OPORTO V. MEMBERS OF BOARD OF INQUIRY AND SICIPLINE OF NAPOCOR (EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES, FORUM SHOPPING)

Oporto failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

The DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES mandates that whenever there is an available administrative remedy provided by law, no judicial recourse can be made until all such remedies have been availed of and exhausted. This rule is based on the practical principle that the administrative agency should be given a chance to correct its error and that relief first sought from a superior administrative agency could render court action unnecessary.

In this case, Oporto appealed the decision of the NAPOCOR President to DOE Secretary. Obviously, he was under the impression that the Secretary had administrative appellate authority over NAPOCOR President's decision. but without waiting for the Secretary's action, Oporto filed with the RTC a petition for prohibition under Rule 65. In so doing, Oporto compounded an earlier error with yet another blunder, namely, forum shopping.

By going to the court without awaiting the action of the Secretary, whom he recognized as a superior administrative authority, Oporto violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Oporto committed forum shopping.

In yet another display of flawed logic, Oporto insists that he had been denied due process - an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion - and if indeed, the DOE Secretary is not the proper forum for an appeal, then the appeal should be deemed as not having been filed at all. Thus, Oporto argues, there would be no incidence of forum shopping.

There is FORUM SHOPPING when the following elements concur:

1. Identity of the parties, or at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both actions;
2. Identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and
3. Identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.

The filing of the petition for prohibition with the RTC while the appeal with the DOE Secretary was yet unresolved is unmistakably a case of forum shopping, as it yielded the full concurrence of all the three elements enumerated above.

Due process is not a mantra, the mere invocation of which shall warrant a reversal of a decision. Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Oporto was not deprived of due process in this case as he had in fact filed his answer ans a Joint Position Paper explaining to the Board the reasons for the discrepancy of the inspection and delivery date. He was likewise able to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the NAPOCOR President's decision. It should be emphasized that despite the opportunity to do so, Oporto did not present any new substantial defense other than to say that the alleged error was not his own doing and that it was a simple case of oversight.

MONTUERTO V. TY AND SANGGUNIAN BAYAN (LOCAL GOVERNMENT)

The law is clear. Under Section 443(a) and (d) of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code, the head of the department or office in the municipal government such as the Municipal Budget Officer, shall be appointed by the Mayor with the concurrence of the majority of all Sanggunian Bayan members, subject to civil service law, rules, and regulations.

Per records, the appointment was never submitted to the Sanggunian Bayan for its concurrence or even if so submitted, no such concurrence was obtained. such factual finding of quasi-judicial agencies, especially if adopted and affirmed by the CA, is deemed FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE and may not be reviewed on appeal by the SC. This Court is not a trier of facts and generally, does not weigh anew evidence already passed upon by the CA. Absent a showing that this case falls under any of the exceptions to this general rule, this Court will refrain from disturbing the findings of fact of the tribunals below.

Moreover, we agree with the ruling of the CA that the verbal concurrence given by the Sanggunian as postulated by the petitioner is not the concurrence required and envisioned under RA 7160. The Sanggunian, as a body, acts through a resolution or an ordinance. Absent such resolution of concurrence, the appointment of petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 443 (a) and (d) of RA 7160. Without a valid appointment, petitioner acquired no legal title to the office of the Municipal budget Officer, even if she had served as such for 10 years.

Accordingly, the CSC has the authority to recall the appointment of the petitioner.

OMBUDSMAN V. TORRES AND TORRES (REMEDIAL, ADMINISTRATIVE)

The existence of malice or criminal intent is not a mandatory requirement for a finding of falsification of official documents as an administrative offense. What is required is simply a showing that the private respondents made entries in their respective DTRs knowing fully that they were false. The offense is in the nature of MALUM PROHIBITUM. The element of damage is also not absolutely necessary, since this case does not pertain to the felony of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Further, it remains arguable that there could have been damage caused the government as public money was paid for hours of work not actually rendered.

It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential principle that the dismissal of the criminal case involving the same set of facts does not automatically result in the dismissal of the administrative charges against private respondents.

While it is true that factual findings of administrative agencies that are affirmed by the CA are conclusive upon and generally not reviewable by the SC, the rule admits of the following exceptions:

• when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures;
• when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
• when there is grave abuse of discretion;
• when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
• when the findings of fact are conflicting;
• when the findings went beyond the issues of the case or are contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case;
• when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court or the administrative agency;
• when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
• when the facts set forth in the pleadings are not disputed;
• when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
• when certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties were manifestly overlooked, which if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

Given the particular circumstances surrounding the case, it cannot be justly and validly inferred that private respondents indeed falsified their DTRs without the presentation of the corresponding DTRs themselves, since these DTRs were supposed to be the subject of the falsification. A party to an administrative case must prove his affirmative allegation with substantial evidence, and the complainant before the Office of the Ombudsman could not have established proof of the falsification absent the alleged falsified documents.

JUDGE RAMOS V. BICAD (ADMIN LAW, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE)

The acquittal of Bicad in the criminal case does not result in the dismissal of the administrative case against him. In ADMINISTRATIVE CASES, the quantum of proof necessary to hold respondent liable is SUBSTANTIAL OR COMPETENT EVIDENCE while proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary to convict an accused in a criminal case. Thus, even if respondent in the administrative case is acquitted in the criminal case, the administrative case may be pursued.

Th act of respondent in having carnal knowledge of a minor is deplorable and must be abhorred. Such revolting act has no place in the judiciary, the true temple of justice. Bicad has shown his lack of morality, discipline, and restraint to his lustful desires.

It must be emphasized that the image of the court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the personnel holding the lowest position. Thus, the Court has, time and again, reminded every member of the judiciary to adhere to the exacting standards of morality, decency, and uprightness to maintain the people's respect and faith in the judiciary.

EMPIRE EAST LAND HOLDINGS V. CAPITOL INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION (CIVIL LAW, CONSTRUCTIVE FULFILLMENT)

If we were to apply the civil law rule of CONSTRUCTIVE FULFILLMENT - the condition shall be deemed fulfilled if the creditor voluntarily prevented its fulfillment - then the submission of a guarantee bond may be deemed to have been complied with. But we cannot apply the rule to conditions (a) and (c), which remain as unfulfilled conditions-precedent. Since no proof was adduced that these two conditions were complied with, petitioner;s obligation to release the retention money had not yet arisen. We would like to emphasize that this is without prejudice to respondent's compliance with the unfulfilled conditions, after which release of the retention money must perforce follow.

BELLO V. NLRC (APPEAL FILED OUT OF TIME)

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of the due process. The perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory; noncompliance with this legal requirement is fatal and has the effect of making the judgment final and executory.

The period for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the time the counsel of record received a copy of the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

Accordingly, the 60-day period for filing the petition for certiorari with the CA should be counted from the receipt by the petitioner's counsel of a copy of the NLRC Decision reversing the Labor Arbiter. It should be noted that when the petitioner filed his MR, only 48 days remained of the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari. The petitioner however, filed his petition for certiorari 211 days from the receipt by his counsel of the Resolution denying the MR. In other words, the petition for certiorari was filed 163 days late.

As much as possible, appeals should not be dismissed on a mere technicality in order to afford the litigants the maximum opportunity for the adjudication of their cases on the merits. However, the failure to perfect an appeal is not a mere technicality as it raises a jurisdictional problem which deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal. After a decision is declared final and executory, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision of the case.

TOMAWIS V. TABAO-CAUDANG (COMPLETENESS OF SERVICE, FORUM SHOPPING, INJUNCTION, CES ELIGIBILITY)

Rule 13, Section 10: Completeness of service. Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of 10 days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after 5 days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier.

The rule on service by refistered mail contemplates 2 situations:

1. actual service, the completeness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registered mail; or
2. constructive notice, the completeness of which is determined upon expiration of 5 days from the date the addressee received the first notice from the postmaster.

The best evidence to prove that notice was sent would be a certification from the postmater to the effect that not only was notice issued or sent but also on how, when, and to whom the delivery was made.

In the instant case, there was no sufficient proof that the respondent actually received a copy of the Dec 15 resolution. Neither was there proof that a first notice was indeed received by her. As such, the rule on constructive notice cannot apply. Accordingly, since the respondent was not served a copy of the resolution, the decision sonld never attain finality. Consequently, there can be no valid basis for the issuance of the writ of execution.

Before a writ of execution may issue, there must necessarily be a final judgment or order that idsposes of the action or proceeding. The writ of execution is the means by which a pary can enforce a final judgment or order of the court. Absent a final judgment or order, there is nothing to enforce or execute; thus, there can be no valid writ of execution.

Injunction is a judicial writ, process, or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action. As a rule, to justify the injunctive relief prayed for, the movant must show:

1. the existence of a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and
2. that the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.

A clear legal right means one clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. The onus probandi is on movant to show that there exists a right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the acts sought to be enjoined. further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage.

Tomawis was appointed Regional Director. However, as he did not possess the requisite CES eligibility, his appointment was characterized merely as temporary. As such, he had no security of tenure. Upon appointment of Caudang to the position, Tomawis' right to the position ceased to exist. Thus, he should have vacated and relinquished the position and turned over the duties, funds, and properties of the office to Caudang.

Accordingly, his petition for injunction should have been denied outright by the court. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Lastly, the SC cannot sustain petitioner's claim that respondent is guilty of multiple forum shopping. There is forum shopping where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. true, respondent had previously instituted quo warranto proceedings involving the same contested position, and her petitions had been dismissed with finality by this Court. We, however, find that the issue in the instant case is based on a different set of facts.

GABRIEL V. CA (CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING, MODES OF SERVICE AND FILING, PROBATE, RIGHT TO APPEAL)

On the first issue regarding the CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING, the Rules of Court provides that the plaintiff of the principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading the requirements as mandated under Section 5, Rule 7. The said requirements are mandatory, and therefore, strict compliance thereof is necessary for the proper administration of justice.


In the petition filed by the petitioners in the CA, the verification and the certification against forum shopping were signed the Teresa Gabriel alone, albeit there were 7 petitioners therein. In their Memorandum, they proffer the view that the signature of Teresa being the mother of the rest of the petitioners, should be considered as substantial compliance, for she was willing to take the risk of contempt and perjury should she be found lying. According to petitioners, what is fatal is the utter lack of signatory in the certification.

The SC has been consistent in stringently enforcing the requirement of verification and certification of non-forum shopping. when there is more than one petitioner, a petition signed solely by one of them is defective, unless he was authorized by his co-parties to represent them and to sign the certification. The attestation contained in the certification of non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.

In the instant case, the records are bereft of anything that would show that Teresa was authorized by the other petitioners to file the petition. In the certification against forum shopping, the principal party is required to certify under oath as to the matters contained therein and the failure to comply with the requirements shall not be curable by amendment but shall be a ground for the dismissal of the case. Personal knowledge of the party executing the same is important ans a similar requirement applies to the verification. Thus, the verification and certification signed only the Teresa are utterly defective, and it is within the prerogative of the court to dismiss the petition.

As aptly stated in Ortiz v. CA, substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict compliance. The attestation contained in the certification of non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.

On the second issue, the written explanation why another mode of service was resorted to is a mandatory and indispensable requirement in pleadings or papers filed before all the courts of the land. Parties must exert their best to effect personal service. The Rules of Court provides that personal service of petitions and other pleadings is the general rule, while resort to other modes of service and filing is the exception. Strictest compliance with Sec 11 of rule 13 is mandated by the Court, and noncompliance therewith is a ground for the denial of the petition or the expulsion of the pleading from the records.

As to the fourth issue, the probate court can rightfully take cognizance of the unpaid taxes of the estate of the deceased; if the estate is found liable, the probate court has the discretion to order the payment of the said taxes.

Finally, petitioners should bear in mind that the right to appeal is not a natural right or part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, ans may be exercised only in the manner ans in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the remedy of appeal must comply with the requirements of the rules; otherwise, the appeal is lost. Rules of procedure are required to be followed, except only when for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve the litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.

PEOPLE V. TUAZON (CRIMINAL, RAPE)

Article 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. by using force or intimidation;
2. xxx
3. when the woman is under 12 years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Moreover, Tuazon shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Section2 thereof provides that the law shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment. Although the law makes no reference to persons convicted to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua such as Tuazon herein, the Court has consistently held that the Indeterminate Sentence Law likewise does not apply to persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim who submits against her will tot her rapist's lust because of fear for her life or personal safety. Because of victim's youthfulness, coupled with the act that offender is her stepfather, it was easy for her to believe that offender would make good his threat to kill her should she resist.

The Court has acknowledged in several cases that the hesitance of the victim in reporting the crime to the authorities is not necessarily an indication of a fabricated charge. This is especially true when the delay can be attributed to the pattern of fear instilled by the threats of bodily harm made by a person who exercises moral ascendancy over the victim.

LACUROM V. JUDGE TIENZO (JUDICIAL CONDUCT, MEMORANDUM DECISIONS)

Indeed, as a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake committed by judges in the performance of their official duties renders them administratively liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, acts done in the ri official capacity, even though erroneous, do not always constitute misconduct.

Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption, or malice may be the subject of disciplinary actions. For administrative liability to attach, respondent judge must be shown to have moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other similar motive. Verify, judges may not be held administratively liable for any of their official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as they acted in good faith.

However, SC finds respondent judge administratively liable for decision in civil case 4884.

the memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. Simply put, the memorandum decision authorized under BP 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

It is obvious that the decision rendered by the respondent judge failed to conform to this requirement. The cryptic decision simply referenced the appealed decision of the MTCC and forthwith found the same as compliant with procedural due process under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Ineluctably, respondent judge transgressed the constitutional directive.

Although not every judicial error signifies ignorance of the law which warrants administrative sanction, this holds true only in instances of tolerable misjudgment. Where however, an elementary constitutional mandate is violated, the blunder constituted IGNORANCE OF THE LAW.

FELSAN REALTY V. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (CIVIL LAW, CONTRACTS)

Considering that the parties entered into a contract, it shall constitute the law between them. The agreement between the parties is the formal expression of the parties' rights, duties, and obligations. Being the primary law between the parties, it governs the adjudication of their rights and obligations. when the terms of the contract are clear and leave no room for interpretation, the literal meaning of its stipulations, shall, therefore, control.

A court has no alternative but to enforce the contractual stipulations in the manner they have been agreed upon and written, The petitioner was, therefore, bound to respect the decision of the respondent not to continue on with the lease. Absent any allegation that a stipulation is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, it must be complied with in good faith.

PARAISO V. CA (GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, CERTIORARI, ELEMENTS OF A CONTRACT)

For a writ of certiorari to issue, the applicant must show that the court or tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged order. GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION is defined as such CAPRICIOUS and WHIMSICAL EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so grave as where the power is exercised in an ARBITRARY or DESPOTIC manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to a evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by of to act at all in contemplation of law.

In the instant case, CA gravely abused its discretion in disapproving the compromise agreement for the simple reason that respondent did not comply with the CA's resolutions requiring it to explain the formal defects in the agreement.

To elucidate, the absence of a specific date does not adversely affect the agreement considering that the date of execution is not an essential element of a contract. A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is essentially a contract PERFECTED BY MERE CONSENT, the latter being manifested by the MEETING OF THE OFFER AND THE ACCEPTANCE upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.

The CA should have allowed greater laxity in scrutinizing the compromise agreement, not only because the absence of a specific date is a mere formal defect, but also because the signatories to the compromise indicated the date when they signed the agreement beside their signatures.

From the foregoing, our inevitable conclusion is that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it disapproved the compromise agreement. However, rather than remanding the case to the appellate court, which will only further delay the lengthy litigation that the parties wish to end, the SC chose to act directly in the matter. Thus, on the basis of our finding that the compromise agreement is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, and good customs, the Court hereby approves the same.

CAMITAN V. FIDELITY INVESTMENT (COUNSEL'S ACT BINDS CLIENT, TORRENS TITLE)

Every counsel has the implied authority to do all acts which are necessary or incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client. Any act performed by counsel within the scope if his general and implied authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded as the act of the client himself. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the client's counsel, which may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment, generally binds the client. To rule otherwise would encourage every defeated party, in order to salvage his case, to claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel. Then, there would be no end to litigation, as every shortcoming of counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client through another counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise be disowned by the same client through another counsel, and so on, ad infinitum.

This rule admits of EXCEPTIONS, i.e., where the counsel's mistake is so great and serious that without due process of law:

1. the client is deprived of his day in court; or
2. the client is deprived of his property.

In these cases, the client is not bound by his counsel's mistakes and the case may even be reopened in order to give the client another chance to present his case. In the case at bar, however, these exceptional circumstances do not obtain.

At this point, the SC reiterated the principle that possession of a lost owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. Registration of real property under the Torrens system does not create or vest title because it is not a more of acquiring ownership. The certificate of title by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over the particular property described therein.

MERALCO V. TEAM ELECTRONIC CORP (PD 401/RA 7832, CORP'S CLAIM OF MORAL DAMAGES)

The law in force at the time material to this controversy was PD 401. It penalized unauthorized installation of water, electrical, telephone connections and such acts as the use of tampered electrical meters. PD 401 granted the electrical companies the right to conduct inspections of electric meters and the criminal prosecution or erring customers who were found to have tampered with their electrical meters. It did not provide for more expedient remedies as the charging of differential billing and immediate disconnection against erring customers. Thus, electric companies found a creative way of availing themselves of such remedies by inserting into the service contracts a provision for differential billing with the option of disconnection upon non-payment by the erring customers. The Court has recognized the validity of such stipulations. However, recourse to differential billing with disconnection was subject to the prior requirement of a 48-hour written notice of disconnection.

MERALCO, in the instant case, resorted to the remedy of disconnection without prior notice. While it is true that MERALCO sent a demand letter to TEC for the payment of differential billing, it did not include any notice that the electric supply would be disconnected. In fine, it abused the remedies granted to it under PD 401 by outright depriving TEC of electric services without first notifying it of the impending disconnection.

SC deems it proper to delete the award of moral damages. TEC's claim was premised allegedly on the damage to its goodwill and reputation. As a rule, A CORPORATION IS NOT ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES BECAUSE, NOT BEING A NATURAL PERSON, IT CANNOT EXPERIENCE PHYSICAL SUFFERING OR SENTIMENTS like wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish, and moral shock. The only EXCEPTION to this rule is when the corporation has a reputation that is debased, resulting in its humiliation in the business realm. but in such a case, it is imperative for the claimant to present proof to justify the award. It is essential to prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to petitioner's acts. In the present case, the records are bereft of any evidence that the name or reputation of TEC/TPC has been debased as a result of petitioner's act. Besides, the trial court simply awarded moral damages in the dispositive portion of its decision without stating the basis thereof.

TAMAYO-REYES V. COMELEC (ELECTION LAW)

SC dismissed the petition.

It should be noted that what Tamayo-Reyes filed was a petition for correction of manifest errors and nullification of proclamation, which is a pre-proclamation controversy.

A PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition or political parties before the board or directly with the COMELEC, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of the election returns. It is limited to the examination of the election returns on their face and the COMELEC, as a general rule, need not go beyond the face of the returns and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate the alleged election irregularities.

Albeit it is regrettable that the COMELEC took 21 months from filing to resolve the case, it nonetheless acted correctly when it ordered the dismissal of the petition. It did not gravely abuse its discretion when it considered only 5 out of the 10 irregularities pointed out by Tamayo-Reyes as matters proper for correction of manifest errors. Applying the data proffered by Tamayo-Reyes herself, it turned out that private respondent would still emerge as the duly elected vice Mayor of Taytay Rizal.

The correction of manifest errors in the election returns, in the entries in the Statement of Votes by precinct per municipality or in the certificate of canvass. For errors to be manifest, they must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected., and objections thereto must have been made before the Board of Canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings. This Court defined "manifest" as evident to the eye and understanding; visible to the eye; that which is open, palpable, and incontrovertible; needing no evidence to make it more clear, not obscure, or hidden.

BENGUET STATE UNIVERSITY V. COA (CONSTI)

COA ruling is upheld.

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to things os a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of a statute which would repel such inference.

COA correctly rules that the "other programs/projects" under RA 8292 and its implementing rules should be of the same nature as instruction, research, and extension. In BSU's case, the disbursements were for rice subsidy and health care allowances which are in no way intended for academic programs similar to instruction, research, or extension. Section 4 cannot therefore, be relied upon by BSU as the legal basis for the grant of the allowances.

Further, a reading of the entire provision supports COA's interpretation that the authority given to the Governing Board of state universities and colleges is not plenary and absolute and is subject to limitations contrary to its claim.

Neither can BSU find solace in the academic freedom clause of the Constitution. Academic freedom as adverted to in the Constitution and in RA 8292 only encompasses the freedom of the institution of higher learning to determine for itself, on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. The guaranteed academic freedom does not grant an institution unbridled authority to disburse funds and grant additional benefits sans statutory basis. Unfortunately for BSU, it failed to present any sound legal basis that would justify the grant of these additional benefits to its employees.

Besides, RA 6758 or the Salary Standardization Law already provides for consolidation of allowances in the standardized salary rates.

As regards the refund of the disallowed benefits, this Court holds that the employees need not refund the benefits they received based on the ruling in Phil Ports Authority v. COA where COA disallowed the payment of hazard duty pay and birthday gifts to its employees for lack of legal basis. However, the Court ruled against refund holding that employees at that time had no knowledge that the payments of said benefits lacked legal basis. Being in good faith, they need not refund the benefits they received.

RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE - AM No. 06-11-5-SC (REMEDIAL)

Section 1. Scope
This Rule shall apply whenever DNA evidence is offered, used, or proposed to be offered or used as evidence in all criminal and civil actions as well as special proceedings.

Section 2. Application of other Rules on Evidence
In all matters not specifically covered by this Rule, the Rules of Court and other pertinent provisions of law on evidence shall apply.

Section 3. Definition of Terms'
e. DNA testing - means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of the information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of determining with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological samples originates from the same person (direct identification) or if the biological samples originate from related persons (kinship analysis).

f. Probability of parentage - means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of the putative father compared with the probability of a random match of the two unrelated individuals in a given population.

Section 4. Application for DNA Testing Order
The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties.

Section 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing
Post-conviction DNA testing may be available, with no need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final and executory judgment provided that
a. a biological sample exists;
b. such sample is relevant to the case; and
c. the testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the judgment of conviction.

Section 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing
Remedy if the Results are Favorable to the Convict - The convict or prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict. In the case the court, after due hearing finds the petition to be meritorious, it shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict, unless continued detention is justified for a lawful cause.

Section 11. Confidentiality
DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall e confidential. Except upon order of the court, a DNA profile and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing shall only be released to any of the following, under such terms and conditions as may be set forth by the court:

1. person from whom the sample was taken;
2. person from whom the sample was taken;
3. lawyers of private complainants in a criminal action;
4. duly authorized law enforcement agencies; and
5. other persons determined by the court.

Whoever discloses, utilizes, or publishes in any form any information concerning a DNA profile without the proper court order shall be liable for indirect contempt of the court wherein such DNA evidence was offered, presented, or sought to be offered and presented.

Where the person from whom the biological sample was taken files a written verified request to the court that allowed the DNA testing for the disclosure of the DNA profile of the person and all results or other information obtained from the DNA testing, the same may be disclosed to the persons named in the written verified request.

Section 13. Applicability to Pending Cases
Except as provided in Sections 6 and 10 hereof, this Rule shall apply to cases pending at the time of its effectivity.

Effective 15 October 2007

LUCASAN V. PDIC (CIVIL, REDEMPTION, PROPERTY)

To avail of the remedy of QUIETING OF TITLE, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely:

1. the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of action; and


2. the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown in fact invalid or inoperative despite it prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Stated simply, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal title or at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.

Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case. Lucasan admitted that he failed to redeem the property during the redemption period, on account of his ten limited financial situation. It was only 15 years later that he manifested his desire to reacquire the properties. Clearly thus, he had lost whatever right ha had over the lots.

The payment of loans made by Lucasan cannot in any way operate to restore whatever right he had over the subject properties. Such payment only extinguished his loan obligations to the mortgagee banks and the liens which Lucasan claimed were subsisting at the time of the registration of the notice of embargo and certification of sale.

Neither can Lucasan capitalize on PBC's failure to file a petition for consolidation of ownership after the expiration of the redemption period. with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the obligor's right to redeem ans that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that is already vested in the purchaser.

Certainly, Lucasan no longer possess any legal or equitable title to or interest over the subject parcels of land; hence, he cannot validly maintain an action for quieting of title.

PIL-EY V. PEOPLE (CRIMINAL)

Issue: WON based on the evidence on record, petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating provisions of PD 533, Anti-Cattle Rustling Law.

YES.
Conviction for cattle-rustling necessitates the concurrence of the following elements:

1. large cattle is taken;
2. it belongs to another;
3. the taking is done without the consent of the owner/raiser:
4. the taking is done by any means, method, or scheme;
5. the taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things.

Considering that the gravamen of the crime is the taking or killing or large cattle or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner or raiser, conviction for the same need only be supported by the fact of taking without the cattle owner's consent.

GOMA V. PAMPLONA PLANTATION (LABOR)

Article 280 of the Labor Code provides that there are two kinds of REGULAR EMPLOYEES, namely:

1. Regular employees by nature of work - Those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer (regardless of length of service); and
2. Regular employees by years of service - Those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed (regardless of nature of work).

If the law has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability, of that activity to the business.

Petitioner was engaged to perform carpentry work. His services were needed for a period of 2 years until such time that respondent decided not to give him work assignment anymore. Owing to his length of service, petitioner became a regular employee, by operation of law.

The principal test used to determine whether employees are PROJECT EMPLOYEES as distinguished from REGULAR EMPLOYEES, is whether or not the employees were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration or scope of which was specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project. In this case, apart from the respondent's bare allegation that petitioner was a project employee, it had not shown that petitioner was informed that he would be assigned to a specific project or undertaking. Neither was it established that he was informed of the duration and scope of such project or undertaking at the time of his engagement.

Well-settled is the rule that regular employees enjoy SECURITY OF TENURE and they can only be dismissed for just cause and with due process, i.e., after notice and hearing. In cases involving an employee's dismissal, the burden is on the employer to prove that the dismissal was legal. This burden was not amply discharged by the respondent in this case. The requirement of substantive due process was not complied with. In view of the non-observance of both substantive and procedural due process, petitioner's dismissal from employment is declared ILLEGAL.