for execution pending appeal; and
3. the good reasons must be stated in a special order.

Execution pending appeal is, of course, the exception to the general rule. Normally, execution cannot be obtained until and unless

1. the judgment has become final and executory;
2. the right of appeal has been renounced or waived;
3. the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been filed; or
4. having been filed, the appeal has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin - in which case, execution shall issue as a matter of right.

On the other hand, when the period of appeal has not yet expired, the execution of a judgment should not be allowed except if, in the court's discretion, there are good reasons therefor.

Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances that justify the immediate execution of a judgment, lest it become illusory; or the prevailing party be unable to enjoy it after the lapse of time, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may have no recourse but to delay.

The court is convinced that there are good reasons to allow the immediate execution pending appeal. Its adjudication is based on petitioner's own admission hence, any appeal would be unmeritorious and would only serve to delay execution of the final order. The fact that an appeal in this case if taken by petitioner will be a mere dilatory tactic has been declared by the SC as a good and sufficient reason upon which to issue execution.

Indeed, this court has held that a good and sufficient reason upon which to authorize immediate execution is when an appeal is clearly dilatory.

D ARMOURED SECURITY V. ORPIA (REMEDIAL)

The Rule on execution provides for those properties exempt from execution. It is apparent that the exemption pertains only to natural persons and not to juridical entities. On this point, the CA correctly ruled that petitioner, being a corporate entity, does not fall within the exemption.

Necessarily, petitioner which is a corporate entity, does not fall under the exemption. Parenthetically, in a parallel case where the security agency claimed that the guns it gives to its guards are tools and implements exempt from execution, the SC had the occasion to rule that the exemption pertains only to natural and not to juridical persons, thus:

'However, it would appear that the exemption contemplated by the provision involved is personal, available only to a natural person, such as a dentist's chair and electric fan. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, if properties used in business are exempt from execution, there can hardly be an instance when a judgment claim can be enforced against the business entity.'

VILLARUEL V. FERNANDO (REMEDIAL)

Settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable any may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or msitakes. True, this rule admits of exceptions. One of the exceptions is whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. This however, is not the case here. In the present case, the Ombudsman issued his Resolution prior to the finality of the trial court's decision. Therefore, the resolution of the Ombudsman is not a supervening event to warrant the stay of the execution of the decision of the trial court.

SANTOS V. COMELEC (REMEDIAL, ELECTION)

The petition is impressed with merit. As shown in the records, respondent was guilty of forum-shopping.

FORUM-SHOPPING is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of 2 or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.

For it to exist, there should be:

1. identity of parties, or at least such as would represent the same interest in both actions;
2. identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
3. identity of the 2 preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

Considering that respondent was indubitably guilty of forum-shopping when he filed SPR No. 37-2002, his petition should have been dismissed outright by the COMELEC. Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case and constitutes direct contempt of court.

A valid exercise of the discretion to allow EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL requires that it should be based "upon good reasons to be stated in a special order." The following constitute "good reasons" and a combination of 2 or more of them will suffuie to grant execution pending appeal:

1. public interest involved or will of the electorate;
2. the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and
3. the length of time that the election contest has been pending.

To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would, in the words of Tobon Uy v. COMELEC, bring back the ghost of the GRAB-THE-PROCLAMATION-PROLONG-THE-PROTEST techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This would, as a consequence, lay to waste the will of the electorate.